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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article examines the role courts play under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act ("CERCLA")' in cleaning up releases of hazardous substances. Congress intended the courts to have an important role
in implementing the cleanup process-particularly in defining the
scope of liability for CERCLA cleanups. 2 But Congress also included a broadly-worded provision that forecloses federal judicial
review of CERCLA cleanups unless the review action falls within
several narrowly-defined exceptions.'
Notwithstanding the terms of the provision foreclosing review,
litigants have turned to the courts, asserting that immediate review
should be available in cases beyond those exceptional proceedings.
Those asserting a need for immediate review rely on a number of
theories grounded either in the language of CERCLA and its policies, or in the terms and policies of other statutes, or in the
Constitution. In response to these claims, courts have applied
CERCLA's categorical limits on review to particular cases with
greatly varying outcomes.
This Article considers the efforts by the courts to apply the
plain meaning of CERCLA section 113(h). After a brief overview
of CERCLA and section 113(h), 4 the Article explores the various
interpretive strategies courts have employed in applying this
"[t]iming of review ' '5 provision. The analysis begins with an "easy
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). CERCLA was amended by the Superfund Amend-

ments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA") of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613
(1986).
2. See generally Michael P. Healy, DirectLiabilityForHazardousSubstance Cleanups Under CERCLA: A Comprehensive Approach, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 65, 102-04
(1992) (discussing Congress's intention that courts develop rules of CERCLA liability on
the basis of evolving common law principles).
3. CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). This provision states that unless the

action falls within one of five categories specified in the statute,
[N]o Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law other than under
section 1332 of Title 28 (relating to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction) or under
State law ... to review any challenges to removal or remedial action selected

under section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued under section
9606(a) of this title ....

Id.
4. See infra part II.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).

HarvardEnvironmental Law Review

[Vol. 17:1

case" of review preclusion, in which there is little chance of establishing federal court jurisdiction. 6 This best case for review
preclusion occurs when judicial review will stop or slow a site's
cleanup, when the claimant is a potentially responsible party
("PRP") seeking judicial review to determine its liability under
CERCLA, and when that claimant presents no alternate statutory
or constitutional basis for review.
After discussing claims for which immediate review is plainly
foreclosed, the Article examines increasingly more difficult cases.
These cases become more difficult where early review (1) presents
no apparent threat to the policies of CERCLA; 7 (2) may affirmatively serve another important policy of CERCLA, such as ensuring the safety of individuals residing nearby the site; 8 or (3) may
ensure that the cleanup does not subvert important policies identified in other statutes. 9 In each of these circumstances, courts
may rely on interpretive strategies to distinguish the case from
CERCLA's express and categorical preclusion of review. Finally,
the Article considers cases seeking early judicial review where the
litigants claim that a CERCLA cleanup offends constitutional
rights.' 0 In this circumstance, courts have willingly allowed immediate judicial review, although many courts have failed to articulate an explicit rationale for this result. This Article proposes a
defensible rationale for these courts' conclusion.
Two issues will be central to this analysis and to the conclusions of this Article: (1) whether the language of the current review
preclusion provision can be construed fairly to permit the wide
variations that courts have established regarding the availability
of review; and (2) whether CERCLA needs to be amended to
allow judges greater discretion regarding the availability of review
in order candidly to address and accommodate the courts' legitimate concerns about the social costs of review preclusion. The
Article concludes that Congress should amend CERCLA to permit
preenforcement review in a limited number of circumstances discussed in Parts III, IV and V. Failure to amend CERCLA jeopardizes the implementation of its underlying policies and under6. See infra part III.A.
7. See infra part III.B.1.
8. See infra part III.B.2.
9. See infra part IV.
10. See infra part V.
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mines the legitimacy of the judiciary's good-faith efforts to
interpret the broad and categorical language of the review preclusion provision.

II.

OVERVIEW OF

CERCLA

AND SECTION

113(H)

Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to provide the United

States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") with "the tools
necessary for a prompt and effective response to problems of

national magnitude resulting from hazardous waste disposal."'"
CERCLA included substantial federal funding, which subsequent

legislation has increased, to allow the federal government to begin
cleanups at the sites of the "most significant releases of hazardous
substances.' 2 Congress has authorized a total of approximately
$15 billion to 13 date for the Hazardous Substance Superfund
("Superfund").

When it finds a release or threatened release' 4 of hazardous
substances, the government can pursue response actions 15 under
11. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn.
1982). The concerns about hazardous waste that gave rise to the substantial support for
CERCLA's enactment arose from "[sleveral well-publicized incidents of improper disposal
of large amounts of hazardous substances which caused serious public health problems."
Healy, supra note 2, at 68; see id. at 68-69 (describing incidents and Congress's awareness
of them). Congress enacted CERCLA because it thought the existing environmental laws
inadequate to address what it saw as a major national problem. See id. at 69 n.10.
12. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1980), reprinted in I SENATE
COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LiABILITY ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND), PUBLIC LAW 96-510, at 324-25 (Comm. Print 1983)
[hereinafter CERCLA HISTORY].
Congress intended that the Superfund would be used to provide seed money for
cleanups and would be replenished by recovering the costs of cleanup from parties identified
as liable for those costs under the Act. See Healy, supra note 2, at 75 & n.34; see also
infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text (discussing cost recovery actions brought under
42 U.S.C. § 9607).
13. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND: EPA COST
ESTIMATES ARE NOT RELIABLE OR TIMELY 1 (1992). In its 1990 Superfund Report, EPA
estimated that the program will actually cost $27.2 billion. Id. The General Accounting
Office thought that even EPA's figure was too low. Id. at 7. The language codified at 26
U.S.C. § 9507 (1988) establishes the Superfund.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) defines a "release" as any discharge of hazardous substances
into the environment, subject to several exceptions.
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (defining terms "respond" and "response").

6
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CERCLA as specified in section 104 of the Act.' 6 The response
actions CERCLA allows fall into two categories. The first is a

"removal action," which is a short-term response to a release

intended "to abate, prevent, minimize, stabilize, mitigate, or eliminate the release or the threat of release."' 7 Examples of removal

actions include the use of fences, warning signs, and other forms
of site control; the installation of drainage controls; the removal
of leaking drums; and the construction of caps over contaminated

soil to reduce migration of hazardous substances. 8 Because a
removal action allows for immediate abatement and CERCLA
limits the total amount of money that may be expended for removal,1 9 implementation does not require the prior completion of
20
a substantial administrative process.
'2
The second type of response action is a "remedial action." '
A remedial action consists of cleanup activities designed to achieve
a permanent remedy at the site. 22 Remedial actions can include
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9604. The EPA's blueprint for administering and implementing
response actions appears in the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan ("NCP"), 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1991). Section 105 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9605,
requires EPA to prepare the NCP after public notice and comment and identifies the issues
that the NCP must address.
17. 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(b)(1); see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (defining terms "remove"
and "removal").
18. 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(d).
19. CERCLA now imposes absolute limits of $2 million in money expenditures and
twelve months' time to pursue a removal action. These absolute limits arise when the
Superfund finances the removal action and the response action does not involve investigation and monitoring permitted under 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b). 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(b)(5).
20. A pre-removal planning process is required only when "a planning period of at
least six months exists before on-site activities must be initiated." 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(b)(4).
That pre-removal planning process, which results in an engineering evaluation/cost analysis
("EE/CA"), is limited in scope. See id. § 300.415(b)(4)(i)-(ii) (providing for lead agency's
"analysis of removal alternatives for a site," that may involve collection and analysis of
environmental samples). Public participation in this process primarily involves the opportunity to comment on the EE/CA. EPA must identify and describe the EE/CA to the public
in a major local newspaper. See id. § 300.415(m)(4). EPA must then prepare responses to
"significant" public comment. Id. § 300.415(m)(4)(iv).
For removal actions undertaken without a six-month planning period, EPA need not
prepare an EE/CA. Federal regulation limits public participation in this type of removal
action to comments on the removal action. The agency must make available to the public
a description of the removal action within "60 days after initiation of on-site removal
activity." Id. § 300.820(b)(1). After public comment on that document, the rules call for
EPA to prepare a response to the public's "significant comments." Id. § 300.415(m)(2).
21. CERCLA defines the terms "remedy" and "remedial action" in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(24).
22. A remedial action "prevent[s] or minimize[s] the release of hazardous substances
so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health
or welfare or the environment." Id.
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several of the approaches considered removal actions,23 as well as
the collection of leachate and runoff, the treatment or incineration

of hazardous substances at the site, and reasonable monitoring to
ensure the adequacy of the remediation effort.2 4 Significant public

health concerns related to ensuring a permanent remedy at the
26
site,25 combined with the substantial costs of a remedial action,
designing, and implementing a remake the process of funding,
27
medial action complex.
Remedial actions financed from the Superfund target the sites

that EPA has identified as posing the greatest risk to human health
23. For example, the statute states that a remedial action may involve "confinement,
... clay cover,... [and] repair or replacement of leaking containers." Id. These actions

may also qualify as removal actions. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). EPA has identified six basic "expectations [for use] in
developing appropriate remedial alternatives." 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(1)(iii).
25. When Congress added section 121 to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621, in 1986, it
stated that "remedial actions must assure protection of human health and the environment."
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3276, 3338. Congress's fundamental concern with the protection of human health also
appears in the Conference Committee's explanation of the cost-effectiveness requirement
included in § 121:
The term "cost-effective" means that in determining the appropriate level of
cleanup the President first determines the appropriate level of environmental
and health protection to be achieved and then selects a cost-efficient means of
achieving that goal. Only after the President determines . ..that adequate
protection of human health and the environment will be achieved, is it appropriate to consider cost effectiveness.
Id.
26. See Problems in ProgramManagement, FinancingMay Lead to CERCLA Rewrite, Panel Chairman Says, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1249 (1992) [hereinafter Problems in
Program Management] (quoting statement by Rep. Pickle, Chairman of the House Ways
and Means Subcommittee on Oversight, that "'the average cleanup cost at a superfund site
now run[s] at about $25 million"'); see generally, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND: EPA COST ESTIMATES ARE NOT RELIABLE OR TIMELY (1992).

27. This complexity may partly explain CERCLA's cumbersome process of remediation. CERCLA cleanups demand substantial effort; cleanups at individual sites progress
slowly. See E. Donald Elliot, Superfund: EPA Success, National Debacle?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1992, at 11, 12 ("The single most damning statistic about the
Superfund program is that it takes, on average, ten years to clean up each site, but only
about three years is actual on-site construction work!"); see also id. at 13 ("it takes seven
years and at least $4 million in transaction costs at each site to conduct the necessary
studies and design remedies before the final cleanup can begin."). The overall pace of
remediation of CERCLA sites has been similarly slow. A 1989 study indicates that, although
EPA expended more than $4 billion in pursuit of cleanups, it had accomplished final
remediation at only 43 sites. FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 642 (1990) (citing report by Clean Sites); see also Problems in

Program Management, supra note 26, (reporting statement by Rep. Pickle that "[o]nly 80
of the 1,200 sites on the Superfund National Priorites List have been cleaned up in 10 years
of program operation.").
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and the environment. 28 This limitation reflects Congress's understanding that priorities must be established because the Superfund
does not contain enough money to respond adequately to all cov-

29
ered releases of hazardous substances.
The design and selection of a remedial action, a process that
includes preparation of the Remedial Investigation and Feasibility
Study ("RIIFS") "to assess site conditions and evaluate alternatives to the extent necessary to select a remedy, '30 operates under
both procedural and substantive constraints. In 1986, Congress
amended CERCLA by adding section 117,31 which ensures the
public a substantial opportunity to participate in the selection and
design of the plan for remediation. 32 Section 117 requires that
before the pursuit of any remedial action, EPA must publish notice
of the proposed remediation plan and must make the full plan
available to the public. The public must then be afforded "a reasonable opportunity for submission of written and oral comments."33 CERCLA also requires public notice of the final remedial
action plan, which must also be available for review by the public.
28. The National Priorities List ("NPL") "is the list of priority releases for long-term
remedial evaluation and response." 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b). That list identifies sites that
pose the greatest threat to human health and the environment, as evaluated according to a
hazard ranking system or a priority determination by a state or EPA. See id. § 300.425(c);
see generally Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 822 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1987). As of 1991, the
NPL listed 1185 sites. See Lisa K. Friedman et al., Solid and HazardousWaste Committee
1991 Annual Report, 8 A.B.A. SEC. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY, & ENVTL. LAW: 1991
YEAR IN REVIEW 187, 199 (1992). EPA may pursue Superfund-financed remedial actions
only at sites listed on the NPL. 40 C.F.R, § 300.425(b)(1). Because Superfund plays the
primary role in funding remedial actions, the restriction that the Superfund finance remedial
actions only at NPL sites has greatly limited the number of sites eligible for a remedial
action. See Richard H. Mays, Who's Afraid of CERCLA § 106 Remedial Orders?,3 Toxics
L. Rep. (BNA) 1305, 1311 n.39 (1989) ("A 1988 study showed that, as of Sept. 30, 1987,
approximately 80 per cent of remedial investigations and feasibility studies, 70 per cent of
remedial designs, and 50 per cent of remedial actions were fund-financed." (citation
omitted)).
29. See supra note 12.
30. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(2); see generally id. (discussing RI/FS).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9617.
32. Congress intended that § 117 would encourage support within the community for
the cleanup. See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 65 (1986), reprintedin
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3188 ("[Ilncreased public participation will in the short term add
procedural steps to the decision-making process, but in the long term will expedite cleanup
progress and increase public understanding of and support for remedial actions undertaken
at Superfund sites."). CERCLA also provides funding for technical assistance grants to the
public to encourage well-informed and productive public participation. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9617(e); see also H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 58 (1986) ("Grants
would be available to help communities understand the proposal and allow them to comment
in a meaningful manner.").
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a).
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A discussion of significant changes from the proposed plan and
responses to any significant public comments on the proposed plan
must also accompany the final plan. 34 Finally, EPA must publish
an explanation of "any significant" differences between this final
remediation plan and any action "taken" or the terms of any

settlement.

35

The process of selecting and designing a remedial action prin-

cipally focuses on identifying a cleanup plan that will adequately
protect both human health and the environment. 36 This process
aims to ensure compliance with standards from other environmental statutes that are "legally applicable . . .or ... relevant and
appropriate under the circumstances" ("ARARs"). 37 CERCLA au-

thorizes and encourages "substantial and meaningful involvement"
by the states in this process in order to identify properly these
environmental standards. 38 CERCLA also grants the states a limited right to judicial review of an EPA decision that a remedy will
not have to conform to an environmental standard viewed as rel39

evant and appropriate by the state.
EPA, 40 states, 4 1 tribes, 42 or other persons 43 may pursue re-

moval and remedial actions. After any of these parties incurs a
34. Id. § 9617(b). Consistent with these formal procedural requirements, CERCLA
also requires the development of an administrative record regarding the selection of a
remedial action. Id. § 9613(k).
35. Id. § 9617(c).
36. See id. § 9621(d)(1). Congress added this provision to CERCLA in 1986 to codify
Congress's intent that "remedial actions must assure protection of human health and the
environment." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, supra note 25, at 245, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3338. See also supra note 25 (discussing Congress's intent that EPA
consider cost-effectiveness of remedial actions only after appropriate level of protection).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f)(1). See United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949
F.2d 1409, 1418 (6th Cir. 1991) ("CERCLA ...provides a substantial and meaningful role
for the individual states in the selection and development of remedial actions to be taken
within their jurisdictions.").
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f)(2)-(3); 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(f)(2). The remedial action
must be one "secured by EPA under CERCLA section 106." 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(f)(2).
Judicial review is "on the administrative record," and CERCLA requires that the remedial
action meet the ARARs desired by the State "if the State establishes ... that the finding
of the President was not supported by substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f)(2)(B).
40. Section 104 gives EPA the authority to respond to a release or a threat of a
release of hazardous substances by taking any "response measure consistent with the
national contingency plan which the President deems necessary to protect the public health
or welfare or the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
41. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.500.
42. The NCP prescribes conditions under which Indian tribes are "afforded substantially the same treatment as states under section 104 of CERCLA." Id. § 300.515(b).
43. Id. § 300.700(a) ("Any person may undertake a response action to reduce or
eliminate a release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.").
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response action expense, CERCLA allows that party to bring an

action under section 107(a)44 to recover the costs incurred in the
response action from those parties defined as responsible under
the Act. 45 Section 107(a) also defines the four classes of "person[s] ' ' 46

that may be liable for bearing the costs of a CERCLA

cleanup. 47 Responsible parties include present owners and opera-

tors of the facility or site,48 some past owners or operators,49
5l
generators,5 0 and transporters .
CERCLA also provides EPA with increased authority and

flexibility to respond to releases or threatened releases that may
pose "an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public

health orwelfare or the environment.

52

Most importantly, section

106 allows EPA to issue administrative orders compelling the pri-

vate cleanup of a facility.5 3 EPA may issue administrative orders

44. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
45. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c) outlines the § 107 cost-recovery action. This provision
also identifies the types of costs that may be recovered in such an action. When the United,
States, a state, or an Indian tribe incurs response costs, it may recover all costs "not
inconsistent with the NCP." 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(1). When other parties incur response
costs, they may recover all costs "consistent with the NCP" from the responsible parties.
Id. § 300.700(c)(2). Courts have construed this difference between the definitions of recoverable costs to create a presumption that costs incurred by the United States, a state, or a
tribe may be recovered. See County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1512 n.8 (10th
Cir. 1991) (explaining that "claims to recover government response costs [are] subject to a
lessened standard of proof"); United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 436 (D.N.J. 1991)
(stating that in cost-recovery action brought by government, "[d]efendants have the burden
of proving that response costs are inconsistent with the NCP" (citation omitted)). When a
private party brings a section 107(a) action to recover CERCLA response costs, that party
carries the affirmative burden of proving that the response costs incurred were consistent
with the NCP. See Tinney, 933 F.2d at 1512.
46. CERCLA defines "person" broadly to include corporations and commercial entities as well as individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
47. Id. § 9607(a). See generally Healy, supra note 2, for an analysis of difficulties
that arise in determining whether particular parties are liable for response costs under 42
U.S.C. § 9607.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1).
49. Id. § 9607(a)(2).
50. Id. § 9607(a)(3) (imposing liability on responsible parties who arranged for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances).
51. Id. § 9607(a)(4) (imposing liability on responsible parties who have transported
hazardous substances and selected disposal facility).
52. Id. § 9606(a).
53. See id. ("The President may . . . . after notice to the affected State, take other
action ... including ... issuing such orders as may be necessary to protect public health
and welfare and the environment"). See also EPA, GUIDANCE ON CERCLA SEC. 106(A)
UNILATERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS FOR REMEDIAL DESIGNS AND REMEDIAL ORDERS

(1990), reprintedin 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35,253 (1990). Section 106(a) also
authorizes the United States to sue in federal district court and "to secure such relief as
may be necessary to abate such danger or threat." 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
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to instigate a removal action or to force implementation of a remedial action it has selected.5 4 If the subject of the order fails to
perform the ordered actions, the government may recover fines55
and punitive damages of up to three times the amount of Superfund
moneys expended to perform the ordered cleanup. 5 6 Once EPA
issues a section 106 order and the subject of the order fails to take
the required actions, EPA may bring an action to enforce the
order 7 or EPA may itself proceed with the response action and
seek damages for the violation of the order in its action to recover
58
the response costs.
Private parties also may bring actions under section 310 of
CERCLA claiming that the United States or any person is violating
CERCLA or that an officer of the United States has failed to
perform a nondiscretionary duty under CERCLA.5 9 These citizens
suits,60 as well as all other litigation that requires a federal court
"to review any challenges to removal or remedial action selected
under section 9604 . . . , or to review any order issued under
section 9606(a)," must satisfy a critical limit on the "[t]iming of
review."' 6' This "unusual provision," 62 added to the Act by SARA
in 1986,63 bars federal court jurisdiction "under Federal law other
than under section 1332 of Title 28 (relating to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction)" to review the citizens suit challenges identified
above, unless it is brought in one of the five specific CERCLA
proceedings that the statute identifies. 64 The rest of this Article
addresses the meaning and effect of section 113's categorical and
substantial limitation on federal court jurisdiction.
54. See Akzo Coatings of Am., 949 F.2d at 1417-18.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (authorizing award of fines of up to $25,000 per day against
"[alny person who, without sufficient cause, willfully violates, or fails or refuses to comply
with" a section 106 order).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (authorizing recovery of punitive damages from a party
liable for response costs under section 107 who, "without sufficient cause," fails to comply
with a section 106 order).
57. See id. § 9606(b)(1).
58. See id. § 9607(c)(3).
59. Id. § 9659(a).
60. See id.
61. Id. § 9613(h).
62, North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 1991). Although this
type of provision may be unusual, it is certainly not unique. See, e.g., Department of the
Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121,
§ 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. 701, 747 (1989) (foreclosing judicial review of defined guidelines
related to timber harvesting).
63. SARA § 113(h), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).

64. Id. § 9613(h)(1)-(5).
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CERCLA CLAIMS

A. Attempts to Litigate the Liability Issue Priorto Completion
of the Cleanup: Is Review Foreclosed in the Easy Case?
Given the terms of Section 113(h) and the structure and purposes of CERCLA, 65 one would expect that federal court jurisdiction would be most plainly foreclosed when, prior to completion
of a government cleanup and a government action to recover
response costs, a party potentially responsible for CERCLA response costs under section 10766 seeks to litigate either the existence of or the extent of liability for response costs. This type of
claim may be raised in several contexts: a PRP might seek a
declaratory judgment that it is not liable for an ongoing cleanup;67
a PRP might seek to enjoin EPA from proceeding with a response
action under section 104, because the response action is viewed
as too costly; 68 or a recipient of a section 106 administrative order
might chhtllenge the order on the grounds that the party is not liable
69
under CERCLA for response costs.
Preclusion of review of PRP claims would be expected in these
circumstances because the statute expressly identifies the pro65. Id. § 9613(h). An overyiew of CERCLA and its purposes is presented snpra
notes 11-64 and accompanying text.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
67. See Apache Powder Co. v. United States, 738 F. Supp. 1291, 1292 (D.Ariz.
1990); Reardon v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 558, 559 (D.Mass. 1990) ("Reardon 1'),
rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc) ("Reardon IX').
68. See Dickerson v. Administrator, EPA 834 F.2d 974, 978 (11th Cir. 1987); Lone
Pine Steering Comm. v. United States EPA, 777 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1115 (1986); Cooper Indus. v. EPA, 775 F. Supp. 1027, 1036 (W.D. Mich. 1991). This
may be the most common circumstance in which a PRP would want to gain early review
of an EPA response action. In these cases the PRP may itself have proposed to EPA an
alternative plan for cleanup that the PRP believes to be more cost effective. See, e.g.,
Lone Pine Steering Comm., 777 F.2d at 883-84.
69. See Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. EPA, 812 F.2d 383, 385 (8th Cir. 1987); Wagner
Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 1986). No definitive ruling exists on whether
a person must be a responsible party under 42 U.S.C. § 9607 in order to be the subject of
a § 106 order, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). See Healy, supra note 2, at 70 n.14.
A PRP might also seek to litigate CERCLA liability issues prior to a cost recovery
action and completion of the response action if EPA asks a federal court to issue an order
in aid of access to a site under section 104(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e). In such cases the
defendant may try to oppose the requested order on the ground that the planned response
action is not cost effective and will result in too expansive liability for the defendant. See
United States v. M. Genzale Plating, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 877, 885 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); United
States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 682 F. Supp. 1260, 1266 (D. Mass. 1988).
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ceedings in which PRPs may litigate issues related to liability70 and
requires that such claims await enforcement action by the government. 7' Moreover, in enacting section 113(h) Congress sought to
"confirm[] and build[] upon existing case law" 72 that had identified
limits on the availability of judicial review prior to government
enforcement actions. As a summary of this pre-SARA, review
preclusion case law demonstrates, Congress clearly intended section 113(h) to foreclose review of CERCLA liability issues prior

to government enforcement.
The first federal appellate decision to address the issue of
preenforcement review under CERCLA was J.V. Peters & Co. v.
Administrato, EPA. 73 There, EPA had tried to negotiate with the
claimants to clean up an Ohio site containing substantial amounts
of hazardous substances. 74 When the parties failed to reach an
agreement, EPA decided to exercise section 104 authority 75 and
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1)-(5).
71. See id. § 9613(h)(1)-(3). This construction of the statute's terms receives additional strength from SARA's legislative history. See 132 CONG. REC. S14,929 (daily ed.
Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) ("Citizens, including potentially responsible
parties, cannot seek review of the response action or their potential liability for a response
action--other than in an action for contribution-unless the suit falls within one of the
categories provided in this section."); 132 CONG. REC. H9609 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986)
(statement of Rep. Roe) ("When the essence of a lawsuit involves contesting the liability
of the plaintiff for cleanup costs, the courts should apply the other provisions of section
113(h), which require such plaintiff to wait until the Government has filed a suit under
sections 106 or 107 to seek review of the liability issue."). See also H.R. REP. No. 253,
99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 266-67 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 294142 (separate and dissenting views of Rep. Florio and nine other Representatives):
The purpose of the [committee amendment foreclosing review except under
limited circumstances] is to prevent private responsible parties from filing
dilatory, interim lawsuits which have the effect of slowing down or preventing
EPA's cleanup activities. By limiting court challenges to the point in time when
the agency has decided to enforce the liability of such private responsible
parties, the amendment will ensure both that effective cleanup is not derailed
and that private responsible parties get their full day in court to challenge the
agency's determination that they are liable for cleanup costs.
Id. The importance of legislative history to a court's interpretation of a statute is discussed
itfra at note 109.
72. 132 CONG. REC. S14,928 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
See Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1387-88 (5th Cir. 1989)
("Section 113(h) . . .codified earlier case law limitations on 'pre-enforcement' review of
remedial and removal actions."); Reardon 1, 731 F. Supp. at 564 ("Section 113(h), enacted
as part of the SARA amendments, codified this prior case law prohibiting the pre-enforcement review of EPA cleanup actions.").
73. 767 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1985).
74. See id. at 264.
75. For a discussion of the cleanup authority granted to EPA under CERCLA § 104,
see supra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
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proceed with its own response action. 76 The plaintiffs thereafter
sought an injunction in federal court, asserting that because they
would become liable for response costs once EPA had undertaken
the cleanup, they needed an immediate hearing or they would be
77
without an adequate remedy.
In affirming the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs'
claim, the court of appeals presented two reasons that CERCLA
barred the preenforcement review being sought by the plaintiffs,
even without an express provision. First, the court concluded that
"[b]ecause the Act's primary purpose is the prompt cleanup of
hazardous waste sites," permitting the immediate review sought78
by the plaintiffs "would debilitate the central function of the Act.
Second, the court concluded that immediate review would not be
available because the cost recovery action under section 107, during which the existence and scope of the plaintiffs' CERCLA
liability would be adjudicated, was an adequate legal remedy. 79 In
short, preenforcement review was barred because it would slow
cleanups and was unnecessary to ensure adequate judicial review.
Immediately after the Sixth Circuit decision in J.V. Peters,
the Third Circuit followed suit in Lone Pine Steering Comm. v.
United States EPA, 80 holding that CERCLA barred preenforcement review of liability claims. The principal claimant, a committee of six PRPs allegedly responsible for the costs of cleaning up
substantial amounts of hazardous substances at the Lone Pine
Land Fill in New Jersey,8 ' sought a declaratory judgment that the
remedial action EPA selected was too costly and otherwise was

76. See J.V. Peters, 767 F.2d at 264.
77. See id.
78. See id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). Unwilling to read CERCLA

as implying a cause of action for review of a response action prior to an EPA enforcement
action, the court held that judicial review would be available only if permitted under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988). J.V. Peters,
767 F.2d at 264.
79. Because the "agency decision to take a response action" under 42 U.S.C. § 9604
was therefore not a "final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in a court,"
5 U.S.C. § 704, review was unavailable under the APA. J.V. Peters, 767 F.2d at 266. The
court supported this decision in part by identifying the requirement in the NCP that EPA
conduct response actions in a cost-effective manner. CERCLA § 105(7), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605(7). The plaintiffs would therefore not be liable for any response costs that they
could show were inconsistent with the NCP. See supra note 45.
80. 777 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986).
81. Id. at 883. The individual corporations comprising the Committee also were
plaintiffs in the action. Id. at 884.
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unlawful under CERCLA. 82 The court of appeals affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the action because "delay[ing] remedial
action until the liability situation is unscrambled would be inconsistent with the statutory plan to promptly eliminate the sources
'83
of danger to health and environment.
The strong CERCLA policy of ensuring prompt cleanups led
the court to conclude that the statute implicitly forecloses early

review of liability-not only when the response action involves
emergency removals, but also when EPA pursues a long-term

remedial action. 84 The court also did not want judicial review
availability to turn on whether preenforcement review in a particular case would slow the cleanup, and held that the facts of a
particular case should not determine jurisdiction. 85 Finally, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that its remedy would be

inadequate if the court delayed review until the government had
82. See id. The plaintiffs brought this action one month after EPA signed the Record
of Decision ("ROD") adopting a cleanup plan. See id.
Following its selection of the plan for remedial action, EPA provided 142 PRPs with
written notice that they could undertake the proposed remedial action and that, if the PRPs
did not pursue the cleanup, EPA would proceed with the remedy using federal money. The
Committee responded to EPA by urging a less costly plan, which could serve as the basis
for a settlement. Shortly thereafter, an EPA official signed the ROD adopting the EPA
remedial alternative and this lawsuit followed. See id.
83. Id. at 886. The district court had- also concluded that preenforcement review of
the claims related to CERCLA liability "'would frustrate Congress' intent to provide a
mechanism whereby hazardous sites can be neutralized expeditiously."' Id. at 884 (quoting
district court decision).
The court of appeals viewed Congress's decision to defer judicial review as permissible when acting to protect public health and safety: "[A] statute, at least in a public health
area, may prohibit pre-enforcement judicial review." Id. at 886. See id. at 885-86 (discussing
other examples of delaying review to promote public health and safety).
84. See id. at 887.
85. See id. at 886. The plaintiffs had argued that judicial review of their claims would
not slow the cleanup of the site. See id. Nevertheless, the court worried that a reviewing
court would be required to monitor implementation of the remedy, if it granted review prior
to enforcement action by the government. See id.
Consistent with its view that jurisdiction over a preenforcement claim should not
turn on the specific underlying facts, the Third Circuit rejected another attempt to gain
early review of a CERCLA claim in Wheaton Indus. v. EPA, 781 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1986).
The plaintiff brought that action seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction against
spending Superfund money, after negotiations with the state to design and implement a
remedial plan had broken down and the state and EPA had agreed on the use of Superfund
money to complete the RIIFS. Id. at 355-56. The plaintiff in Wheaton argued that it sought
review only of EPA's refusal to allow the plaintiff to perform the RI/FS, and thus should
be distinguished from Lone Pine. The Third Circuit rejected this distinction because, in
both cases, "the plaintiff sought control of an activity that is a necessary component of
remedial actions and based the substantive claim on Section 104 of CERCLA." Wheaton,
781 F.2d at 356. Thus, both of the plaintiffs threatened EPA's ability to administer CERCLA
cleanups promptly.
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completed its cleanup and had sought to recover its response
6
costs.

8

In Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett,87 the Second Circuit also held
that CERCLA foreclosed preenforcement review of EPA's hazardous substance cleanup efforts. The Wagner Seed plaintiff
owned a warehouse storing agricultural chemicals. Lightning
struck the warehouse, causing a fire that totally destroyed the
building, as well as water runoff that carried toxic chemicals onto
surrounding properties. 88 After the plaintiff conducted an initial
cleanup, EPA decided that additional cleanup measures were necessary and accordingly issued a section 106 order to the plaintiff,
indicating that the site posed an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health and the environment, and requiring plans
to eliminate contamination completely.8 9
The plaintiff's district court action alleged that Wagner Seed
was not properly subject to the section 106 order because the
release of hazardous substances was caused by "an act of God,"90
and that it therefore was not liable for response costs under section
107. 91 Relying on the prior cases that had rejected attempts to gain
early review of CERCLA liability issues, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court decision and dismissed the CERCLA
claims:
These courts believe that Congress envisioned a procedure that
permits the EPA to move expeditiously in the face of a potential
environmental disaster. To introduce the delay of court proceedings at the outset of a cleanup would conflict with the
strong congressional policy that directs cleanups to occur prior
to a final determination of the partys' [sic] rights and liabilities
under CERCLA. These policy concerns extend across the
86. The plaintiffs in Lone Pine had argued that they would be unable to show in an

action brought after completion of the government's cleanup that "the response action was
excessive. If the EPA's remedial action is effective, plaintiffs will not be able to demonstrate
that their less comprehensive proposal would also have been adequate to the task. To that
extent, the remedial measures would destroy the evidence which plaintiffs require." Lone
Pine, 777 F.2d at 885. The Third Circuit believed that CERCLA provided sufficient costrecovery action review: "The courts are not unaware of bureaucratic excesses and will
undoubtedly look carefully at the claims made by the government when suit for reimbursement is brought under § 9607." Id. at 887.
87. 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986).
88. Id. at 313.

89. Id.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1).
91. See Wagner Seed, 800 F.2d at 313.
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spectrum of possible EPA responses including the response
taken here--ordering a private party to remedy a chemical spill
..

.

.The district court lacks jurisdiction to consider the ap-

propriateness of appellant's act of God defense. 92

As these cases show, prior to the enactment of CERCLA's
timing of review provision in 1986, the courts had uniformly concluded that allowing preenforcement review of CERCLA liability
issues would be inconsistent with Congress's intent for prompt,
undelayed cleanups of hazardous substances.
PRPs may assert two significant interests to support early
judicial review of their CERCLA liability claims, notwithstanding
the compelling argument that, based on codification of the results
in the above cases, section 113(h) bars district court jurisdiction
to consider CERCLA liability issues before enforcement. First, a
PRP will probably argue that, by proceeding with the cleanup
under section 104 or by promulgating the section 106 order, EPA
has placed the PRP in a situation of immediate and likely longterm economic harm that will not be alleviated until a court determines the existence and scope of CERCLA liability. 93 Second, a
PRP will likely contend that the post-cleanup proceedings, in
which liability issues otherwise will be adjudicated, 94 come too late
because post-response costs will be higher than they would have
95
been had review preceded the cleanup.
96
Judge Posner has articulated the latter concern in dicta.
Specifically, Judge Posner worried that, because the statute pre92. Id. at 315.
93. See Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1518 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(explaining that imposition of CERCLA lien had effect of "clouding title, limiting aliena-

bility, affecting current and potential mortgages") ("Reardon IF'); Voluntary Purchasing
Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1390 n.18 (5th Cir. 1989) ("We realize that the inability
of a PRP to initiate a proceeding to resolve the existence and amount of its liability may
result in a material adverse impact on some aspects of a PRP's ability to conduct its
business (e.g., obtaining credit)"); see also Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pintlar Corp.,
948 F.2d 1507, 1516-17 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that PRP notice letter carries immediate and
severe implications for PRP and should accordingly be viewed as effective commencement
of litigation necessitating legal defense).

94. See CERCLA § 113(h)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(l)-(4). Section 113(h)(1) most
often identifies this type of proceeding-a cost recovery action brought by the government

under CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
95. The plaintiff in Lone Pine presented exactly this interest. See supra note 86. The

Third Circuit nevertheless held that early review was unavailable and appeared to reject
the argument that delayed review would necessarily be inadequate. Lone Pine Steering
Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1985).

96. North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 1991). As Judge
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cisely identifies the proceedings in which the issue of the cost
effectiveness of a cleanup may be litigated, 97 some litigants may
never be able to adjudicate whether certain cleanup costs should
have been expended, and consequently they may be forced to bear
unnecessary costs. 98
Given these concerns about the effects of delaying review of
PRP liability claims, we consider whether stress points in the
statutory scheme would allow immediate judicial review in situations where the PRP seeking to litigate liability issues suffers substantially because the CERCLA liability issues will remain unresolved for long periods of time or because post-cleanup review
will be inadequate. Three such stress points provide the basic
interpretive strategies for judicial responses to section 113(h)'s
broadly preclusive language.
1. The Definition of Removal and Remedial Action

Section 113(h) by its terms limits review only of "challenges
to removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this
Posner recognized, his discussion is dictum both because the claimant in North Shore Gas
only raised claims under other statutes to which the claimant had no standing, see id. at
1244, and because the case did not raise a CERCLA claim that could not be reviewed
adequately if review were delayed, see id. at 1245.
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(I)-(5).
98. In North Shore Gas, Judge Posner considered an unusual situation in which two
adjacent Superfund sites partly overlapped. EPA held Outboard Marine Corporation responsible for pursuing the cleanup at one of the sites and ordered North Shore Gas to clean
up the second site. See North Shore Gas, 930 F.2d at 1241. Outboard Marine's remedial
plan involved the construction of a boat slip where the two sites overlapped. North Shore
Gas argued that construction of the slip would substantially increase the cost of clean up
at the site for which North Shore Gas was responsible. See id.
Judge Posner considered § 113(h)'s impact if North Shore Gas had contended that
the cleanup plan being pursued by Outboard Marine violated CERCLA, and review of that
claim had to be delayed until the cleanup was complete. See id. at 1244-45. Examining the
post-cleanup remedies that might be available to a PRP in North Shore's position, Judge
Posner first discussed a contribution action under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B), which is
permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1), and declared this action inadequate because its effect
would be limited. See North Shore Gas, 930 F.2d at 1244. The action also would result in
only the sharing of the costs of an improperly required remedial action. "Such a suit would
not rectify the error, but merely change the victim." Id.
Then Judge Posner discussed an action by North Shore Gas against EPA for the
reimbursement of improperly incurred costs. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(D) and
the exception to the judicial review bar in 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(3)). Judge Posner questioned
the adequacy of this delayed relief as well: "The rub is that the statute as worded envisages
a suit by the person [Outboard Marine] to whom the remedial order was addressed." 930
F.2d at 1244. Judge Posner suggested finally that the solution to this quandary might be to
hold that the arbitrary character of the order to Outboard Marine resulted in an arbitrary
order to North Shore Gas. Id. at 1245. Although "the breadth of section 113(h) is troublesome," the court did not have to resolve these knotty problems because North Shore Gas
had only raised claims under other statutes. Id.
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title." 99 A court's decision whether to foreclose immediate review
therefore depends upon whether the PRP is challenging a "removal

or remedial action."100 Those terms, broadly defined in section
101,101 specifically include "enforcement activities related to" the
response action. 02
The most detailed judicial analysis of CERCLA's definitions
of removal and remedial action is contained in the First Circuit's
en banc decision in Reardon v. United States ("Reardon I1").103
There, the plaintiff sought to challenge EPA's placement of a

99. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).
100. Because § 113(h) also severely limits judicial review of challenges to "any order
issued under section 9606(a) of this title," 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), a court must also determine
whether a party's claim is foreclosed because it challenges the issuance of an order under
§ 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606. See Pollution Control Indus. of Am. v. Reilly, 715 F. Supp. 219,
221 (N.D. Ill.
1989). There, EPA had issued a section 106 order requiring the plaintiff to
perform an emergency removal action at a site the plaintiff owned. Id. at 220. After the
plaintiff notified EPA of the contractor it desired to use for the response action, EPA issued
an order disqualifying the contractor because of its involvement in a prior fraud case. Id.
The plaintiff then filed the action in question, seeking a preliminary injunction to bar EPA
from enforcing the disqualification order. Id. The court held that § 113(h) barred the action
because the disqualification order was issued pursuant to EPA's "broad" authority under
§ 106. See id. at 220-21. The court concluded, moreover, that "[t]o allow plaintiffs to enjoin
the EPA's disqualification order would in effect permit them to utilize ajudicial mechanism
by which to promulgate 0 delay. This would frustrate the very policy underlying section
113(h) ..... Id. at 221.
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (defining terms "remove" and "removal"); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(24) (defining terms "remedy" and "remedial action").
102. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) provides that "the terms 'respond' or 'response' means
[sic] remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action;, [sic] all such terms (including the
terms 'removal' and 'remedial action') include enforcement activities related thereto."
In Reardon H, 947 F.2d at 1514, the court stated that, to the extent § 101(25) had
the effect of expanding the scope of review preclusion under § 113(h), the result was an
"inadvertentOl rather than purposeful[ ]"action by Congress. Id. at 1514. The court viewed
the expanded definition included in § 101(25) as intended to ensure that the government
could recover the costs of enforcement actions brought against responsible parties. Id. at
1514 (citing relevant legislative history). The dissent in Reardon H disagreed strongly with
the court's reliance on this legislative history in deciding that a lien was -an enforcement
activity related to the response action and, therefore, could not be challenged prior to EPA
enforcement. See id. at 1525 n.6 (Cyr, J., dissenting).
The court held, however, that even if Congress had no specific intent to expand the
scope of review preclusion in § 113(h), the court was bound to apply the statute's definition
uniformly. Id. at 1514. This is a well accepted rule of statutory construction. See Estate of
Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 2589, 2596 (1992) (identifying "basic canon of
statutory construction that identical terms within an Act bear the same meaning" (citations
omitted)); Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2251 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("consistency of usage within the same statute is to be presumed"). But see Nicklos Drilling
Co., 112 S.Ct. at 2607 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("'It is not unusual for the same word
to be used with different meanings in the same act, and there is no rule of statutory
construction which precludes the courts from giving to the word the meaning which the
legislature intended ....' (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286
U.S. 427, 433 (1932))).
103. 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991).
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CERCLA lien on the plaintiff's property. ) 4 The court first consid-

ered whether section 113(h) barred judicial review of the statutory
claims that the Reardons had raised in challenging the legality of
the lien. 0 5 Consistent with the generally accepted starting point
for statutory analysis,' 10 6 the court considered the plain and ordi104. The CERCLA lien had been imposed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(/)(1), which
states that:
All costs and damages for which a person is liable to the United States under
[42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)-the CERCLA liability provision] ... shall constitute a
lien in favor of the United States upon all real property and rights to such
property which(A) belong to such person; and
(B) are subject to or affected by a removal or remedial action.
Id. The lien arises as a matter of law under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l)(2) and "continue[s] until
the liability for the costs (or a judgment against the person arising out of such liability) is
satisfied or becomes unenforceable" as a result of the statute of limitations provided in 42
U.S.C. § 9613(g). 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l)(2).
105. See Reardon 11, 947 F.2d at 1512-14. The claimants argued that EPA had
violated CERCLA in imposing a lien because the plaintiffs were innocent purchasers of
property under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35), and therefore were not liable for § 107 response costs.
See 947 F.2d at 1511; 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). They also contended that the lien violated the
terms of the lien provision because it covered too much property. See 947 F.2d at 1511; 42
U.S.C. § 9607(l)(1) (quoted supra note 104).
106. See Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S.Ct. at 2594 ("In a statutory construction case,
the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with
clarity to an issue, judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance is finished." (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Ron Pair
Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). This fundamental approach to statutory construction
reflects a basic understanding that the governed should have fair notice of the laws that
apply to them. See, e.g., CASs R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 114 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,

Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV.321, 339 (1990); Robert
Weisberg, The CalabresianJudicialArtist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN.
'L. REV. 213, 233 (1983).

The plain meaning approach also receives strong support from the constitutional
structure, which assigns Congress the power to legislate. See SUNSTEIN, supra, at 113;
Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretationand Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281,
283 (1989). Placing principal reliance on the terms of the statute also serves political process
values by encouraging enforcement of the choices elected representatives made on behalf
of the public. See A. Michael Froomkin, Climbing the Most Dangerous Branch: Legisprudence and the New Legal Process, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1071, 1087 (1988); Eskridge &
Frickey, supra, at 356. See also Felix Frankfurter, Foreword-A Symposium on Statutory
Construction, 3 VAND. L. REV. 365, 368 (1950) (arguing reliance on statute's text will
promote more care in drafting statutes). Finally, reliance by a court on plain meaning may
be important to the court's own institutional interest because it provides "a way in which
people with potentially divergent views and potentially divergent understandings of what
the context would require may still be able to agree about what the language they all share
requires." Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the CoordinatingFunction of
PlainMeaning, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 231, 254.
These generally recognized values of a plain meaning rule of interpretation for courts
have not foreclosed substantial controversy about how courts actually should apply the
rule. For example, many judges and scholars would agree that "[d]eference to plain meaning
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nary meaning of the terms used in section 113(h) and concluded
that "the activity of filing liens is, in ordinary language, an 'en'0 7
forcement activity.""
This linguistics-based rationale closely relates to the functional approach that several other courts have relied upon to give
greater substance to the meaning of CERCLA's terms.108 Reliance
upon the functional approach requires courts to look beyond the

plain terms of CERCLA and to consider as well Congress's reasons for carefully limiting the availability of judicial review. 0 9
requires examination of more than an isolated word." William D. Popkin, The Collaborative
Model of Statutory Interpretation,61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 592 (1988). This view of plain
meaning appears sensible "because it is impossible to make sense of statutory language
without some context." Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-inthe Classroomand
in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 808 (1983). Commentators are less likely to
agree, however, on how courts should properly identify the "context" within which to
understand the statute's terms. Compare id. ("Of course the words of a statute are always
relevant, often decisive, and usually the most important evidence of what the statute was
meant to accomplish.") with Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use ofLegislative
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 199 (1983) ("In the context
of the statute, other related statutes, or the problems giving rise.to the statute, words may
be capable of many different meanings, and the literal meaning may be inapplicable or
nonsensical.").
Indeed, flexibility in the application of the plain meaning rule has caused Chief Judge
Wald to claim that the rule no longer has any real force. See id. at 195 ("[Allthough the
[Supreme] Court still refers to the 'plain meaning' rule, the rule has effectively been laid
to rest. No occasion for statutory construction now exists when the Court will not look at
the legislative history." (footnote omitted)).
Despite claims that the plain meaning rule no longer exists or that it cannot be applied
in a coherent manner, however, the rule continues to influence theories of statutory construction. Reference to a statute's language substantially defines negative theories of statutory interpretation. See William N. Eskridge, Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO.
L.J. 319, 333; see also id. at 331. Even for scholars who are not strict textualists, the text
of the statute-the alpha in the "hierarchy of sources"--is the important, occasionally
decisive starting point. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra, at 353 (beginning "Practical Reasoning Model Of Statutory Interpretation" with "Most Concrete Inquiry," the "Statutory
Text"). Like this practical reasoning model, Popkin's collaborative model of statutory
construction likewise relies on plain meaning. See Popkin, supra, at 595; cf. SUNSTEIN,
supra, at 114 ("[The words of a statute provide the foundation for interpretation, and those
words, together with widely shared conventions about how they should be understood,
often lead to uniquely right answers, or at least sharply constrain the territory of legitimate
disagreement."). Although authorities differ on the weight that should be given to a statute's
plain meaning, the text of a statute remains a fundamental source for its interpretation.
107. Reardon II, 947 F.2d at 1512-13. The court also stated in this regard that "[w]hen
the government files a lien on property to secure payment of that [CERCLA] liability, it
can reasonably be described as seeking to enforce the liability provision." Id.
108. Decisions employing the functional approach are discussed infra at notes 110111 and accompanying text.
109. This is a well-accepted next step for courts seeking to understand the meaning
of statutory terms or to strengthen the construction that they have given to the statute.
The approach involves reference to and reliance upon extrinsic evidence of a statute's
meaning, evidence that most often comes from legislative history. See, e.g., Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 106, at 356; SUNSTEIN, supra note 106, at 128. Judge Easterbrook has
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Courts have found two purposes of the review preclusion provision

important in defining the meaning of the terms "removal" and
"remedial actions": the prevention of delays in cleanups" ° and the
avoidance of piecemeal review of CERCLA cleanups."' Based
upon these purposes, courts have identified several tests for determining whether section 113(h) bars immediate review. Courts
have held that a plaintiff challenges a removal or remedial action
(1) when the contested action constitutes part of the response
action and "is reasonably related to the [cleanup] plan's objeccriticized this general style of statutory construction first because it places too much
lawmaking power in the undemocratic judiciary. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of
OriginalIntent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 59, 62 (1988) ("The
use of original intent rather than an objective inquiry into the reasonable import of the
language permits a series of moves. Each move greatly increases the discretion, and
therefore the power, of the court."). He also claims that the method is flawed because,
given the insights of public choice theorists, it "ignores the fact that laws are born of
compromise" by favoring one side of the compromise at the expense of the other. Id. at
63.
Commentators generally distinguish between judicial reliance on "intent" and on
"purpose" in construing statutes. Professor Dickerson has explained the basic distinction
as follows: "in general legal usage the word 'intent' coincides with the particular immediate
purpose that the statute is intended to directly express and immediately accomplish,
whereas the word 'purpose' refers primarily to an ulterior purpose that the legislature
intends the statute to accomplish or help to accomplish." REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 88 (1975). Construing a statute according to
its general purpose has been subjected to stronger criticism than judicial reliance on the
typically narrower intent of a legislative provision, because of the difficulty of discerning
a statute's purpose and the consequent likelihood that a court may infer its own purposes
from a statute. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 106, at 137-38. Courts may also find
discerning the legislature's (narrower) intent from the extrinsic source of legislative history
difficult, because evidence of legislative intent in the legislative history may itself be
ambiguous. See Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1096 n.4 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating, in a
discussion of the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) review foreclosure, that "[b]oth sides support
their interpretation of the statute with lengthy quotations from senators and congressmen
trying to put their spin on the statute's interpretation; these contradictory explanations
further demonstrate the dangers ofjudicial reliance on legislative history instead of statutory
text." (citations omitted)).
110. See North Shore Gas v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[tjhe purpose
of section 113(h) is to prevent litigation from delaying remediation"); Schalk v. Reilly, 900
F.2d at 1097 ("[C]hallenges ... impact the implementation of the remedy and result in the
same delays Congress sought to avoid by passage of the statute .... ").
Congress primarily intended to foreclose judicial review that would delay cleanups.
In this regard, the Senate Report states that CERCLA bars judicial review of response
actions prior to enforcement because preenforcement review "would be a significant obstacle to the implementation of response actions and the use of administrative orders [under
§ 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606]. Preenforcement review would lead to considerable delay in
providing cleanups, would increase response costs, and would discourage settlement and
voluntary cleanups." S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 58 (1985).
I11. See Voluntary PurchasingGroups ("VPG"), 889 F.2d at 1390; see also Reardon
11, 947 F.2d at 1513 (quoting VPG, 889 F.2d at 1390). Senator Thurmond had explained
that the review preclusion provision included in SARA "is designed to preclude piecemeal
review." 132 CONG. REC. S14,928 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
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tives ; 1 12 (2) when the challenged action is "actually part of the
enforcement process related to" the cleanup;1 3 (3) when immediate
14
review would "impact [upon] the [cleanup's] implementation;"'
or (4) when immediate review would involve the litigation of issues
resolvable only5 by using information unavailable until government
enforcement."
Nothwithstanding these decisions, which rely on the intent of
CERCLA and its terms to foreclose judicial review of CERCLA
claims in a broad range of cases, other judges have sought to allow
early review of CERCLA claims by narrowly construing the definition of removal and remedial actions. These judges viewed the
CERCLA terms as ambiguous" 6 because they do not compel a
particular conclusion," 7 and then identified alternative strategies
for properly construing the statute. In the most elaborate attempt
to explain a narrow construction of the terms "removal" and "remedial actions," Judge Cyr's dissent in Reardon II supported immediate federal court jurisdiction by relying on two meta-policies
that he argued must inform the court's construction of a statute
112. North Shore Gas, 930 F.2d at 1244 ("[A] measure that is ordered as part of a
remedial plan, and that is reasonably related to the plan's objectives so that it can be fairly
considered an organic element of the plan, is itself remedial within the meaning of section
113(h).").
113. VPG, 889 F.2d at 1388-89.
114. Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d at 1097. The court there relied upon this rule to bar
early review of the procedures used by EPA in developing a remedy at the site. See id.
115. See Reardon H, 947 F.2d at 1513.
116. A court's decision that a statute contains an ambiguity is important, because
the court is then forced to look beyond the provision's terms in interpreting the statute.
See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992) (concluding that § 506 of the
Bankruptcy Code is ambiguous, causing courts to interpret the provision to conform to
pre-Code practice). Whether a court chooses to find that statutory language is ambiguous
is a significant decision, one that is largely unconstrained. See Easterbrook, supra note
109, at 62 ("[T]he court may choose when to declare the language of the statute 'ambiguous.'
There is no metric for clarity."). Compare United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310
U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) ("When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in
the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use,
however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination."' (footnotes omitted)),
with DICKERSON, supra note 109, at 139 (stating that when a court decides whether a statute
is ambiguous, "the statutory text is normally to be read, at least initially, without benefit
of legislative history.").
117. Judge Cyr, in his dissent to the en banc decision of Reardon H, described in
detail why neither the language nor the legislative history of CERCLA necessarily leads to
the conclusion that CERCLA bars immediate review of the lien's legality under the statute.
Reardon H,947 F.2d at 1524-27. Prior to the en banc decision, discussed supra notes 103107 and accompanying text, a First Circuit panel had concluded that the meaning of
"response action" was unclear and then had held that CERCLA did not foreclose jurisdiction to resolve claims that the lien violated CERCLA. See Reardon v. United States, 922
F.2d 28, 32 (Ist Cir. 1990) (withdrawn).
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susceptible of multiple meanings.H8 Judge Cyr principally interpreted the statute in accordance with the first meta-policy, the
constitutional principle of due process. 119 Applying this principle,
he concluded that a CERCLA lien is not an activity related to the
enforcement of a removal or remedial action and thus a federal
court can review such a lien immediately to determine whether it
120
is permissible under CERCLA.
118. Reardon II, 947 F.2d at 1527-28. Professor Eskridge has suggested that one
situation in which "it is not inconsistent with legislative supremacy for a judge to interpret
a statute dynamically" arises "when . . .statutory or constitutional meta-policies suggest
a narrowing interpretation." Eskridge, supra note 106, at 330 (footnote omitted). Judicial
deference in this context accounts for the fact that "there are certain meta-principles that
underlie legislative activity. True deference to legislative supremacy will strive to effectuate
these underlying principles." Id. at 344. Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 106, at 114-15 ("the
significance of congressional enactments necessarily depends on background norms about
how words should be understood, and those norms are rarely supplied by the legislature
itself .... [I]n easy as well as hard cases, courts must resort to background assumptions
if interpretation is to proceed.").
A court may also seek to account for "statutory or constitutional meta-policies" by
requiring a clear statement from Congress before it will interpret a statute in a manner that
is contrary to or in tension with those meta-policies. See Harry H. Wellington & Lee A.
Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v.

Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547 (1963). The authors state that:
the invocation of the clear statement rule would seem appropriate ... where
one interpretation of a statute would work vast and far-reaching changes in an
established body of jurisprudence, either statutory or common law. Such
changes in a body of existing doctrine is [sic] not a factor Congress is likely
to have considered in passing a statute, and the disruption worked by such a
statute is a consideration worthy of legislative attention.
Id. at 1563 n.50. In this context, judicial construction of statutes in a manner sensitive to
underlying meta-principles is consistent with democratic values. See id. at 1563. Cf. id. at
1566 ("Certain issues should be faced squarely by legislatures, and rules of statutory
interpretation are, among other things, instruments for inducing such confrontation and
instruments for the protection of the people from the courts and the courts from the
people.").
119. See Reardon 11, 947 F.2d at 1527-28. Cf. id. at 1530 (Cyr, J., dissenting) ("I
believe the statute is reasonably interpreted as permitting a prompt postdeprivation challenge at the instance of innocent landowners and is therefore constitutional .... "). In this
regard, Judge Cyr relies upon the Supreme Court's admonition in Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988),
that a court "will construe [a] statute to avoid [constitutional] problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." 947 F.2d at 1524. The plain meaning
rule of statutory construction and a criticism of the rule are discussed supra notes 106-109
and accompanying text.
120. Reardon H, 947 F.2d at 1528. This use of a constitutional meta-principle to
inform and indeed to determine the interpretation of a statute is a strategy available to
courts, even when the terms of the statute support an alternative interpretation and would
not be unconstitutional. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 106, at 359 (footnote omitted),
who explain that, in one Supreme Court decision "where the plain meaning of the statutory
text undercut the Court's interpretation and the historical evidence was ambiguous, the
fact that constitutional values supported denying the tax exemption was crucial to the
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Judge Cyr relied on a second meta-principle in urging that
removal and remedial actions be construed narrowly to allow review: individuals asserting violations of CERCLA should have an
opportunity for meaningful review of their claims that the government is acting illegally.121 Regarding the Reardons' claim that the
innocent purchaser exemption protected them from a CERCLA
lien, Judge Cyr concluded that the long delayed review CERCLA
otherwise provided would be inadequate. Delayed review would
not redress "the inability to dispose of the encumbered property
while awaiting EPA's discretionary initiation of an in rem action
to recover on an invalid CERCLA lien.' ' 2 2 This reliance on a
with interpretive strategies
judicial review meta-principle comports
1 23
pursued by the Supreme Court.
Judges have thus taken one of two approaches in interpreting
the terms "removal" and "remedial actions," which initially define
the scope of review preclusion under section 113(h). They have
either construed the terms broadly by applying a functional test
grounded on the language and intent of the review preclusion
provision, or they have relied on important meta-policies to narrow
the construction of terms that they conclude have no plain, unambiguous meaning.
decision." Id. When courts rely upon meta-principles to trump the otherwise clear meaning
of a text, as the Supreme Court did in this latter context, their actions are much more
difficult to defend as consistent with legislative supremacy. But cf. supra note 118 (explain-

ing how judicial reliance on meta-principles is arguably consistent with legislative
supremacy).
121. See Reardon H1, 947 F.2d at 1527 (contending that foreclosing early review of

the Reardons' CERCLA claims will put it "beyond the court's power to grant later and
adequate relief" and that review preclusion was thus not intended by Congress (citation
and internal quotations omitted)).
122. Id. at 1527. Judge Cyr distinguished the inadequacy of review in this limited
context from the delayed, but presumably adequate, review available to PRPs "seeking to
challenge their potential liability for cleanup costs," whose injury can be "made whole" by
review of the "recent assessment of unwarranted cleanup costs." Id.
123. See Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670-73
(1986). For additional support in legal scholarship, see Sunstein, who writes that:
Broad delegations of power to regulatory agencies have been allowed largely
on the assumption that courts would be available to ensure agency fidelity to
whatever statutory directives have been issued. If agencies are able to interpret
ambiguities in these directives, the delegation problem increases dramatically.
A firm judicial hand in the interpretation of statutes is thus desirable. The point
can be made more vivid by imagining cases involving the question whether
agency action is reviewable ....
SUNSTEIN,

supra note 106, at 143.
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2. The CERCLA Citizens Suit Provision
The second major stress point for the interpretation of CERCLA's review preclusion originates in the scope of its citizens suit
provision. 2 4 The citizens suit provision may provide courts with
some flexibility in deciding whether CERCLA forecloses judicial
review, because section 113(h)(4) states that a federal court has
immediate jurisdiction over a citizens suit "alleging that the removal or remedial action taken under section 9604 of this title or
secured under section 9606 of this title was in violation of any
requirement of this chapter.' ' 2 5 Section 113(h) thus does not foreclose review of a cleanup in a proper citizens suit. CERCLA does
not expressly state, however, the circumstances in which a PRP
may bring a citizens suit.
In Cabot Corp. v. EPA, 126 EPA was working to develop and
implement a remedial plan to clean up the Moyer's Landfill site. 27
The PRPs responded to EPA's efforts by forming a committee to
negotiate with EPA about a possible settlement and by developing
an alternative cleanup plan, which became the focus of the committee's negotiations with EPA. 2 8 After this negotiation process
broke down and it was certain that EPA would proceed with its
own remedial plan, 29 the PRPs filed a citizens suit against EPA"1 °
seeking an injunction to bar EPA from pursuing any remedial
action at the site.'13 The plaintiffs claimed that EPA's remedial
plan violated CERCLA because it was not cost effective. 32 The
court therefore squarely faced the issue of whether this action
124. 42 U.S.C. § 9659.
125. Id. § 9613(h)(4). CERCLA's citizens suit provision states that:
Except as provided in ... section 9613(h) of this title (relating to timing of
judicial review), any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf(1) against any person (including the United States ... ) who is alleged

to be in violation of any standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order
which has become effective pursuant to this chapter ....
Id. § 9659(a).
126. 677 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1988).

127. Id. at 824.
128. Id. at 825.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9659.
Cabot Corp., 677 F. Supp. at 825.
Id.
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could proceed as an exception under section 113(h)(4) to section
113(h)'s general rule of preenforcement review preclusion.
The court concluded that it would look beyond the plain language of section 310133 to determine whether these plaintiffs could
bring their citizens suit. Even though the PRPs could be plaintiffs
in a citizens suit, 134 the court concluded that the terms of section
113(h) limited the type of claim that plaintiffs could raise in a
citizens suit under section 310.135 This construction of CERCLA
properly recognizes the significance that the entire statute's struc-

ture should have on the construction of a particular provision:
courts should construe individual provisions so that they form part
of a harmonious statutory structure. 136 The court harmonized
133. 42 U.S.C § 9659.
134. See Cabot Corp., 677 F. Supp. at 829 ("The statutory language empowers any
person to bring a citizen suit, irrespective of whether that person is also a PRP ....").
135. See id. at 826-27 ("The citizen-suit provision is on its face limited by subsection
9613(h) ...which delays judicial review of most 'challenges to removal or remedial actions
selected under section 9604' of CERCLA. The PRPs' suit is covered by see. 9613(h),
because it challenges EPA's cleanup activities which thus far have been conducted pursuant

to sec. 9604." (footnote omitted)).
136. The court's interpretive strategy is proper for three reasons. First, a strategy
that construes a statute so that it forms a harmonious structure intelligently approaches
reading and understanding of the words of the statute:
The interpreter should approach the statutory text as a reasonably intelligent
reader would and give the text its most commonsensical reading ....Textual
analysis should ... consider how the statutory provision at issue coheres with
the general structure of the statute, since other provisions in the statute might
shed light on the one being interpreted.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 106, at 355 (footnotes omitted); see Oestereich v. Selective
Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 238 (1968) ("[L]iteral reading" of a provision
foreclosing jurisdiction will not be adopted "where literalness in statutory language is out
of harmony ...with an Act taken as an organic whole." (citation omitted)); see also JAMES
W. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 46, 59-60 (1982) (discussing "presumption... which
enjoins that we read particular words or phrases in the light cast by other parts of the same

statute" (footnote omitted)).
Second, the strategy properly accounts for "certain meta-principles that underlie
legislative activity. . . .One such principle is that statutes are part of a coherent body of
public law that should be implemented in a reasonable manner." Eskridge, supra note 106,
at 344. Presumably that "coherent body" includes the law that is itself being applied. See
supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text for a discussion of the significance of metaprinciples in construing statutes.
Finally, construing statutory provisions with due regard for the purposes and structure of the entire statute permits a court to account for statutory interactions that arise as
a statute moves from enactment to implementation. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating
Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20, 57 (1988) ("The statute 'means' nothing

until it takes its place in the legal system, until it begins to interact with judges, lawyers,
administrators, and lay people. Each of these interactions changes, or fills out, the meaning
of the statute.").

28
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CERCLA's language and provisions by holding that the Act fore-

closes immediate review of challenges to response actions that the
citizens suit exception otherwise would allow, when the citizen

raises claims that, under section 113(h), PRPs cannot have courts
137
review before the government brings an enforcement action.
This construction of the statute was reinforced by Congress's

broad intent that cleanups of hazardous waste sites not be delayed
by litigation, 138 as well as by the statements of some legislators

that the citizens suit provision should not provide jurisdiction for
a PRP's claim relating to the existence or scope of liability for a

response action.

39

The Cabot Corp. court's harmonizing approach suggests that,
notwithstanding section 310's broad language which permits chal-

lenges to CERCLA violations in citizens suits, 141 courts should
interpret section 113(h) to limit section 310 by allowing review

only when a citizen alleges irreparable harm, such as when the
plaintiff claims that the government response action threatens
harm to the public health or the environment. 41 Correspondingly,
courts should hold that section 113(h) provides no cause of action
when a PRP alleges monetary harm, as it typically does when
137. The court stated that:
If the PRPs here, in the guise of citizens, were permitted to raise the same
challenges in a citizens suit timed in accordance with § 9613(h)(4) that they, as
PRPs, would have had to wait to raise under § 9613(h)(1), subsection (4) would
eviscerate subsection (1). In order to avoid reading §§ 9659 and 9613(h)(4) as
permitting an 'end-run' around the ban on preenforcement review that would
otherwise apply here, § 9613(h)(4) must be read as applying only to those
claims that would not otherwise be deferred under §§ 9613(h)(1), (2), (3) or (5).
Cabot Corp., 677 F. Supp. at 828.
138. See id. Courts of appeals have relied on this view of CERCLA's purpose to
give a broad, functional meaning to the terms removal and remedial action. See supra note
110 and accompanying text.
139. See Cabot Corp., 677 F. Supp. at 829.
140. See supra note 125 (quoting relevant portions of citizens suit provision).
141. See Cabot Corp., 677 F. Supp. at 829:
Congress' decision to enable EPA to clean up hazardous waste sites prior to
litigating the allocation of the expenses of those cleanups supports a distinction
between citizen suits alleging irreparable harms and those claiming monetary
damages. Health and environmental hazards must be addressed as promptly
as possible rather than awaiting the completion of an inadequately protective
response action.
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challenging liability. 142 This conclusion reflects the necessary con-

sideration of intra-statutory interactions.143 The result also comports with the significant narrowing function that context plays in

the understanding of language' 44 and, more importantly, the narrowing function that courts must perform when construing a text
that may be overbroad on its face. 145
3. Adequacy of Delayed Review

Judge Posner suggested the last of the three initial judicial
strategies for interpreting section 113(h) in the context of a PRP's
attempt to litigate the existence or scope of liability. By looking
to the caption of the provision-"it is notable that section 113(h)
142. See id. ("[W]here PRPs allege harms the implications of which are essentially
monetary, those allegations should be tested when EPA seeks to collect cleanup costs, as
provided by § 9613(h)(1) ....").The court also supports this distinction in the claims
allowed under 42 U.S.C. § 9659 by relying on the due process meta-policy, referring to
"[t]he compatibility with due process of deferring judicial review of claims of compensable
harm, as distinguished from the need for prompt review of allegations of irreparable injury,
such as harm to public health or the environment." Cabot Corp., 677 F. Supp. at 829 n.6.
The court does not, however, specifically conclude that review of monetary claims is
necessarily adequate. But see J.V. Peters & Co. v. Administrator, EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 266
(6th Cir. 1985) (declaring that delayed remedy available to PRP in cost-recovery action "is
an adequate remedy in a court" for addressing scope of CERCLA liability). The significance
of meta-policies in construing statutes is discussed supra notes 118-120 and accompanying
text.
143. See supra note 136 for a discussion of this basis for statutory construction.
144. See DICKERSON, supra note 109, at 111 ("The most useful, indeed almost indispensable, function of context is to narrow the range of reference of otherwise over-general
words.").
145. Sunstein identifies "overinclusiveness" as one of several "pervasive difficulties
with textualist approaches to statutory construction ...." SUNSTEIN, supra note 106, at
116. In discussing the overinclusiveness problem, he states that "[1]anguage that would in
many settings be entirely unambiguous should not be the only basis for interpretation in
some cases; here context is the central problem." Id. at 118. Sunstein then argues that, in
cases of overinclusiveness, a court plays its proper role in the legal system by narrowly
construing the statute, notwithstanding the broad text: "[S]ometimes the best interpretation
of a textual command runs counter to its apparent literal meaning ....[T]he exclusion of
the absurd outcome should be seen not as amendment or usurpation, but as permissible,
indeed conventional interpretation." Id. at 119. See also Popkin, supra note 106, at 602
("The generality of statutory language is sometimes more than the court can accept in light
of the statute's purpose, despite the apparent plain meaning of the words." (footnote
omitted)); see generally United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 357-59 (1988)
(applying narrow reading of "all taxation" so that exemption refers only to direct taxation);
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (concluding that statute
prohibiting payment of travel expenses to alien intending to work in United States did not
apply to immigration of cleric whose hiring agreement provided for transportation to United
States).
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is captioned 'timing of review'"" 46-- and to the legislative purpose
of the provision-which does not intend "to defeat an aggrieved
person's presumptive right of judicial review of agency action, but
merely to postpone the exercise of the right to the completion of
the remedial action"' 47-- Posner suggested that, in an appropriate
case, a court may allow jurisdiction over a PRP's preenforcement
liability claim. Section 113(h) does more than merely toll the availability of judicial remedies; the statute "specifi[es] the remedies
that survive"1 48 and may thereby directly affect the adequacy of
the relief available after EPA finally brings an enforcement action.
Judge Posner's view thus appeared to be that, in cases in
which section 113(h) has the effect of foreclosing adequate judicial
review of liability issues, a court may be able to rely on Congress's
intent that adequate review be ensured, and therefore proceed
with immediate review. This construction of CERCLA is strengthened when considered in the context of the meta-policy149 that
effective judicial review should be available to ensure the legality
50
of government action.
146. North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 1991). The general
rule of statutory construction is that a court should not look to the title of the statutory
provision, if the text of the statute itself has a clear meaning. See Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917) ("[W]hen words are free from doubt they ... are not to
be added to or subtracted from by considerations drawn from titles or designating names
or reports accompanying their introduction or from any extraneous source"); see also West
Coast Truck Lines v. Arcata Community Recycling Ctr., 846 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988).
147. North Shore Gas, 930 F.2d at 1245 (citation omitted).
148. Id.
149. See generally supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 121 and accompanying text for a discussion of this meta-policy.
The United States has suggested one other context in which a question of CERCLA liability
may be litigated prior to government enforcement, notwithstanding the broad terms and
intent of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). The government has taken the position that:
Even though review of the recordation of a lien ... is generally barred under
Section 113(h) until such time as EPA files a cost recovery action . . . . we
believe that immediate relief against recordation or a lien would be available
if . . . EPA's actions are utterly without foundation in CERCLA and the
uncontested facts . . . . In such a situation, the government's action would

verge on a violation of due process.
Appellees' Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 13, Reardon
v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509 (Ist Cir. 1991) (No. 90-9319) (on file with the Harvard
Environmental Law Review); see supra note 120 and accompanying text. The government
cites Enochs v. Williams Packing Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962), in support of its position, which
appears to be that courts may act immediately to review a government action that would
fix CERCLA liability when it is clearly based on undisputed facts that "by no legal
possibility" could the government's claim of liability succeed. Id. at 5 (internal quotations
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B. Is Review Foreclosedin Cases that Pose No Apparent Threat
to CERCLA's Goals or that May Promote Competing CERCLA
Goals?
Having surveyed the basic strategies available to courts in
deciding whether CERCLA allows judicial review in a case that
contests CERCLA liability and that threatens to slow the cleanup
of hazardous substances, the Article now considers those strategies in two contexts where the need to foreclose review appears
less compelling. In the first, a PRP raises the liability issue after
the cleanup has been completed.' 5' In the second, citizens claim a
response action poses a threat to public health or the environment,
in a suit whose judicial review would slow the action's
implementation. 52
1. JudicialReview of a Liability Claim FiledAfter Completion of
the Response Action
In Voluntary PurchasingGroups, Inc. v. Reilly, 53 the court
of appeals had to determine whether a district court had jurisdiction over the claim by Voluntary Purchasing Group, Inc. ("VPG")
that it was not liable for any of the costs of a removal action
conducted by EPA. 154 EPA sent VPG a letter stating that EPA had
completed the emergency response action, explaining that VPG
was potentially responsible for the response costs, and demanding
that VPG (alone or in conjunction with other PRPs) pay EPA the
cost of the response action. 55 Upon receipt of this letter, VPG
filed an action in district court seeking a declaratory judgment that
and citation omitted). No CERCLA case has yet involved this type of claim for early
review, which, as the government's argument indicates, is grounded in a constitutional
meta-policy.
151. See infra part III.B.1.
152. See infra part III.B.2.
153. 889 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1989). The author was counsel for EPA in this appeal.
154. See id. at 1384-85. The site at issue had been used to process pesticides and
herbicides and had been listed on the NPL since 1983. In 1981, EPA had conducted an
emergency response action at the site, expending approximately $2 million of Superfund
money. Id. at 1382-83.
155. Id. at 1382-83. This January 1988 letter, which was sent to nine other PRPs,
also informed the 10 recipients that they might be liable for additional response costs if a
remedial action were pursued. Id.
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it was not a party liable under section 107 for the costs of the EPA
removal. 156
Unlike the cases discussed previously,15 7 judicial review of the
PRP's claim in Voluntary Purchasing Groups would not have
slowed the site's cleanup.' 58 The court concluded, however, that
the plain language of section 113(h) reflected Congress's "obvious
intent to preclude review in relation to removal and remedial actions except in the limited circumstances described in section
113(h). '' 159 Because section 113(h)(1) specifically identifies "[a]n
action under section 9607 of this title to recover response costs or
damages or for contribution" as one of the five proceedings 60 in
which a court has jurisdiction to review a challenge to a "removal
or remedial action selected under section 9604,"161 the court

straightforwardly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to
adjudicate VPG's claim for a declaratory judgment of no liability
under section 107.162
The court also looked beyond the plain terms of the statute
to support its decision that there was no jurisdiction by relying on
the broader purposes of section 113(h).1 63 These "[o]ther CERCLA
[o]bjectives" are to preclude piecemeal review, thereby allowing
EPA to focus its resources as the agency sees fit, and to promote
judicial and
administrative efficiency by foreclosing "crazy quilt
' ' 64

litigation.

1

156. Id. at 1383-84. The United States thereafter filed a cost recovery action in

another district seeking to recover its response costs from VPG and six other parties that
had received the January 1988 letter. Id. When the district court denied the motion by EPA
to dismiss VPG's declaratory judgment action, EPA pursued an interlocutory appeal. Id.
157. See supra part III.A.
158. See Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 889 F.2d at 1388 ("[R]emoval action has

already taken place and any delay caused by the VPG suit will not interfere with the
emergency cleanup of the Rogerdale Road site."). The court stated that CERCLA's preclusion of judicial review was "clear... where such review will delay cleanup." Id.
159. Id.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1). The other proceedings are identified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(h)(2)-(5).
161. Id. § 9613(h).

162. In addition to the terms of the statute, the court relied on two pre-SARA cases
that barred review in this type of circumstance. Voluntary PurchasingGroups, 889 F.2d at
1389 (citing B.R. MacKay & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1290, 1294-97 (D.

Utah 1986); Pacific Resins and Chems. Inc. v. United States, 654 F. Supp. 249, 253 (W.D.
Wash. 1986)).
163. See Voluntary PurchasingGroups, 889 F.2d at 1390. This common approach to

statutory construction is generally discussed supra note 109.
164. Voluntary PurchasingGroups, 889 F.2d at 1390. In a footnote, the court elaborated on this rationale. Id. at 1390 n.22 ("If PRPs are allowed to bring actions for
declaratory judgment, as VPG asserts here, the government will lose some of the flexibility
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In determining that section 113(h) foreclosed the declaratory

judgment action, the court appeared to assume that the remedy
available to VPG at the time EPA brought the cost recovery action

would be adequate.

65

The situation in Voluntary Purchasing

Groups does not, therefore, present the sort of worst case scenario

for precluding review that Judge Posner hypothesized in North
Shore Gas. 166 Although there does not yet appear to have been

any claim by a PRP alleging that irreparable injury will occur in
the absence of immediate review, 167 the Voluntary Purchasing
Groups decision demonstrates that the greatest hurdles to review
of such a claim are (1) the terms of section 113(h), where section
113(h)(1) specifically states that liability issues must be litigated in
cost recovery actions,168 and (2) Congress's broad intent in section
113(h) to avoid piecemeal review with its attendant disruptions
and delays.

169

Beyond the aforementioned stress points that a court might
use to find jurisdiction over a PRP claim that does not threaten
direct delay of an ongoing cleanup, the statute's only remaining
flexibility lies in the meaning in section 113(h)(1) of "[a]n action
under section 9607 of this title to recover response costs or damages or for contribution."'' 70 Relying on a broad reading of this
of determining when a cost recovery suit should be filed and will be forced to operate on
the timetable of the PRP.").
165. See id. at 1390 n.21 (citation omitted) (the court's "finding that the district court
lacks jurisdiction in this matter does not mean that VPG will be deprived of its day in
court. VPG will be able to assert all of its allegations from its [declaratory judgment] suit
..as defenses in the [cost-recovery] action filed by the United States .... ).
166. North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1991); see supra
note 98. The only immediate injury that VPG asserted to demonstrate an urgent need for
prompt review of its declaratory judgment claim was the triggering of liability for prejudgment interest as of the date of EPA's January 1988 letter demanding payment of a sum
certain for the EPA removal action. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(D) ("interest [on the amounts
recoverable under section 9607] shall accrue from the later of (i) the date payment of a
specified amount is demanded in writing, or (ii) the date of the expenditure concerned."
(emphasis added)). See also Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 889 F.2d at 1390 n.18 ("We
realize that the inability of a PRP to initiate a proceeding to resolve the existence and
amount of its liability may result in a material adverse impact on some aspects of a PRP's
ability to conduct its business (e.g., obtaining credit).").
167. It may well be that the inadequacies of delayed review, which greatly concerned
Judge Posner, will not arise in the instant context because a challenge to an ongoing
response action is not at issue. Judge Posner feared that, once response costs have already
been incurred, a PRP would be left merely to divide up those costs rather than to litigate
effectively whether the costs should have been incurred. A PRP in VPG's position will not
be able to raise such a claim, because EPA has already completed the response action.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1).
169. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1).
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language, which defines when the response action may be challenged, a PRP might argue that an EPA demand letter, such as the
one received by VPG shortly before it brought its declaratory
judgment action, initiates the section 107 "action ...

to recover

response costs. '' 17 1 Under this reading, the PRP, following receipt
of the demand letter, would be able to raise in district court any
claims it wished regarding the cleanup. A PRP might support this
argument by citing the terms of section 107, which refers to the
use of a demand letter as though it were part of the usual process
72
of recovering costs.
The Voluntary Purchasing Groups court rejected this argument, because "the [demand] letter did not establish that recovery
would be sought from all recipients of the letter.' ' 73 Although
stated imprecisely, 74 the court's analysis quite convincingly builds
upon two other points made in the decision. First, at the definitional level, the court held that the demand letter was an "enforcement activit[y] related"' 75 to EPA's removal action at the site, and
therefore the demand letter itself could not be challenged by VPG
except in a section 107 cost recovery action. 76 Second, the court
presented a functional argument: a decision that the date of the
demand letter identifies when a PRP may bring an action to determine the extent of its CERCLA liability would fatally undermine
the effectiveness of the letter, because the demand letter is intended in part to encourage settlement with EPA and negotiations
among PRPs named in the letter.177 This functional argument is
stronger than the court's discussion suggests. In the 1986 amendments to CERCLA, which added the review preclusion provision, 78 Congress also added section 122 7 9-- a provision establishing settlement procedures intended "to expedite settlements."' 80
171. Id.
172. See id. § 9607(a)(4)(D). This provision is quoted and discussed supra note 166.

173. Voluntary PurchasingGroups, 889 F.2d at 1388. The court supported this point
by noting that the United States in fact brought a cost recovery action against only seven
of the ten parties identified as potentially responsible in the demand letter. Id. at 1388 n. 16.
174. EPA's demand letter by its terms did in fact "seek" reimbursement of the
Superfund from every recipient of the letter. See id. at 1383.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25).
176. See Voluntary PurchasingGroups, 889 F.2d at 1388-89 & n.14.

177. See id. at 1388-89.
178. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.

179. 42 U.S.C. § 9622.
180. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, supra note 25, at 252, reprinted in 1986

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3345. The Conference Report also states that the § 122 procedures
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Thus, the Voluntary Purchasing Groups court's construction of
section 113 properly promotes harmonization of the goals and
181
structure of CERCLA.
The Voluntary PurchasingGroups decision articulates a convincing rejoinder to any theory that would narrow the range of
jurisdiction preclusion under section 113(h) by expanding the scope
of a cost recovery action under section 113(h)(1). 82 The case also
illustrates why, consistent with the Act, preenforcement review of
CERCLA liability issues should be foreclosed, even if a response
action is complete and review therefore does not threaten to slow
an ongoing cleanup.
2.
Judicial Review of a Health- or Other Nonliability-Based
Claim Filed While a Response Action Is Ongoing
The last of the general circumstances in which a party might
claim that a removal or remedial action violates CERCLA arises
when the party claims that the response action threatens public
health or the environment or contradicts some other policy of
CERCLA. In the cases within this category, the plaintiffs could
not litigate the same claim in a section 107 cost recovery action.183
a. Availability of Immediate Review Based on the Section
113(h)(4) Exception to Review Preclusion
Claimants asserting health- and other nonliability-based claims
in challenging response actions have relied on the express terms
were intended "to assure the effective clean-up of Superfund sites." Id. The statements of
legislators also reflect Congress's intent in enacting SARA to encourage settlements instead
of litigation. See 132 CONG. REC. H9571 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Stangeland) ("[SARA] makes major improvements intended to stimulate settlements under
which those responsible for placing hazardous waste at Superfund sites would agree to
undertake cleanups. These improvements were absolutely essential to halt the unconscionable drain on resources being consumed by litigation."); id. at H9585 (statement of Rep.
Fields) ("[SARA] sends a strong signal to the Environmental Protection Agency and to the
Department of Justice that Congress wants settlement, not litigation, with potentially
responsible parties whenever possible.").
181. The importance of construing a statute so that it is implemented in an internally
coherent manner is discussed supra note 136 and accompanying text.
182. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1).
183. As previously noted, a principal policy reason for holding that review of such
liability claims is foreclosed under § 113(h)(1) is that Congress intended for such claims to
be reviewed only at the time the government brought the cost recovery action. See supra
notes 71-72.

HarvardEnvironmental Law Review

[Vol. 17:1

of section 113(h)(4), which provides that such challenges may be
brought in:
[a]n action under section 9659 of this title (relating to citizens
suits) alleging that the removal or remedial action taken under
section 9604 of this title or secured under section 9606 of this
title was in violation of any requirement of this chapter. 84
Courts have adopted three basic approaches to this exception to
review preclusion. Their decisions have turned on the extent to
which such courts viewed the terms of section 113(h)(4) as permitting the consideration of overall CERCLA policy to resolve
any ambiguity. This Article now considers each of the three principal tactics, and offers a new approach to applying the preclusion
exception.
i. Narrow Construction of the Citizens Suit Exception: Reliance
on Plain Meaning and Narrow Statutory Goals
In Schalk v. Reilly,185 the plaintiffs sued in federal court alleging that a remedial plan identified by the United States and a
private party in an approved consent decree was illegal because
the parties had not complied with CERCLA when completing the
RIIFS for a site. 186 Specifically, these plaintiffs objected to the plan
to dispose of the polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) contaminating
two landfills through incineration. 8 7
The court relied on the "plain language" of section 113(h)(4)
in holding that the provision bars review of the proposed remedial
action in the context of a citizens Suit. 88 The court, applying the
184. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4). CERCLA's citizens suit provision is quoted supra note
125.
185. 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Frey v. Reilly, 111 S. Ct. 509 (1990).

186. Id. at 1094. The RI/FS is defined supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
The plaintiffs also claimed that the remedial plan was illegal because EPA had not prepared
an environmental impact statement pursuant to the requirements of the National Environmental Policy. Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970). Schalk v. Reilly, 900
F.2d at 1094.
187. See Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d at 1093-94.

188. Id. at 1095. This broad rule of review preclusion is supported, though minimally,

by the legislative history. See H.R.

REP.

No. 253, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 81, reprinted in

1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2863 ("there is no right of judicial review of the Administrator's
selection and implementation of response actions until after the response action [sic] have
been completed .... ").
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last sentence of the provision and particularly noting its use of the
past tense, stated that section 113(h)(4) strictly foreclosed the
citizens suit provision from being used to challenge remedial actions prior to their completion:
In a challenge to a removal action where a remedial action "is
to be undertaken," no action may be brought. That is our
situation. An incinerator has been chosen as the method to
dispose of hazardous wastes in the Bloomington area, but the
remedial action outlined in the consent decree has not yet been
undertaken ....The statute precludes federal court review at
this stage-when a remedial
plan has been chosen, but not
1 89
"taken" or "secured.'

The breadth of the review preclusion becomes even clearer
when the court states that CERCLA policy supports the broad
preclusion rule identified in the "plain language" of section
113(h)(4): "The legislative history supports the conclusion that
federal courts are deprived of subject matter jurisdiction where
remedial action has not been completed."' 90 The first approach

thus holds that, despite the presence of a claim that implementation
of a response action violates CERCLA because it poses unreasonable risks to human health and the environment, immediate review
under the 113(h)(4) exception to review preclusion nonetheless
will be unavailable when the response action has not yet been
completed. 191
189. Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d at 1095.
190. Id. at 1096 (emphasis added). The court in Schalk v. Reilly earlier stated that a
broad rule of preclusion is required. See id. at 1095 ("The obvious meaning of this statute
is that when a remedy has been selected, no challenge to the cleanup may occur prior to
completion of the remedy." (emphasis added)).
191. Two other courts of appeals have reached similar conclusions about the broad
scope of CERCLA claim preclusion. See Alabama v. United States EPA, 871 F.2d 1548,
1557 (11th Cir. 1989) ("The plain language of the statute indicates that section 113(h)(4)
applies only after a remedial action is actually completed. The section refers in the past
tense to remedial actions taken 'under section 104 or secured under 106. Absent clear
legislative intent to the contrary, this language is conclusive." (initial emphasis added)),
cert. denied Alabama ex rel Siegelman v. United States EPA, 493 U.S. 991 (1989); Boarhead
Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1019 (3d Cir. 1991) ("CERCLA's language shows Congress concluded that disputes about who is responsiblefor a hazardous site, what measures
are actually necessary to clean-up the site and remove the hazard or who is responsible
for its cost should be dealt with after the site has been cleaned up." (emphasis added)).
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ii. More Flexible Constructionof the Citizens Suit Exception: Re-

liance on Stages of Response Action Implementation in Light of
Statutory Goals
The second of the three approaches that courts have taken in
construing section 113(h)(4)'s exception to review preclusion reflects an attempt by courts to apply an apparent textual ambiguity
to further the broad policies of CERCLA. In these cases, the
courts identify a linguistic ambiguity in the section 113(h)(4) exception but conclude that, because of the text's plain language and
CERCLA policy, the exception is not broad enough to allow immediate litigation of all health claims.
In Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v. Reilly, 192 an
association of citizens residing near a site listed on the NPL
brought a citizens suit to enjoin EPA's scheduled remedial action
because the cleanup presented a health hazard. 93 The court examined section 113(h)(4)'s language and concluded that "Congress's use of the past tense ... combined with its final sentence
...point[s] to one conclusion: Congress intended judicial review

of EPA remedial action only after some action is undertaken ....
[T]he statute's languagefails to answer the question of how much
94
must be done before review is available.'
To resolve this ambiguity, the court turned to the legislative
history of SARA. The court did find "some support" therein for
reading the exception broadly to allow review after a remedial plan
is formulated, based on the view that plan formulation constitutes
action taken. 95 This support was outweighed, however, by the
192. 716 F. Supp. 828 (D.N.J. 1989).

193. See id. at 829-30. The site at issue was ranked 12th on the NPL and covered
60 acres and a large number of nearby residences.
194. Id. at 833 (emphasis added). Earlier, the court had made a similar statement
about the ambiguity of the exception from review preclusion. See id. at 831 ("[A]lthough
the statutory language [in section 113(h)(4)] clearly states that review is unavailable until
action is taken, the provision is not entirely clear about what constitutes action taken.").
195. Id. at 833-34. Several legislators advanced this reading of the provision during
its consideration. See 132 CONG. REc. H9587 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Florio) ("A final cleanup decision, or plan, constitutes the taking of action at a site, and
the legislative language makes it clear that citizens' [sic] suits under section 310 will lie
alleging violations of law and irreparable injury to health as soon as 'action is taken."');
see also 132 CONG. REC. H9600 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Roe) ("The

legislation allows citizens to bring a lawsuit under section [9659] as soon as the agency
announces its decision regarding how a cleanup will be structured."); 132 CONG. REC.
S14,898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Stafford) ("It is crucial, if it is at all
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Conference Committee Report discussion of the scope of the cit-

izens suit exception to review preclusion-"the most authoritative
legislative history," according to the court. 196 The Conference Re-

port "clearly indicates that a citizens suit will not lie to challenge
a choice of remedy until after a distinct phase of the cleanup is
completed. ' 197 In the court's view, this legislative history meant
possible, to maintain citizens' rights to challenge response actions, or final cleanup plans,
before such plans are implemented even in part.
...). See generally supra note 116
(discussing whether legislative history should be considered when determining whether a
statute is ambiguous).
196. Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency, 716 F. Supp. at 833-34. The court
commented, "Because the conference committee report on SARA was commended to the
entire Congress, it carries 'greater weight than any other of the legislative history."' Id.
See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 94 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("The most authoritative form of such [contemporaneous legislative] explanation
is a congressional report defining the scope and meaning of proposed legislation. The most
authoritative report is a Conference Report acted upon by both Houses and therefore
unequivocally representing the will of both Houses as the joint legislative body."); see also
GWENDOLYN B. FOLSOM, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: RESEARCH FOR THE INTERPRETATION
OF LAWS 33 (1972) ("Where the language in issue has been the subject of difference between
measures approved by the two houses and then reconciled in conference, the conference
report will be most important." (footnote omitted)).
197. NeighborhoodToxic Cleanup Emergency, 716 F. Supp. at 834. The Conference
Report includes the following discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4):
In new section 113(h)(4) . . . ,the phrase "removal or remedial action taken"
is not intended to preclude judicial review until the total response action is
finished if the response action proceeds in distinct and separate stages. Rather
an action under section 310 would lie following completion of each distinct and
separable phase of the cleanup ....

It should be the practice of the President

to set forth each separate and distinct phase of a response action in a separate
Record of Decision document. Any challenge under this provision to a completed stage of a response action shall not interfere with those stages of the
response action which have not been completed.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, supra note 25, at 224 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3276, 3317; see also id. (stating that judicial review may proceed when "all the activities
set forth in the Record of Decision for the surface cleanup phase have been completed.").
Other parts of the legislative record additionally support the view that a stage of the
response action must be implemented before a court has jurisdiction over a citizens suit
challenging that part of the response action. See H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 32, pt. 3,
at 23, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. at 3046, which states that the citizens suit exception
to the bar on CERCLA review:
is not intended to allow review of the selection of a response action prior to
completion of the action: the provision allows for review only of an "action
taken . . ." (italics added). Thus, after the RI/FS has been completed, the

remedial action has been selected and designed, and the construction of the
selected action has begun, persons will be able to maintain suit to ensure that
a specific on-the-ground implementation of the response action is consistent
with the requirements of the Act. .

.

. The Committee emphasizes that this

paragraph is not intended to allow delay of the clean-up and that, in actions

40
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that "in no event is judicial review [available] to delay the start of
a cleanup remedy."'198 In reaching this conclusion, the court necessarily decided that the legislative history upon which it relied is
more decisive than Congress's broad intent to protect the public
health by safeguarding the public from hazardous wastes. 199
The district court in Schalk v. EPA200 reached the same conclusion in dismissing the citizens suit that challenged the selection
of a remedial plan, which involved the incineration of PCBs. 211
The court first concluded that "the statute is not entirely clear
about just when in the course of a remedial action a citizen's [sic]
suit may be brought" and therefore it considered CERCLA's legislative history. 202 Relying on the committee reports and the statements of particular members of Congress, 20 3 the court concluded
that section 113(h)(4) "permits citizens' [sic] suits challenging EPA
actions only once a remedial action or discrete phase of a remedial
action has been completed. ' '2°4 The court dismissed the plaintiffs'
citizens suit as "premature" because the remedial action at issue
had "not yet been implemented.

'20 5

Courts applying this second approach to the review preclusion
exception distinguish between claims brought after mere selection
under this paragraph, courts should not entertain claims to re-evaluate the
selection of remedial action.
See also 132 CONG. REC. S14,917 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Mitchell) ("A
suit to compel compliance with the CERCLA standards would be permitted, under section
113(h) after each stage of cleanup is complete. In this way, an entire cleanup need not be
complete before a citizen can sue."); 132 CONG. REC. S14,929 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986)
(statement of Sen. Thurmond) (declaring that § 113(h) is intended to preclude "premature
challenges in court to remedy selection or liability").
198. Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency, 716 F. Supp. at 834. In addition to
the legislative history, the court cited other cases interpreting § 113(h) to support its
decision. See id. at 832. The court did recognize, however, that § 113(h)(4) "arguably allows
judicial review of a specific part of the remedial plan already effected but alleged to have
been effected in violation of some CERCLA/SARA requirement." Neighborhood Toxic
Cleanup Emergency, 716 F. Supp. at 834.
199. The plaintiffs argued that this policy supported jurisdiction over their claim.
See id. at 834.
200. 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1655 (S.D. Ind. 1988), aff'd, Schalk v. Reilly, 900
F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Frey v. Reilly, 111 S.Ct. 509 (1990). The court of appeals
decision is discussed supra notes 185-191 and accompanying text.
201. See Schalk v. EPA, 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1655-56.
202. Id. at 1657.
203. See id. at 1657-59.
204. Id. at 1659.
205. Id. Cf. Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 895 (D. Minn. 1990) ("[T]o
the extent that plaintiffs can show that they seek under section 9659 [the citizens suit
provision] to challenge a distinct, separate phase of the cleanup which has been completed,
this Court has jurisdiction to hear such a claim for injunctive relief." (footnote omitted)).
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of a site and those following completion of a phase or stage of a
remedial action; these courts would refuse review in the former
situation and grant review in the latter. The distinction corresponds
with the terms of the statute and with the legislative history. However, the approach to the exception discussed below shows that
allowing review only after a stage of the cleanup has been completed is problematic when there is a health basis for the citizens
suit claim: a court will be unable to prevent the threatened harm
if the harmful phase of the remedial plan has already been implemented at the time of review.

iii. Most Flexible Construction of the Citizens Suit Exception:
Health- or Other Nonliability-Based Claim May Be Brought Any
Time After the Remedial Plan Has Been Selected
The final approach to defining the scope of section 113(h)(4)'s
exception to review preclusion focuses principally on CERCLA's
policies, once the court has concluded that the statutory language
admits a colorable claim that review is not foreclosed. 20 6 This
approach reflects a particular concern that broader statutory values
will be demeaned by postponed review. Review only after implementation of a phase of the cleanup may be inadequate to ensure
protection of important CERCLA values, including protection of
20 7
human health.
Although this issue was not resolved by the court, the discussion of the scope of the citizens suit exception to review preclusion
206. Any such colorable claim must be premised on the argument that § 113(h)(4) is
ambiguous and that the selection of a response action constitutes "action taken" that is
subject to judicial review. See supra note 194.
207. This approach to the review preclusion issue receives some inferential support
from a House Report, which ties Congress's concerns about litigation delays to its concern
that public health will be threatened:
The purpose of [the review preclusion] provision is to ensure that there will
be no delays associated with a legal challenge of [sic] the particular removal
or remedial action selected under section 104 or secured through administrative
order or judicial action under section 106. Without such a provision, responses
to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances could be unduly
delayed, thereby exacerbating the threat to human health or the environment.
H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 32, pt. 5, at 25 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3148. In a case where delay in implementing the cleanup would likely result in public health
improvements, § 113 will less likely bar early review.
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in Cabot Corp. v. United States EPA20 8 supports a broad excep-

tion, at least when the plaintiff raises public health issues. 20 9 The
court in Cabot Corp. first identified the ambiguity in the citizens
suit exception: "subsection 9613(h)(4) appears to be the provision
most hospitable to early judicial review . . . . Th[e] language

arguably permits challenges to EPA's plans even before they have
210
been implemented.
After identifying what it viewed as an ambiguity in the statute's terms, the court employed two important strategies to resolve
that ambiguity. Relying in part on the statements of members of
Congress, 21' the court first concluded that the court should construe the provision to promote CERCLA's intent to allow preimplementation review of a claim that implementation of a remedial
action plan threatens public health and the environment.212 Second,
the court found support for a broad construction of the citizens
208. 677 F. Supp. 823, 828-30 (E.D. Pa. 1988). See supra notes 126-139 and accompanying text for a discussion of the central holding in Cabot Corp.
209. See NeighborhoodToxic Cleanup Emergency, 716 F. Supp. at 833 ("The [Cabot
Corp.] court concluded in dicta that pre-remedy citizens suits could [be] brought under
section 9613(h)(4) if the plaintiffs sought to address health and environmental hazards, but
that they could not be brought if they alleged in essence monetary harm." (citation omitted)).
210. Cabot Corp., 677 F. Supp. at 828 (citations omitted).
211. See id. at 828-29. The relevant legislative history is summarized supra note
109. During the debate that preceded final enactment of SARA, however, Representative
Glickman sought to foreclose an interpretation of § 113(h) that would permit immediate
review of a claim because it was health-based. The Congressman compared a citizen's
health-based claim to a PRP's premature liability claim and argued that they are substantially the same because both delay cleanups. Rep. Glickman stated that:
This is a valid argument and one which both neighbors of sites and potentially
responsible parties have asserted. Neither of these persons wants to see an
inadequate or inappropriate remedy built. If the remedy is not adequate the
neighbors may be injured and the potentially responsible parties may be liable
under State law for those injuries. If the remedy has to be rebuilt, the potentially
responsible parties may have to pay twice for the cleanup of one site. Notwithstanding these arguments, the conferees decided to ensure expeditious cleanups
by restricting such preimplementation review.
132 CONG. REc. H9583 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986). See also id. (statement of Rep. Glickman)
("Clearly the conferees did not intend to allow any plaintiff, whether [a] neighbor.., or
[a] potentially responsible party . . . to stop a cleanup by what would undoubtedly be a
prolonged legal battle.").
212. See Cabot Corp., 677 F. Supp. at 829 ("Health and environmental hazards must
be addressed as promptly as possible rather than awaiting the completion of an inadequately protective response action." (emphasis added)).
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suit exception in the due process meta-policy, 2 3 because it ensures
214
adequate review of a claim of irreparable injury.

The analysis in Cabot Corp. thus supports a third interpretation 6f the citizens suit provision, which permits preimplementa-

tion review of a citizens suit claim if the claim alleges that implementation of a response action will cause an irreparable injury to
215
public health or the environment.
iv. An Alternative Approach to the Availability of Citizens Suit
Jurisdiction Over Health-Based Claims Prior to Implementation
of the Response Action
Although the Cabot Corp. decision correctly seeks to promote
the central CERCLA purpose of protecting human health and the
environment from the dangers posed by hazardous substances, the
decision nevertheless is insufficiently attentive to the remedial
structure of CERCLA. 216 This Article suggests an alternative approach, consistent with CERCLA's structure and policies, which
allows review in certain circumstances where the preimplementation claim alleges that implementing the proposed response action
threatens public health.
213. The relevance of meta-policies to statutory construction is discussed supra notes
118-123 and accompanying text. The articulation of a due process meta-policy and how
that policy relates to CERCLA is discussed supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
214. See Cabot Corp., 677 F. Supp. at 829. The court stated that:
The compatibility with due process of deferring judicial review of claims of
compensable harm [such as the issue of liability for response costs], as distinguished from the need for prompt review of allegations of irreparable injury,
such as harm to public health or the environment, supports the distinction here
drawn between PRPs' suits alleging essentially monetary harms and bona fide
citizens suits alleging irreparable harm.
Id. at 829 n.6.
215. In one other case, Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269
(D. Del. 1987), a court stated, with little analysis and without discussing the full terms of
§ 113(h), that "[w]ithout deciding the issue, it appears that [the plaintiff] may... challenge
in a citizens suit the adequacy of EPA's selected remedy, particularly its failure to provide
[an alternative water supply]." Id. at 1290 n.39.
216. Admittedly, the Cabot Corp. court had no need to engage in a detailed inquiry
into whether the court should draw distinctions among health-based claims when deciding
whether immediate review is available. The court in fact only had to decide whether PRPs
could bring a citizens suit and thereby avoid preclusion of the liability issues the PRPs
hoped to litigate. See supra notes 134-137 and accompanying text.

44
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Health-based claims in the context of a CERCLA response
action may be divided into two broad categories: claims that a
remedial action, when completed, will insufficiently protect human
health and the environment because hazards will remain at the
site; and claims that the implementation of the proposed response
action itself poses an undue threat to human health and the
environment.
The first of these broad categories includes two related types
of claims. The first type relates to the standards that should define
a sufficiently clean site following remediation. The second type of
claim relates to whether the remedial action has actually resulted
in compliance with the applicable cleanliness standards. Both of
these claims concern the threat to human health that the site will
pose after the remedial action is complete.
CERCLA directly addresses substantive and procedural issues related to the sufficiency of a remedial action. In the 1986
amendments, Congress added section 121, which governs the identification of cleanliness standards, called ARARs, by reference to
other statutes. 217 CERCLA ensures that the states are "substantial[ly] and meaningful[ly] involve[d]" 218 in the process of identifying these standards and the remedial means for meeting them.
States play a substantial role in identifying the ARARs that define
whether a remedial action is sufficiently clean, 219 and a decision
by EPA to waive any ARAR suggested by the state during the RI/
220
FS process must meet a standard defined in the NCP.
Consistent with these procedural requirements, Congress has
also provided directly for judicial review to ensure adequately
healthful cleanliness standards in several ways: CERCLA identifies the state as the party with a right to assert a claim alleging
that cleanliness standards are inadequate; 221 it specifies the focus
217. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621. This provision is discussed generally supra notes 37-39
and accompanying text.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f)(1).
219. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(d) ("A key component of the EPA/state partnership
shall be the communication of potential federal and state ARARs.").

220. The NCP describes six circumstances under which EPA may pursue a remedy
that will not result in compliance with an ARAR recommended by the state. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.430(f)(1)(ii)(C). The Record of Decision that accompanies the selection of the remedial
action must identify the grounds for deciding not to ensure compliance with a staterecommended ARAR. See id. § 300.430(f)(1)(ii)(B).
221. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f)(2)-(3); 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(f)(2).
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where the
of judicial review; 222 and it limits review to situations
223
remedial action is the subject of a section 106 order.
These CERCLA provisions have important implications both
for a court's construction of CERCLA's citizens suit provision
and its determination of the specific issue of whether to allow
citizens suit jurisdiction when the plaintiff claims that the proposed
remedial action will not guarantee a sufficiently clean site. First,
when Congress has identified the specific means for vindicating a
statutory right that it has created, courts should refrain from modifying the means selected by Congress. Rather, courts should defer
to Congress's considered judgment on the question as reflected in

the legislative compromise of the enacted statute. 224 The avail222. Judicial review considers "the administrative record," and, if "substantial evidence" does not support the EPA decision, CERCLA requires that the remedial action be
designed to meet the ARAR identified by the State and improperly waived by EPA. 42
U.S.C. § 9621(f)(2)(B).
223. Id. § 9621(f)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(f)(2). CERCLA provides that a state may
raise its claim by intervening in the action brought by the United States under § 106, 42
U.S.C. § 9606, which would otherwise have resulted in a consent decree including the
terms of the remedial action plan EPA selected. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f)(2)(B). Section 106
orders are discussed generally supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
SARA's legislative history indicates that Congress knew that review under 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621(f)(2)-(3) was available notwithstanding 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), and was to be the only
exception to that latter provision. Declared Rep. Glickman:
The only opportunity for review that is not specifically provided for in the
timing of review provision is the opportunity set forth in new section 121(f)(2)
and (3), the cleanup standards section relating to remedial actions secured
under section 106 and remedial actions at facilities owned or operated by a
Federal agency .... This opportunity does not exist for fund-financed remedial
action.
132 CONG. REC. H9582 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986).
224. See Farber, supra note 106, at 316 ("[T]he [legislative] supremacy principle does
not allow courts to rechoose strategies for Congress."). Judge Easterbrook has explained
the theoretical basis for judicial restraint in the face of congressional selection of the means
by which a statute is to be applied:
A legislature that seeks to achieve Goal X can do so in one of two ways. First,
it can identify the goal and instruct courts or agencies to design rules to achieve
the goal. In that event, the subsequent selection of rules implements the actual
legislative decision, even if the rules are not what the legislature would have
selected itself. The second approach is for the legislature to pick the rules. It
pursues Goal X by Rule Y. The selection of Y is a measure of what Goal X
was worth to the legislature, of how best to achieve X, and of where to stop
in pursuit of X. Like any rule, Y is bound to be imprecise, to be over- and
under-inclusive. This is not a good reason for a court, observing the inevitable
imprecision, to add to or subtract from Rule Y on the argument that, by doing
so, it can get more of Goal X. The judicial selection of means to pursue X
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ability of review for states in circumstances identified in the statute
also undermines any meta-policy claim to grant citizens suit jurisdiction because meaningful review of claims relating to healthbased cleanliness standards is otherwise completely foreclosed. 225
Although a private litigant or a court might worry that Congress has fashioned too narrow a remedy, the remedy prescribed
by Congress is not unreasonable on its face. First, CERCLA provides the public that will be affected by the quality of cleanliness
standards with substantial rights to participate in the formulation
of the remedy. 226 These procedural rights allow the public to convince both the state and EPA to select a remedial action ensuring
compliance with particular ARARs and to encourage the state to

seek federal court review if EPA waives an ARAR that the state
had recommended. Second, the remedial structure established by
Congress reflects its intent that EPA, and not the states, play the
leading role in deploying and protecting the limited resources of
the Superfund. 27 Accordingly, states may not pursue judicial review of an EPA decision to waive state-recommended ARARs if
EPA itself is pursuing the remedial action and therefore depleting
the Superfund. 228 In these circumstances, the state can enforce
more rigorous cleanliness standards only by paying for the costs

of a more expensive cleanup. 229 In other words, if the remedial

action selection process produces sufficient public support for endisplaces and directly overrides the legislative selection of ways to obtain X.
It denies to legislatures the choice of creating or withholding gapfilling authority. The way to preserve the initial choice is for judges to put the statute down
once it becomes clear that the legislature has selected rules as well as identified
goals.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains,50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 546-47 (1983) (footnotes
omitted); cf. Farber, supra note 106, at 293 ("[A]lthough courts may not violate clearly
enacted legislative intent, the supremacy principle does not prevent them from going beyond
such intent in implementing statutory language when there are gaps in the legislative
scheme.").
225. The Supreme Court has appeared less willing to hold that Congress has foreclosed review in a statute when, in the absence of a holding that jurisdiction is present,
the party seeking review would be severely prejudiced because the issue being raised would
not otherwise be the subject of meaningful review. See Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 459, 466 n.16 (1991); McNary v. Haitian
Refugee Ctr., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 888, 896-99 (1991).
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 9617. This provision is described supra at notes 31-35 and
accompanying text.
227. Both Congress and EPA recognize that the Superfund has insufficient funds to
pay for cleanups of all hazardous substance releases. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text; see also Healy, supra note 2, at 73-77.
228. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f)(2).
229. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(f)(I)(ii).
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hanced cleanliness standards in a remedy EPA is pursuing, CERCLA forecloses judicial review of EPA's waiver of the state-recommended ARAR, and the state can respond to the public support
only by funding an enhanced remedy. Thus, CERCLA's structure,
coupled with underlying congressional intent, should convince the
courts that no jurisdiction exists over citizens suits which claim,
prior to completion of a discrete phase of the remedial action, that
the applicable cleanup standards or ARARs are inadequate.
A court also should conclude that section 113(h) forecloses
preimplementation review of the second of the two types of claims
relating to post-remedy health hazards at a cleanup site. When a
claimant brings an action prior to implementation contending that
the planned remedial action will not, in fact, result in compliance
with the relevant ARARs, a court will not be able to deny jurisdiction based on Congress's express decision that only a specific
method of review is available for such claims. Still, several considerations would support a court's decision to refuse to hear the
action.
A denial of jurisdiction comports with legislative history indicating a general congressional intent that review of a response
action should not occur until after completion of a discrete phase
of the action. 230 The decision that CERCLA bars preimplementation jurisdiction is consistent, moreover, with legislative history
indicating that review of this specific type of claim should be
foreclosed until EPA has implemented a relevant phase of the
cleanup. 231 This decision is also consistent with CERCLA's central
230. See supra note 197.

231. See H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 32, pt. 3, at 23, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3046 ("[A] suit ... may be appropriate where a specific aspect of the
remedial action, which has been taken, in fact fails to attain a standard required under this
Act ....
(Tihis paragraph is not intended to allow delay of the clean-up ....
[Clourts
should not entertain claims to re-evaluate the selection of remedial action."); see also H.R.
REP. No. 253, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 267 (separate and dissenting views of Rep. Florio
and nine other Representatives), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2941, which states

that:
The amendment [that included the provision barring preenforcement review]
also recognizes the full rights of affected citizens to obtain court review of the
adequacy of the remedies selected by EPA at a site. It is the intention of the

legislation to permit citizens to bring such challenges at the earliest opportunity
without permitting such suits to delay or prevent ongoing cleanup work. Af-

fected citizens should be able to file suit and obtain judicial review while there
is still adequate time to require the agency to revise its response action plans
to meet applicable legal requirements.
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intent to protect human health. If review is delayed until after a
discrete phase of the cleanup is completed, citizens can still gain
adequate review of these health-based claims because the claims
address the sufficiency of the cleanup in the future. Indeed, by
delaying review until completion of a discrete phase of the cleanup,
a court should be in a position to demand that the parties provide
strong evidence about the program's effectiveness in meeting the
applicable cleanup standards.
With regard to the second broad category of health-based
claims-claims that the process of implementing a response action
will itself injure public health and the environment-different considerations should determine whether a district court has citizens
suit jurisdiction prior to completion of either a phase of or the
entire response action. When a claimant has participated in the
section 117 process of identifying a cleanup plan2 32 and has raised
health-based concerns about the effects of the cleanup procedures
in that context, a court should have jurisdiction over a citizens
suit raising the health-based claims that were unsuccessful in the
233
proceeding.
Congress enacted the procedural guarantees of section 117 in
order to ensure that communities affected by response actions
would support cleanups that may cause inconveniences for long
periods of time. 234 Without jurisdiction over a citizens suit claiming
that implementation of a proposed response action will be harmful
to public health, the prescribed CERCLA process will not meet
the purposes Congress identified.2 35 Most importantly, as the court
232. 42 U.S.C. § 9617.

233. This claim by affected citizens should be distinguished from a preimplementation
claim by a PRP that the remedial plan selected by EPA will result in undue expenditures
and increased liability for cleanup costs. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Courts
should deny pre-cost recovery review of such a PRP claim because Congress has determined
that, to prevent delay of cleanups, these liability issues should not be litigated at the urging
of PRPs.

234. H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 90 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2872 ("The Committee is of the strong opinion that communities affected
by Superfund sites will demonstrate much stronger support for actions necessary to clean
up those sites if the community is involved from the beginning in determining the actions
which will be necessary to complete the cleanup."); H.R. REP. No. 253, pt. 3, at 26 (1986),

reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3049; H.R. REP. No. 253, pt. 5, at 65 (1986), reprinted

in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3188 ("The Committee believes that increased public participation
will in the short term add procedural steps to the decision-making process, but in the long
term will expedite cleanup progress and increase public understanding of and support for
remedial actions undertaken at Superfund sites.").
235. It should be recognized, however, that parts of the legislative history could

support an inference that Congress viewed the CERCLA public information procedures as
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49

in Cabot Corp. v. United States EPA recognized generally, 2 6 when
litigants challenge the means selected to pursue a response action
as dangerous to human health, barring judicial review until after
EPA has implemented the action (or a relevant phase of the action)
eviscerates the suit's purpose: by the time post-implementation

review finally becomes available, the threatened damage to human
health and the environment already may have occurred. The meta-

policy favoring the availability of adequate review thus strongly
weighs in favor of jurisdiction in this context. 237 Moreover, as
courts recognized when they granted judicial review of compliance
with the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 23 8 review
prior to action by the government is necessary to ensure that the
health
agency fairly and fully considers the envirohmental and
239
impacts before the government action is a fait accompli.
having a limited impact on EPA's administration of cleanups. A House Report states that
the provision establishing requirements for community involvement "is not intended to be
unreasonably burdensome for the Administrator." H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 32, pt.
1, at 91 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2873. Although this language may be
broad enough to lead one to conclude that early judicial review should therefore be foreclosed because it is too burdensome, the only examples that the Report includes relate to
publication requirements ensuring that the community receives proper notice that EPA is
contemplating a remedial action. See also H.R. REP. No. 253, pt. 1, at 267 (1986), reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2941-42 (separate and dissenting views of Rep. Florio and nine
other Representatives) ("To eliminate unnecessary litigation, the.., amendment establishes
public participation procedures which will allow all interested persons ... to advise the
Administrator concerning the nature and scope of the remedial action plans ... including
notice and a reasonable opportunity for comment on the proposed remedial action plan.").
236. See Cabot Corp. v. United States EPA, 677 F. Supp. 823, 828-29 (E.D. Pa.
1988).
237. This meta-policy is described supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text. See
also Cabot Corp., 677 F. Supp. at 829 n.6.
238. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c (1988 &
Supp. 11 1990).
239. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where the court, in the absence of a specific grant
of jurisdiction, held that "it is the responsibility of the courts to reverse" an agency decision
when "the decision was reached procedurally without individualized consideration and
balancing of environmental factors--conducted fully and in good faith." Id. at 1115. But
cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519 (1978), where the court held that nothing in NEPA, other pertinent statutes, or past
agency practice permitted a court "to overturn the rulemaking proceeding on the basis of
procedural devices employed (or not employed) by the [Atomic Energy] Commission [when
considering environmental effects associated with certain nuclear power reactors in licensing proceedings] so long as the Commission employed at least the statutory minima." Id.
at 548. Courts also have sought to ensure NEPA's procedural effectiveness by holding that
an irreparable injury may occur if an agency is allowed to build momentum toward and
commit itself bureaucratically to a particular action before completing the procedures
mandated by NEPA. See Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952-53 (1st Cir. 1983) (citing
cases).

HarvardEnvironmentalLaw Review

[Vol. 17:1

Finally, unlike the issue of the sufficiency of cleanliness standards, 240 Congress has defined no other mechanism to ensure a
fair process for considering claims about the effects of implementing a response action. 24' It is anomalous for Congress to
establish a process that allows these claims to be raised administratively so as to encourage public participation in and support of
the cleanup, but that fails to provide any means to ensure adequate
consideration in developing the response action; 242 the absence of
meaningful review would likely subvert local support for the
cleanup and lead the public to question whether EPA is seriously
243
concerned about important local public health issues.
The process that Congress specified for reviewing the adequacy of cleanlinegs standards is not, however, irrelevant to the
availability of preimplementation review of health-based claims
relating to response action implementation. In the cleanliness standard context, Congress's limited remedy indicates concern that
the Superfund not bear undue costs of cleanup and that EPA have
discretion to weigh the costs and benefits associated with a Superfund-financed cleanup. 244 This congressional intent should in240. See supra notes 217-223 and accompanying text.
241. Notwithstanding the important policies that would be served by allowing preimplementation review of the limited type of health claim at issue here, review has its costs.
As the Seventh Circuit indicated in another context when it rejected a request for preimplementation review of a remedial action, "challenges to the procedure employed in
selecting a remedy nevertheless impact the implementation of the remedy and result in the
same delays Congress sought to avoid by passage of the statute." Schalk v. Reilly, 900
F.2d 1091, 1097 (7th Cir. 1990).
242. Indeed, language in a House Report suggests that the citizens suit provision
would be available for review when claims of illegality under CERCLA would otherwise
not receive adequate review. See H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 108, reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2890 ("The [citizens suit] section provides a safeguard for citizens
who have been unable to obtain redress from EPA, other Federal facilities, states or
responsible parties.").
243. Cooper Indus. v. EPA, 775 F. Supp. 1027, 1038 (W.D. Mich. 1991) holds broadly
that § 13(h)'s "ban on preimplementation review extends not only to parties' contentions
that the remedy selected does not meet the substantive requirements of CERCLA, but also
to procedural claims regarding the EPA's remedy selection process." Id. This court's
holding went beyond the plaintiff's original claims that EPAs proposed response was
unnecessarily costly and that the PRP would be held liable for improperly high cleanup
costs. Id. at 1038-39. The court instead could have decided the case on the more limited
grounds that Congress intended review of these liability issues to be foreclosed until EPA
brings an enforcement action to recover response costs. See supra notes 132-139.
244. See supra notes 227-229 and accompanying text. This intent that EPA make its
best judgment about the use of the Superfund is also evident in the broad discretion that
Congress gave to EPA in deciding the general priority for cleanups in the light of the limited
funds available. See S. REP. No. 848, supra note 12, at 57, reprinted in 1 CERCLA
HIsTORY, supra note 12, at 364 ("In order to achieve the maximum protection of public
health, welfare and the environment with the limited resources of the Fund, the President
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crease judicial deference to a decision by EPA to pursue a response
action, notwithstanding contrary public comment, because EPA
concludes that a potential lower-risk cleanup plan simply does not
warrant the increased costs to the Superfund of implementing that
safer plan.
b. Availability of Immediate Review of Claims Unrelated to
CERCLA Liability Issues
A litigant seeking review of a CERCLA claim unrelated to
the issue of liability for response costs under section 107245 may
use other strategies to support a claim for immediate review. Reliance on the basic strategies already identified in discussing liability claims 246 should have a greater chance of succeeding when
the underlying claim is not related to liability for two reasons.
First, because CERCLA identifies proceedings to litigate liability
2 47
for section 107 response costs as an exception to section 113(h),
courts properly mistrust efforts to hasten the liability determination which was intended to begin only after the government initiates an enforcement action. 248 Second, when the claim being raised
is unrelated to liability, competing policy considerations, such as
the protection of public health and the environment, the speed of
the cleanup process, or the adequacy of delayed review, may weigh
in favor of immediate review and prompt courts to define the scope
of section 113(h) more narrowly.
In particular, plaintiffs raising these claims which are unrelated to CERCLA liability rely on the strategy that the claim at
issue does not present "any challenges to removal or remedial
action selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any
order issued under section 9606(a) of this title,"2 49 and thus hope
may have to balance the need for a capital-intensive remedy at one site or facility against
the need to respond to other releases, discharges or disposal.").
245. 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
246. Those three basic strategies are: (1) narrowly defining the meaning of removal
and remedial action, see supra part III.A. 1; (2) making citizens suit jurisdiction broadly
available, see supra part III.A.2; and (3) allowing immediate review when delayed review
will be inadequate, see supra part III.A.3.
247. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1); see also id. §§ 9613(h)(2) & 9613(h)(5).

248. Congress intended that PRPs would have a right to review of liability issues
only after EPA brought a cost recovery action. See supra notes 70-72 (discussing legislative
history).
249. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).
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to avoid review preclusion under section 113. In Alabama v.
EPA,250 the court had to decide whether Alabama could receive
immediate review of its claim that EPA had violated CERCLA in
allowing hazardous substances removed from a site in Texas to be
permanently deposited at a large waste disposal site in Alabama.2 51
Although the court specifically rejected the plaintiffs' argument
that their suit was "not a challenge to the remedial action plan
selected for the ...

site" and therefore fell outside the scope of

section 113(h), 252 the court nevertheless proceeded to decide this
claim on the merits, notwithstanding the terms of section 113 .253
In allowing review, the court apparently distinguished between a challenge to the remedial action, for which there is no
jurisdiction, and a challenge to the procedures resulting in the
selection of the remedial action, for which there is jurisdiction.2 54
This approach appears to preclude review of the substance of the
section 104 response action, which may be conducted only in the
limited proceedings identified in section 113(h), but to permit immediate review of the procedures resulting in the response action. 255 Although the Alabama court did not express its views
250. 871 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1989).
251. Id. at 1551.
252. Id. at 1559.
253. See id. (addressing and rejecting claims on the merits "[tlo the extent plaintiffs'
complaint may in part be read as not challenging the remedial action plan and therefore
not removed from federal jurisdiction by § 113(h)"). The plaintiffs' claims related to whether,
under § 104(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(2), EPA should have allowed Alabama to participate
as an affected state in public hearings on the appropriate remedial action. Alabama, 871
F.2d at 1556. The court held that Alabama was not an affected state at the time EPA issued
the ROD. Id. at 1559. The court also held on the merits that citizens of Alabama were not
"interested persons" or "affected persons" within the meaning of § 113(k)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(k)(2)(B), at the time EPA issued the ROD. Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1559. Finally, the
court held that EPA complied with the publication and comment requirements of §§ 117(a)(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9617(a)-(b). Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1559.
254. See Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1560. Several provisions of CERCLA identify the
required procedures. See supra Part II for an overview of CERCLA's response action
procedures. The plaintiffs' claims in this case related to failure to comply with § 104(c)(2)
and § 113(k). See Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1556. The court rejected the plaintiffs' procedural
claim under § 117(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9617(c), and stated that, even when a revised remedial
plan differs significantly from the original plan, CERCLA merely requires that EPA publish
the reason for the change in the remedial plan. See Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1558-59.
255. If a citizens suit were brought to challenge the procedures, a court might
conclude that such a procedural challenge applies by definition to actions that have been
taken and that are alleged to be inadequate. See 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (quoted supra note 125);
see also supra note 197 (discussing legislative history supporting construction of citizens
suit provision to require completed action). The plaintiff's action in such a case would
therefore arguably fall within the exception for citizens suits identified in § 113(h)(4). The
Alabama court apparently rejected this reading of § I13(h)(4) when it held that a remedial
action must be completed before a citizens suit may challenge it. See supra note 191 and
accompanying text.
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directly, its decision to review the plaintiffs' procedural challenges
seems to reflect a concern about whether review delayed until the
remedial action has been completed is adequate. Once the remedial
action is completed, review would be wholly inadequate because
256
the procedural claims would be moot.
Another court's willingness to construe narrowly the scope of
section 113(h)'s preclusion ofjudicial review appears in the context
of non-liability claims in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v.
EPA.257 In this case, the owner of one of the very few incinerators
"capable of destroying polychlorinated biphenyls 258 brought a
claim contending that EPA had violated CERCLA when it relied
on its off-site policy to bar the incinerator from receiving and
incinerating PCB-contaminated wastes generated during CERCLA
response actions.25 9 The claimant was therefore neither a PRP nor
a citizen affected by implementation of a response action. EPA
moved to dismiss, contending that the action was precluded by
260
section 113(h).
Although EPA had specifically relied on section 106(a) 261 in
promulgating the off-site policy, which was the subject in part of
the plaintiff's challenge, the court concluded that CERCLA did
not foreclose jurisdiction. 262 The court identified both a technical
statutory basis and a functional, policy-based rationale for its decision to proceed with review of the CERCLA claim. First, the
court relied on one of the threshold statutory stress points to justify
its holding that there was jurisdiction: the court simply concluded
that the claim did not involve a challenge to a section 106 order
and that section 113(h) was accordingly inapplicable. 263 Second,
256. See supra part III.B.2.a.iv.
257. 673 F. Supp. 1043 (D. Kan. 1987).

258. Id. at 1045.
259. Id. at 1044-45. This long-standing dispute involved EPA's application of its "offsite policy" for CERCLA and of 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(3), which was enacted as part of
SARA. See Chemical Waste Management, 673 F. Supp. at 1047-53.
260. Id. at 1054.
261. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
262. Chemical Waste Management, 673 F. Supp. at 1055.
263. See id., where the court states that:
[A]s a technical matter, the present ineligibility of the SCA-Chicago facility
derives from SARA section 121(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(3), and not from the
off-site policy [promulgated under section 106]. The facility is receiving wastes
from sites whose records of decision are governed by the off-site policy. So,
in a strict sense, section 113(h) is facially inapplicable.
This conclusory rationale does not explain why the challenge does not attack an order
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the court relied on the purposes of the statute and held that immediate review should be available. 2 64 CERCLA's goals would be
served in such cases because immediate review would not delay
the cleanup of CERCLA sites and because delayed review would
be inadequate. The court concluded that Congress had intended
to foreclose review in order to ensure that cleanups are not delayed,2 65 but found that the remedy sought would in fact hasten
cleanups because the specific EPA policy being challenged had
actually slowed the pace of cleanups. 266 The court also found that
its second policy rationale-ensuring adequate judicial reviewwas implicit in CERCLA 267 and that delayed review of the plainissued under § 106, since § 106 authorized the off-site policy. Nor does it recognize that
§ 104 response actions address the handling of materials removed from a CERCLA site.
The court's flawed reasoning could therefore allow a claimant to circumvent § 113(h) by
relying on some other substantive provision of CERCLA in challenging a specific portion
of a response action.
In werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 891 (D. Minn. 1990), the district court
reached a conclusion contrary to the holding in Chemical Waste Management. The plaintiffs
in Werlein contended, on the basis of the title of the Federal Facility Agreement that applied
to the cleanup, that § 113(h) did not bar review because "the remedial actions at [the site]
were not selected under section 9604, but rather under section 9620," the CERCLA provision directly relating to federal facilities. Werlein, 746 F. Supp. at 891. The court rejected
this argument, holding that the response action formalized in the agreement was authorized
by and selected under § 104, but was only subjected to the procedural requirements of
§ 120 because a federal facility was involved. Id. at 891-92. See also id. at 892 ("If, as the
Court believes, section 9604 applies to federal facilities, then there is no rationale for
including a second CERCLA section which separately empowers remedial action.").
264. See supra note 109 (discussing judicial reliance on general purposes of a statute
in construing the statute, and identifying criticisms of this approach to statutory
construction).
265. See Chemical Waste Management, 673 F. Supp. at 1055 ("[The legislative
history of section 113(h) establishes that it was designed to preclude piecemeal review and
excessive delay of cleanup.").
266. The court stated in this regard that:
The [challenged] policy enforced by the EPA in determining CERCLA eligibility [to receive materials removed during cleanups] has resulted in documented delays in effectuating the cleanup at CERCLA sites . .

.

. [S]everal

remedial actions have had to be stopped because of a lack of disposal capacity
... .
In this lawsuit, the plaintiffs do not seek any remedy that will
result in a delayed cleanup, but rather seek relief that could speed up the
disposal of wastes.
Id.
267. Id. The court noted that "section 113(h) implicitly contemplates that in foreclosing a lawsuit in federal court, an aggrieved party will still have an opportunity to be
heard in an action following the completion of the cleanup." Id. It likely referred to the
most typical preenforcement review situation, when a PRP wishes to litigate liability issues,
notwithstanding that those issues may be reviewed adequately in a cost recovery action
brought by the government under § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. Judge Posner located a policy
of ensuring adequate review in the title of § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h): "Timing Of
Review." See supra part III.A.3.
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tiff's claim would be inadequate since it would prevent the plaintiff
from receiving Superfund dollars. 268 Because these CERCLA policies converged, the court found a strong case for immediate judicial review under CERCLA.
This approach by the Chemical Waste Management court,
allowing immediate review of a challenge to a specific EPA procedure, in many respects resembles a construction of CERCLA
that would allow immediate review of a citizens suit challenging a
proposed response action prior to implementation because of the
risks that implementing the chosen plan allegedly poses to public
health. 269 In both situations, from a claimant's perspective, the
plain meaning of the statutory text is at best ambiguous, and surely
would allow a conclusion that there is no immediate jurisdiction.
To overcome this language, the claimant therefore must rely on
other important policies-adequacy of review,270 protection of public health, 27' and prompt cleanups. 72 These policies may strongly
favor immediate review. First, the inadequacy of delayed review
is plain in both contexts. Regarding the other policies, however,
the two contexts differ. In Chemical Waste Management, the
claimant convinced the court that both of the other policies would
be served by immediate review, making the holding granting review relatively uncontroversial. In the case of a citizen wishing to
assert a health-based claim, however, the claimant will likely have
to convince the court that CERCLA's broad policy to protect
human health and the environment outweighs the intent that there
be no delay in cleanups. This health-based claim will necessarily
present a harder case for a court because review of such a claim
268. See Chemical Waste Management, 673 F. Supp. at 1055. The court declared:

['1o the extent that plaintiffs ... are presently being foreclosed from receiving
a substantial dollar amount of hazardous waste business because of EPA's

wrongful actions, there exists no effective protection of their rights except for
this lawsuit. The court will not read section 113(h) . . . to eliminate any
opportunity for the plaintiffs vo be heard.
Id.
269. Such a theory is proposed supra part III.B.2.a.iv. The theory presented earlier
is stronger, however, because it is grounded more firmly on CERCLA's text, structure and

policies.
270. This important meta-principle should affect statutory construction and is arguably implicit in CERCLA. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.

271. See supra notes 11, 25 & 192 (identifying Congress's intent that CERCLA
protect public health); see also supra note 207 (relating the intent to speed cleanups to the

underlying intent to protect public health).
272. See supra notes 11 & 78.
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will slow the cleanup, thereby undercutting an important and wellarticulated CERCLA policy.2 73 Thus not all claims unrelated to
CERCLA response costs liability stand an equal chance of gaining
immediate review.
IV.

Is JUDICIAL REVIEW FORECLOSED WHEN PLAINTIFFS SEEK
TO LITIGATE ISSUES RELATED TO LIABILITY OR TO THE
ADEQUACY OF CERCLA CLEANUPS UNDER OTHER STATUTORY
SCHEMES?

This second principal group of cases allows plaintiffs an entirely new strategy for persuading courts to allow immediate review of CERCLA issues despite section 113(h)'s broad preclusion
of review. This different approach entails seeking review of a
CERCLA response action by asserting claims under another statutory scheme.
This strategy may offer important advantages to a claimant
who requests assistance from the courts in light of claimed incon273. In addition to this conflict with a CERCLA policy, allowing immediate review
of the health-based claim would be in tension with the language of § 113(h)(4), which refers
to cleanups that have already been implemented. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4).
At least one other consideration is important to a court's decision about whether to
hear immediately a citizens suit claim. A claim that on its face is both unrelated to liability
and intended to promote the public health may still fail to sidestep the review preclusion
provision. When a PRP raises a CERCLA claim that appears unrelated to liability for
response costs, a court will more likely find review to be precluded than it would have if
another party had raised the claim. PRP non-liability claims will most typically threaten
the speed and extent of a cleanup. Yet Congress determined that PRPs should shoulder
the potential harms associated with delayed review until the government brings a cost
recovery action. Moreover, it often may be arguable that, despite the PRP's averment to
the contrary, such a claim by a PRP actually relates to the extent of response cost liability.
One example of review preclusion in this context is Environmental Waste Control,
Inc. v. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 763 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Ga.
1991). There, the plaintiffs owned and operated a landfill that posed a risk to public health.
Id. at 1578. Pursuant to the discretion provided in § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604, the defendant
agency performed an assessment of the risks to the public posed by suspected or known
health hazards at the landfill. Environmental Waste Control,763 F. Supp. at 1578-79. The
plaintiffs' action, brought shortly after the assessment was published, challenged the legality
of the assessment. Id. at 1579. Plaintiffs alleged that the assessment was false and misleading, that it had damaged their business reputation, and that the process leading to its
publication was unconstitutional. See id. at 1579. Relying on CERCLA's "very broad
definition for 'removal,"' the court stated that "the definition for 'removal' encompasses
the preparation of health assessments," which EPA uses to monitor and assess the health
risks posed by releases. Id. at 1580. The court, relying as well on Congress's intent that
cleanups not be slowed, also stated that "the statutory provisions . . . make plain that
health assessments are an integral part of a series of regulatory measures which Congress
evidently desires to allow to proceed unhindered up to a certain point." Id. The court
finally held that preparation of the health assessment is an action "selected" under § 104
and that the terms of § 113(h) foreclosing review applied in this case. Id.
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sistencies arising from the interaction of different statutory
schemes.2 74 Such interstatutory inconsistencies might render the
ordinarily clear plain meaning of a statute ambiguous when read
in its broader context,2 75 and it is a function of the courts to
recognize and reconcile this conflict.2 76 Yet the methods of reso274. Professor Eskridge has written that courts should exercise decisionmaking discretion over legislation, insofar as the legislature "will often give orders that become
inconsistent over time, thereby impelling the agent [i.e., the courts] to alter one or more
Eskridge, supra note 106, at 327. See Wellington & Albert, supra note
of the orders ....
118, at 1550 ("Judicial legislation is a necessary condition of the legal system because
legislatures deal with problems prospectively, cannot foresee all they deal with, and cannot
resolve all they do foresee."); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 106, at 121. Legislative
directives may eventually become inconsistent through simple inadvertence, since "[o]nly
the most omniscient legislature could prevent statutory policies from colliding with one
another." Eskridge, supra note 106, at 337-38. See also IA NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.09 (C. Dallas Sands ed., 4th ed. 1985). Since
statutes fall within a broad pattern of legislation and temporal change, a court resorts to
political values to reconcile inconsistency between a particular statute and the larger
statutory scheme. See Popkin, supra note 106, at 614.
275. "An internal contextual ambiguity may result, for example, from an internal
inconsistency: When one provision plainly contradicts another, which is intended to prevail?
Contextual ambiguities may also be external. Thus a statute may bear a similarly ambiguous
relationship to another statute with which it is inconsistent." DICKERSON, supra note 109,
at 47. Indeed, such inconsistencies are to be expected. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 106, at
213 ("The possibility that Congress, on occasion, does pass inconsistent statutes or does
not know that what it is passing today is repealing, by implication, what it passed last
month or last year is a real one.")
276. See Wellington & Albert, supra note 118, at 1551 ("Reliance on the plain
meaning rule seems especially misplaced where two or more statutes . . . bear upon an
issue before the court. To assume that accommodation or reconciliation of apparently
conflicting statutes is work only for the legislature is to ignore the dynamics of the legislative
process."); Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and
the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 868 (arguing that if courts
fail to take into account "that statutory interpretation involves many different statutes and
applications of those statutes to different substantive problems in different legal postures,"
"will reach counterproductive or senseless results." (footnotes omitted)).
These interstatutory ambiguities present new problems for courts engaging in statutory interpretation. This Article has already discussed the ambiguities that may arise when
construing a statute within its own four corners, see supra notes 106 & 116, or when looking
as well to the legislative history of that one statute, see supra note 109.
Given the broad language of § 113(h), overinclusiveness would likely pose a serious
problem if a court focused only on the text of CERCLA and ignored interstatutory interactions. This discussion has previously identified overinclusiveness as one of the serious
problems associated with textualism aid has examined the critical role that courts play in
narrowing statutory language that may prove to be overbroad. See supra note 145. Train
v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1 (1976), provides a significant
example of this judicial function in the context of statutory interactions. There, the Supreme
Court concluded that the meaning of "radioactive materials" in the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act ("FWPCA") was not plain and had to be interpreted in light of the Atomic
Energy Act ("AEA") and the important policies served by that statute. The Court concluded
that:
reliance on the "plain meaning" of the words "radioactive materials" contained
in the definition of "pollutant" in the FWPCA contributes little to our understanding of whether Congress intended the [FWPCA] to encompass the regu-

HarvardEnvironmentalLaw Review

[Vol. 17:1

lution employed likewise lack consistency. Courts may fashion a
judicial resolution to this type of ambiguity through a practical
reasoning approach to statutory construction, which seeks to acknowledge and harmonize the relevant statutory directives, 77 or
through a mechanical application of traditional canons of statutory
construction. These two approaches, however, often point in opposite directions.278
lation of source, byproduct, and special nuclear materials. To have included
these materials under the FWPCA would have marked a significant alteration
of the pervasive regulatory scheme embodied in the AEA. Far from containing
the clear indication of legislative intent that we might expect before recognizing
such a change in policy, the legislative history reflects, on balance, an intention
to preserve the pre-existing regulatory plan.
Id. at 23-24 (citation and footnote omitted); see supra note 118 (discussing the applicability
of a clear statement requirement when a statute fundamentally alters the underlying law).
The Court's treatment of interstatutory ambiguities contrasts with the position that Justice
Scalia has articulated. See Aleinikoff, supra note 136, at 30 n.54, where the author critiques
Justice Scalia's textualist position:
Well-schooled in public choice theory, Scalia knows that it is perilous to believe
that similar terms used in different statutes refer to similar concepts. There is
little evidence that Congress seeks or achieves such coherence. Thus Justice
Scalia seems to be exchanging one fiction (legislative intent) for another (consistency of meaning across statutes). There may be good reasons for indulging
in such a fiction .

. .

. But one can hardly do so on the basis of-the public

choice theory that Scalia uses against intentionalism.
Id.
277. As articulated by Professors Eskridge and Frickey, practical reasoning is "an
approach that eschews objectivist theories in favor of a mixture of inductive and deductive
reasoning (similar to the practice of the common law), seeking contextual justification for
the best legal answer among the potential alternatives." Eskridge & Frickey, supra note
106, at 322 n.3 (emphasis added). Many years before these authors described the practical
reasoning approach to statutory construction, other prominent scholars recommended a
similar approach for courts faced with statutory inconsistencies. Cf., e.g., Alexander M.
Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:The Lincoln
Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31 (1957) ("It is for the Court in such cases [in which
'Congress had its eye . . . on results and not on the havoc it might wreak in achieving
them'] to give pause, not to invoke constitutional prohibitions, but to give a chance for a
better-informed second thought."). Thus, a court's effort to harmonize statutory goals when
construing problematic language comports with the judicial role in the legal process and
leaves Congress with an opportunity to amend the.statute if the court errs.
278. See Posner, supra note 106, at 806, where the author states that:
The usual criticism of the canons ... is that for every canon one might bring
to bear on a point there is an equal and opposite canon, so that the outcome
of the interpretive process depends on the choice between paired oppositesa choice the canons themselves do not illuminate .... I think the criticism is
correct, but I also think that most of the canons are just plain wrong.
Id. (footnote omitted). See generally Symposium, A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation,45 VAND. L. REv. 529 (1992) (discussing from various points of view
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A litigant wishing to gain immediate review of a CERCLA
cleanup may benefit from this strategy if the litigant can bring suit
pursuant to an identifiable statute associated with a strong policy
favoring prompt consideration of the statutory claim. A court
might hear these claims immediately, notwithstanding the broad
terms of section 113(h), if it is unwilling to hold that CERCLA has
impliedly foreclosed the federal court review that Congress had
provided to further other policies of other statutes. Because of the
complex issues of statutory construction arising in this context,
"one of the most challenging tasks of any court is to unpack
'

interacting statutory policies. "279
This Part of the Article considers three paradigm cases where
claimants have presented-with varying degrees of success-a
the place of the canons of statutory construction in contemporary law). For a recent
example of the canons of statutory construction supporting contrary interpretive conclusions, see American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992), where Justice Scalia,
in dissent, states that "[e]ven if it were the case that my reading of the clause rendered [a
statutory] phrase superfluous, I would consider that a small price to pay for adhering to
the competing (and more important) canon that statutory language should be construed in
accordance with its ordinary meaning." Id. at 2481.
In the present context, the generally recognized canon is that "repeals by implication
are not favored." Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). See also Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974); IA SINGER, supra note 274, § 23.09 ("[S]ubsequent
legislation is not presumed to repeal the existing law in the absence of expressed intent."
(footnote omitted)). A contrary canon, however, is the "established rule of statutory construction: leges posteriores, priores contrariasabrogant." Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259,
285 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart explains that this canon requires that,
when two statutes directly conflict, the later statute is to be given effect; see also 1A
SINGER, supra note 274, § 23.09 (In the case of irreconcilable conflict between two statutes,
"the latest legislative expression prevails, and the prior law yields to the extent of the
conflict." (footnotes omitted)).
Judge Posner has devoted scholarly attention to the "popular" canon disfavoring
repeal by implication. Posner, supra note 106, at 812. Suggesting that the explanatory
rationale that Congress "combs" the statutes and explicitly repeals any statute conflicting
with a new one is implausible, Posner argues against the canon:
Since total foresight is not possible, if some latent inconsistency becomes actual
all a court can do is figure out as best it can whether Congress would have
wanted to forbid the inconsistent application of the old statute or give less
scope to the new one.
An alternative basis for this canon is the idea that if the choice is between
giving less scope to the new statute and cutting down the intended scope of
the old (because both cannot be enforced fully without conflict), Congress must
desire the courts to do the first. But there is no basis for this imputation of
congressional purpose, and the opposite inference is if anything more plausible-that the enacting Congress cares more about its statutes than those of
previous Congresses.
Id. at 812-13.
279. Eskridge, supra note 106, at 338.
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conflict between statutory purposes to support the argument that
immediate judicial review should be available. The first case arises
when a PRP seeks to have a CERCLA claim extinguished in a
bankruptcy proceeding and EPA contends that CERCLA bars the
review sought by the PRP prior to a cost recovery action. 280 The
second paradigm case occurs when a plaintiff seeks early statutory
review of claims presented under other statutes and the government argues that section 113(h) of CERCLA nonetheless bars
review of the claim. 281 The final case arises when a plaintiff seeks
to raise a claim arising under another statute that does not itself
provide for statutory review and the government seeks dismissal
on the ground that CERCLA forecloses jurisdiction. 282 The relevant language in CERCLA applicable to all three cases is both
broad 283 and categorical: "No Federal court shall have jurisdiction
under Federal law other than under section 1332 of Title 28 ...
to review any challenges to removal or remedial action selected
under section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued under
section 9606(a) of this title," except in certain defined proceedings
that are inapplicable prior to enforcement or implementation.28 4

280. This type of case is discussed infra part IV.A.
281. This type of case is discussed infra part IV.B.
282. This type of case is discussed infra part IV.C.

283. See Reardon v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 558, 563 (D. Mass. 1990) (section
113(h) limitation on jurisdiction "drafted broadly"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 947 F.2d

1509, 1515 (1st Cir. 1991) (en bane). Furthermore, the legislative history "reflect[s] the
intent that section 9613(h) apply broadly." Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 894
(D. Minn. 1990). Comments by legislators, in particular, suggest that the provision was
intended to be broad enough to foreclose review under other statutes. See 132 CONG. REC.
S14,929 (daily ed. Ost. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) ("The timing of review
section is intended to be comprehensive. It covers all lawsuits, under any authority,
concerning the response actions that are performed by EPA .... The section also covers
all issues that could be construed as a challenge to the response, and limits those challenges

to the opportunities specifically set forth in the section.") (emphasis added); 132 CONG.
REC. H9582 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Glickman) ("[Section 113(h)] covers

all issues that could be construed as a challenge to the response, and limits challenges to
the opportunities specifically set forth in the section."); id. (statement of Rep. Glickman)
("[C]itizens, including potentially responsible parties, cannot seek review of the response
action or their potential liability for a response action unless the suit falls within one of the
categories provided in this section."); cf. S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1985)
("[T]he scheme and purposes of CERCLA would be disrupted by affording judicial review

of orders or response actions prior to commencement of a government enforcement or cost
recovery action.").
284. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (emphasis added).
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A. May a PRP's CERCLA Liability Be Dischargedin a
Bankruptcy Proceeding that Occurs Before EPA Attempts to
Recover its Cleanup Costs Under Section 107?
As previously explained, the best case for foreclosing review
under CERCLA until EPA initiates a response action occurs when
a PRP seeks to litigate the existence or scope of its liability under
the Act. Such claims threaten to delay cleanups and specifically
were intended to be litigated only after the United States itself
brings the cost recovery action under section 107.285 How should
a court respond, however, if rather than merely bringing an early
claim against EPA, the PRP files for bankruptcy and seeks to have
any claim available to EPA for CERCLA response costs discharged in bankruptcy?
Bankruptcy is indeed one area of the law in which several
courts have recognized a plain "conflict" with the policies of CERCLA:2 86 the Bankruptcy Code policy goal that debtors achieve a
"fresh start, an objective made more feasible by maximizing the
scope of a discharge, ' 21 87 sometimes collides with the intent of
CERCLA that cleanups be pursued promptly with "litigation about
88
cleanup costs [delayed] until after the cleanup. 2
Courts so far have endorsed various approaches to interpreting CERCLA based upon consideration of interactions between
these two statutory schemes. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit was the first appellate court to decide whether section
113(h) affects a bankruptcy court's ability to discharge claims
related to a PRP's CERCLA liability before EPA has itself sought
to recover those costs under section 107. In In re Chateaugay,2 89
285. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., In re Combustion Equip. Assocs., Inc., 838 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1988);

Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington N.R.R., 133 B.R. 648, 654 (D. Minn. 1991); see
also In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 779 (7th Cir. 1992)
("CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Act are two sweeping statutes both with very important

purposes. The problem is that the goals underlying these statutes do not always coincide.");
In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991) ("the Bankruptcy Code and

CERCLA point toward competing objectives"); In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397,
404 (N.D. Tex. 1992) ("CERCLA and the [Bankruptcy] Code are in tension in significant
respects"); cf. In re Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (balancing

"the debtor's right to reorganize its affairs in a rational way" against the "administrative[]
difficult[y]" for environmental agencies that must present certain claims for response costs
that will otherwise be discharged in bankruptcy), aff'd, 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
287. In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1002.
288. In re Combustion Equip., 838 F.2d at 37. That policy is the substance of § 113(h).

289. 944 F.2d 997.
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LTV Corporation ("LTV") sought reorganization under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code.2 90 During the proceeding, the company
identified contingent claims held by EPA and state environmental
agencies. 291 Thereafter, "EPA filed a proof of claim for approximately $32 million, representing response costs incurred pre-petition at 14 sites where LTV had been identified as a [PRP] under
CERCLA." 292 The government then sought a declaratory judgment
that the response costs to be incurred after bankruptcy confirmation could not be discharged, 293 and appealed the district court's
decision that all pre-petition claims, including claims for CERCLA
occurred prior to
cleanup costs relating to hazardous releases that 294
the petition, could be estimated and discharged.
Presented with what the parties identified as "a conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA, ' 2 95 the Second Circuit
first stated that the result EPA sought would not necessarily promote environmental goals because it might encourage corporations
to seek Chapter 7 liquidation or dissolution under state law, ulti296
mately reducing sums available to pay CERCLA response costs.
The court also stated, however, that it would construe any inconsistencies in favor of the bankruptcy policy because of the broad
intent of the bankruptcy statute,2 97 an intent that a statute with a
narrower focus could not overcome. 298 The court finally responded
290. Id. at 999.
291. Id.

292. Id. The $32 million proof of claim was, in EPA's view, possibly only a fraction
of LTV's total CERCLA liability. The response action had been completed at only one of
the sites and LTV may have been liable for response costs to be incurred at additional
sites. See id.
293. See id. at 1000.
294. See id. at 1000-01.
295. Id. at 1002.
296. Id. The court stated in greater detail:
[w]hile EPA obviously prefers in this case to keep its CERCLA claim outside
of bankruptcy so that it may present it, without reduction, against the reorganized company that it anticipates will emerge from bankruptcy, one may
well speculate whether, if unincurred CERCLA response costs are not claims,
some corporations facing substantial environmental claims will be able to
reorganize at all.
Id. at 1005.
297. Id. at 1002 ("[The B~ankruptcy statute ... is intended to override many provisions of law that would apply in the absence of bankruptcy--especially laws otherwise
providing creditors suing promptly with full payment of their claims.").
298. The court stated in this regard that:
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directly to EPA's argument that section 113(h)'s "ban on preenforcement judicial review requires that it receive a declaratory
judgment upholding its contention that unincurred response costs

are not dischargeable 'claims.'

' '299

Relying on the most basic in-

terpretive strategy available under CERCLA, the court rejected

EPA's argument in very concise and conclusory terms:
CERCLA's prohibition of pre-enforcement review is simply
inapplicable. The Court is not being called upon to "review any
challenges to removal or remedial action selected under section
9604 of this title, or to review any order issued under section
9606(a) of this title." 42 U.S.C. sec. 9613(h) (1988). We therefore need not decide whether CERCLA's ban on pre-enforcement review, if applicable, would constitute an implied repeal
of the authority otherwise
conferred on federal courts by the
300
Bankruptcy Code.

Thus, the Second Circuit did not address the issue of implied
repeal,3 0 but instead it relied upon an overly narrow construction
of section 113(h).
If the Code, fairly construed, creates limits on the extent of environmental
cleanup efforts, the remedy is for Congress to make exceptions to the Code to
achieve other objectives that Congress chooses to reach, rather than for courts
to restrict the meaning of across-the-board legislation like a bankruptcy law in
order to promote objectives evident in more focused statutes.
Id. As the court subsequently made clear, the court did not view § 113(h) as a limited,
implied repeal of the Bankruptcy Code, notwithstanding its broad preclusion of federal
court jurisdiction. See id. at 1006. The court did not, however, detail further the reasoning
behind its decision that the Bankruptcy Code is the "broad legislation" that must receive
priority in enforcement.
The court failed to consider the more coherent, contrary approach that inconsistent
statutes be construed by giving primary effect to the statute with a limited, special focus.
See Alabama ex rel. Siegelman v. EPA, 911 F.2d 499, 504 (11th Cir. 1990) ("traditionalview" is that "specific statutes prevail over general statutes dealing with the same basic
subjects" (citations omitted)); Popkin, supra note 106, at 615-16 ("The assumptioni is that
the legislature intends the more specific statute to prevail, given the close attention to detail
implied by the statute's specificity."); cf. supra note 278 (critiquing repeal by implication
canon of statutory construction); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp
Fin., Inc., 112 S.Ct. 459 (1991) (holding that Bankruptcy Code automatic stay provision,
11 U.S.C. § 362, does not qualify or supersede plain, preclusive language of Financial
Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1)).
299. In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1006.
300. Id.
301. See supra note 278 for discussion of the implied repeal canon of statutory
construction.
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Determining a PRP's liability for CERCLA cleanup costs necessarily involves review of the EPA response action under section
104. Even to estimate contingent liability under section 502(c) of
the Bankruptcy Code, 30 2 a court must consider whether the cor-

poration that has filed for bankruptcy is a responsible party under
section 107 of CERCLA and whether EPA is claiming proper
response costs. 30 3 The court accordingly erred in deciding that
jurisdiction to estimate
section 113(h) was irrelevant to the court's
304
bankruptcy.
in
and discharge claims
302. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1988).
303. The leading treatise on bankruptcy law includes the following description about
the estimation of contingent claims: "In estimating a claim, the bankruptcy court should
use whatever method is best suited to the particular circumstances. Although the bankruptcy court is bound by the legal rules which govern the ultimate value of the claim, there
are no other limitations on the court's authority to estimate claims." 3 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 502.03, at 502-75 (15th ed. 1991) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Federal
appellate courts concur that, when estimating contingent or unliquidated claims, a "[bankruptcy] court is bound by the legal rules which may govern the ultimate value of the claim.
For example, when the claim is based on an alleged breach of contract, the court must
estimate its worth in accordance with accepted contract law." Bittner v. Borne Chem. Co.,
691 F.2d 134, 135 (3d Cir. 1982) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Accord In re Brints
Cotton Mktg., Inc., 737 F.2d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1984); see also In re Lane, 68 B.R. 609,
613 (D. Haw. 1986) (estimating value of unliquidated misrepresentation claim based on the
likelihood of its success); see generally Note, Proceduresfor Estimating Contingent or
UnliquidatedClaims in Bankruptcy, 35 STAN. L. REv. 153 (1982).
In the context of estimating a contingent claim for CERCLA cleanup costs, courts
estimating the claim's worth will consider whether the bankrupt person is liable under
§ 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607, and whether the costs sought are consistent with the NCP. See
supra note 45 and accompanying text. As previously discussed, review of these issues
necessarily involves review of a response action or a § 106 order barred by 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(h).
304. In the decision under review by the Second Circuit, the district court had
recognized that allowing discharge and estimation of CERCLA claims related to pre-petition
releases would result in "administrative difficulties," but believed that such difficulties "are
more properly directed to Congress, which may, if it chooses, provide appropriate legislative redress. They are not and should not be a basis for this Court to imply an exception
to the Bankruptcy Code which Congress has not yet seen fit to enact ..."In re Chateaugay
Corp., 112 B.R. 513, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991). The lower
court had described these administrative difficulties in the following terms:
At best, the Court has been told that it will be administratively difficult for
state and federal environmental agencies to determine and select which sites
should be subject to enforcement action and what remedies should be pursued
as to each because of the large number of potentially hazardous sites. However,
these problems can be dealt with by increasing the resources assigned to such
tasks, and by appropriating sufficient funds for that purpose. They hardly
suffice as a basis to ignore the debtor's right to reorganize its affairs in a
rational way ....

Id.
The district court's implicit rationale-that the court exercised appropriate restraint
in construing CERCLA narrowly and allowing Congress to make legislative judgments-
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Having decided that it had jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy
Code to estimate and discharge claims related to liability for the
costs of CERCLA response actions, the court then decided the
scope of the CERCLA claims subject to the discharge. Relying on
Congress's broad definition of the term "claim" in the Bankruptcy
Code, 305 the Second Circuit adopted the district court's view that
claims related to "pre-petition releases or threatened releases of

hazardous substances" would be discharged. 30 6 More specifically,
in adopting the district court ruling, the court held that CERCLA

claims are discharged in bankruptcy for all "releases that have
occurred pre-petition, even though they have not then been dis'30 7
covered by EPA (or anyone else).
The Second Circuit's decision to elevate the policies of the
Bankruptcy Code over CERCLA contrasts sharply with the dismay actually have the effect of undercutting legislative supremacy. As Judge Posner has
written, "[t]o construe a statute strictly is to limit its scope and its life span-to make
Congress work twice as hard to produce the same effect." Posner, supra note 106, at 821
(footnote omitted); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 106, at 119 (noting that formalist approach tied solely to literal meaning of the text "would force the legislature to spend its
limited time correcting, after the fact, mechanical judicial interpretations.").
305. See In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1005.
306. Id. This holding as to the scope of claims subject to discharge was based on
the "fresh start" policy of the Bankruptcy Code. See id. See also infra note 318 and
accompanying text.
307. In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1000; see id. at 1005 ("[T]he location of these
[unknown] sites, the determination of their coverage by CERCLA, and the incurring of
response costs by EPA are all steps that may fairly be viewed, in the regulatory context,
as rendering EPA's claim 'contingent,' rather than as placing it outside the Code's definition
of 'claim."'). By allowing the discharge of claims related to all pre-petition releases, the
court not only denigrated the significance of CERCLA's review preclusion provision, but
also made settlement of CERCLA claims more difficult for EPA. See Kevin J. Saville,
Note, DischargingCERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy: When Does a Claim Arise?, 76 MINN.
L. Rnv. 327, 352 (1991) ("If the debtor can escape both known and unknown liability by
entering into bankruptcy, it has no incentive to settle with EPA."). But see Kenneth E.
Aaron, The ChateaugayAppeal: Crash at the Intersection of Bankruptcy and Environmental Law, 6 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 535 (1991). Aaron criticizes the Second Circuit for
improperly narrowing the definition of "claim" that the district court had adopted. Id. at
536-37.
Notwithstanding the Second Circuit's affirmance of the district court's decision,
Aaron also argues that the Second Circuit established a threshold requirement of a nexus
between the debtor (LTV) and the creditor (EPA), satisfied by an "acute awareness" by
the agency of the debtor. See id. at 536. According to Aaron, as long as there is a prepetition release or threat of a release, EPA's awareness of a PRP and of the PRP's prepetition conduct should have no bearing on whether a dischargeable claim exists. Id.
Although it allowed discharge of claims for pre-petition releases, the court rejected
the debtor's argument that the discharge should also include claims for all response costs
"based on LTV's pre-petition conduct, a position that would have included LTV's prepetition conduct of placing hazardous substances in sealed containers, followed by release
of the substances into the environment years after confirmation." In re Chateaugay, 944
F.2d at 1000.
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trict court decision in In re National Gypsum Co.30 There, the
court, consistent with the interpretive strategy identified at the
outset of this Part, 0 9 sought to determine the
interaction between the two statutes [that] serves most faithfully the policy objectives embodied in the two separate enactments of Congress. In order to best serve the goals of CERCLA
in the context of bankruptcy, the Court must recognize the
circumstances particular to bankruptcy proceedings and the
provisions of the Code that by necessity affect the PRP's ability
to partake in environmental costs and remedies, as well as its
ability to reorganize. 10
In seeking to harmonize the two statutes, the district court
reached conclusions conflicting with those of the Second Circuit
on both of the issues discussed above-the applicability of section
113(h) to the estimation and discharge of a claim in bankruptcy,
and the scope of the discharge of CERCLA claims in bankruptcy.
The court's analysis of the first issue began with the proposition
that the Second Circuit had rejected: the National Gypsum court
recognized that the section 113(h) bar against preenforcement review applies generally to questions of PRP liability under CERCLA and that those liability issues are implicated when courts
estimate and liquidate claims in bankruptcy.31 1
This decision did not, however, compel a conclusion that
claims related to CERCLA response actions could not be discharged in bankruptcy. The court recognized the exceptions to the
bar on review of liability issues and characterized those exceptions
as "various enforcement or cost-recovery measures. '"312 The court
then held that "[i]n reading the Code and CERCLA together, the
308. 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992). National Gypsum had filed a Chapter 11 petition
for bankruptcy. Id. at 399. The United States thereafter filed a proof of claim on behalf of
EPA and the Department of the Interior asserting that National Gypsum was liable for
response costs and damages under CERCLA. Id. at 399-400.
309. See supra notes 274-277 and accompanying text.
310. In re National Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 404. The court also stated in this regard
that "[o]nce a [PRP] is in bankruptcy, the provisions of CERCLA cannot stand as the sole
relevant statutory guide, and must be reconciled with the provisions of the Code .... [I]t
is not a question of which statute should be accorded primacy over the other." Id. at 404.
See also id. at 411 n.33 ("[A]rguments based on the primacy of one statute over the other
can not be adopted by this Court.").
311. Id. at 411. But ef. id. at 406 n.21 ("[The presentation of evidence and testimony
for purposes of reaching an estimate [of a claim in bankruptcy] is not tantamount to the
litigation precluded by 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).").
312. Id. at 411.
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filing of a Proof of Claim [in a bankruptcy proceeding] constitutes
such governmental [enforcement or cost recovery] action, and falls
under the enumerated exceptions to Section 113(h)." 313 Notwithstanding this judicial sleight of hand, 31 4 the court properly sought
to merge the two statutory policies and narrowed the preclusion
of review provision to satisfy Bankruptcy Code policy.31 5 The court
believed that a broader reading of review preclusion
would allow the United States, by not filing a Proof of Claim,
to preserve its claims for all sites for post-bankruptcy proceedings to the detriment of all other creditors whose claims are
discharged, and of the Debtors to the extent post-bankruptcy
claims impact[ ] their ability to effectively
environmental
reorganize. 316
With regard to the second issue-the scope of the discharge
of CERCLA claims-the court began its analysis by recognizing
that Congress intended that the term "claim" would have a broad
meaning in the Bankruptcy Code so that, for example, a claim
would exist for purposes of bankruptcy without regard to whether
a statutory cause of action was ripe for adjudication outside the
bankruptcy context. 317 The court did not, however, look solely to
318
this intent and the Bankruptcy Code's "fresh start" policy.
Rather, the court believed the critical distinction to be "between
costs associated with pre-petition conduct resulting in a release
...that

could have been 'fairly' contemplated by the parties; and

those that could not have been 'fairly' contemplated by the parties. ' 319 The National Gypsum court recognized the general sig313. Id.
314. The exceptions to the bar against jurisdiction established by section 113(h) are
more specific than the court's analysis suggests. In fact, the exceptions identify specific
proceedings available under CERCLA, and do not specify a bankruptcy proceeding as an
enforcement action in which liability issues may be litigated. See 42 U.S.C.§ 9613(h)(1)(5).
315. See supra note 145 for a discussion of the proper narrowing function that courts
perform when statutory language proves to be too broad.
316. In re National Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 411.
317. See id. at 405.
318. See id. at 407 ("[T]his Court is not willing to favor the Code's objective of a
'fresh start' over CERCLA's objective of environmental cleanup to the extent exhibited
by Chateaugay." (footnote omitted)).
319. Id. at 408 (footnotes omitted). In this regard, the National Gypsum court criticized the Second Circuit Chateaugay court, stating that the Second Circuit provided no
basis for excluding response costs from its broad definition of claims in situations where
the debtor had disposed of hazardous substances pre-petition, but where a release or a
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nificance of the decision in Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v.
Reilly320 in seeking to harmonize the policies of CERCLA and the
Bankruptcy Code. 32' There the Fifth Circuit concluded that Congress had enacted section 113(h) precisely to ensure that EPA
would have the ability to exercise its discretion in allocating its
own resources toward the cleanup of hazardous substances, rather
than having EPA's resources allocated to "piecemeal" litigation
every time a PRP raises the issue of CERCLA liability prior to
the government filing a costly recovery action. 32 2 The National
Gypsum court concluded that, in cases where PRPs file for bankruptcy, EPA no longer retains full enforcement discretion when
threat of a release had not occurred pre-petition. The National Gypsum court found that
"there exists no meaningful distinction between debtor's conduct and the release or threatened release resulting from this conduct." In re National Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 407 (footnote
omitted); see id. at 407 n.24 ("It is not clear to the Court why the placing of hazardous
substances in sealed containers pre-petition, followed by release of the substances into the
environment years after confirmation, is not a claim; while the release of substances at
locations unknown to the parties pre-petition is a claim.").
The NationalGypsum court's decision about the scope of the discharge of CERCLA
claims is consistent with the result the court reached in United States v. Union Scrap Iron
& Metal, 123 B.R. 831 (D. Minn. 1990). There, the court rejected under § 113(h) a reorganized company's contention that "a release or threatened release alone constitutes a
dischargeable claim." Id. at 837-38. The court believed that such a rule would conflict
directly with CERCLA's policies. See id. at 838. The National Gypsum court's decision is
also consistent with the approach suggested by a commentator: "[C]ourts should discharge
only the CERCLA liability which is or was foreseeable at the conclusion of the debtor's
bankruptcy case." Saville, supra note 307, at 354; see also id. at 359 (identifying factors
that the court should consider in assessing foreseeability).
In deciding whether CERCLA costs are associated with claims within the "fair
contemplation" of the parties, the court identified several factors that reflect CERCLA
policy. In re National Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 408. These factors include "knowledge by the
parties of a site in which a PRP may be liable, NPL listing, notification by EPA of PRP
liability, commencement of investigation and cleanup activities, and incurrence of response
costs." Id. (citation omitted).
320. 889 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1989).
321. See In re National Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 411.
322. Voluntary PurchasingGroups, 889 F.2d at 1390. CERCLA litigation requires a
substantial commitment of administrative resources. A study recently published by the
RAND Institute for Civil Justice reports *that "enforcement costs were I1 percent of the
Environmental Protection Agency's outlays between FY 1984 and FY 1988." JAN PAUL
ACTON ET AL., SUPERFUND AND TRANSACTION COSTS xv (1992). Studying the transaction
costs for Superfund cleanups incurred by five very large industrial firms, the RAND study
found that "[t]ransaction-cost shares appear to fall as sites move through the remedial
process." Id. at 61. If courts adopt a broad rule allowing contingent CERCLA claims to
be estimated and discharged in bankruptcy, EPA will be forced to adjudicate many of these
claims at a very early stage in the cleanup process and thus dedicate a greater proportion
of its administrative resources to litigation transaction costs. A new limit on EPA's ability
to allocate its resources according to its own discretion and priorities may substantially
affect the implementation of CERCLA, including the speed of cleanups. See Voluntary
PurchasingGroups, 889 F.2d at 1390.
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deciding whether to file a notice of CERCLA claims;323 "[i]n order
for the EPA to preserve its claims in regard to a PRP in bankruptcy,
its duties are triggered by the mere discovery of a site linked to
the Debtors, and extends to such activity that would allow a rough
324
and speedy estimation of CERCLA claims under the Code.
This modification of EPA's priorities, which demands an earlier
filing of claims against PRPs in bankruptcy, and the resulting limitation on EPA's enforcement discretion were necessitated by the
policy underlying bankruptcy law. 325 The significance of the court's

decision, however, is that, unlike the Second Circuit, the district
court in National Gypsum sought to harmonize the two conflicting
statutory schemes and limit the erosion of EPA's discretion under
CERCLA as much as possible.
The preceding decisions reveal that two important statutory
goals conflict within the bankruptcy context. When called upon to
reconcile this conflict, the Second Circuit sought to avoid it and

3 26
held that section 113(h) simply was inapplicable to the analysis.

323. See In re National Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 411 n.36 (noting that in Voluntary
Purchasing Groups, "[tihe Fifth Circuit was not faced with the unique circumstances
surrounding the interaction of the Code and CERCLA").
324. Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
325. See id. at 411 n.34, where the court states that:
The Court is cognizant ... that the combined effect of its ruling is that
in order to preserve its CERCLA claims against a bankrupt PRP, the United
States must file a Proof of Claim [for all claims that are fairly contemplated];
and that in filing such Proof of Claim, the United States subjects itself to
declaratory relief, otherwise precluded by Section 113(h) .... However, this
is the only reading of CERCLA and the Code that strikes a balance between
the objectives served by both statutes.

326. In In re Combustion Equipment Assocs., 838 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1988), the Second
Circuit in dicta cautioned that CERCLA was intended to ensure that EPA's resources be
available for the cleanup of hazardous wastes, rather than for piecemeal, atomistic review
of CERCLA liability issues. See id. at 40. Combustion Equipment did not involve an
attempt to discharge in bankruptcy CERCLA claims related to pre-petition releases.
The case was filed by Carter Day, the successor to Combustion Equipment Associates, after its December 1983 Chapter 11 reorganization. Carter Day sought a declaratory
judgment that bankruptcy reorganization discharged any CERCLA liability that it might
have had for two landfill cleanups. Id. at 36. Carter Day brought the action after EPA's
September and October 1983 identification of Combustion Equipment and 190 other parties
as potentially responsible for the costs of cleaning up the two landfills, and after EPA
completed the ROD for the sites in 1986. Id. The district court concluded that the action
was not ripe and dismissed the complaint. Id.
On appeal, the Second Circuit viewed ripeness --and not the scope of section 113(h)
preclusion-as the underlying issue. Id. at 37. The appeals court agreed that Carter Day's
claims were not ripe for review, and expressly stated that it would not reach the question
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In contrast, the district court in National Gypsum recognized the

conflict between the statutes and sought an accommodation that
reflected the best possible legal answer in light of the conflict. The

Second Circuit's approach in Chateaugayto statutory construction
allowed the court to sidestep the broad preclusive language of
CERCLA. While permitting the potentially premature discharge
of CERCLA claims, the opinion shortchanged the goals of CERCLA in deference to a competing scheme of legislation, and called

into doubt the effectiveness of section 113(h) by inviting its circumvention. 3 7 This is not the problem in itself; rather, the opin-

ion's fault lies in its overly facile resolution of the conflict between
statutes and the future effects that its rationale may have on resolving other statutory inconsistencies. The National Gypsum
court, on the other hand, narrowed the effect of the broad and
categorical terms of section 113(h) preclusion, based on its assess-

ment of the intent and purpose of the competing statutes. In performing this narrowing function, the National Gypsum court re-

frained from adhering blindly to a canon of construction and from
deciding the issue based only on a conclusory analysis.

of whether the CERCLA claims could have been discharged, if they had been considered
during reorganization. Id. at 37. See id. at 41 ("Since we have not attempted to rank the
various factors . . . . we express no opinion about the outcome of other cases seeking
declaratory judgments relating to the discharge of non-CERCLA liability or even of CERCLA liability based on distinguishable facts."). The court did suggest, however, that the
result might very well have been different in the bankruptcy reorganization context:
[Tihe bankruptcy court's power to estimate contingent liabilities, 11 U.S.C.
sec. 502(c), substitutes for ripeness. The fact that some claims could be estimated does not mean that those claims would be ripe for resolution after
confirmation, but only that the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the bankruptcy
.court to decide, in one particular procedural context, what would otherwise
be unripe disputes. Under this view, the power to ripen expires with the
bankruptcy court's power to estimate, and Carter Day, having not availed itself
of that power, would have lost the opportunity and would now have to wait
until the claim is actually ripe. We reiterate that we do not necessarily adopt
this view ....
Id. at 40.
327. This approach was adopted by the district court in Manville Corp. v. United
States, 139 B.R. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The court stated, "to the extent there is a clash
between the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA in the [bankruptcy] context CERCLA does
not completely override the Code." Noting that the Second Circuit in Chateaugay pronounced the inapplicability of § 113(h) to a bankruptcy pre-confirmation adversary proceeding, the Manville court rejected the government's claim that the case at bar was
distinguishable-that the appellate ruling did not extend to a determination of post-confirmation dischargeability. See id. at 104-05.
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B. May a PRP (or Another Party) Obtain Preenforcement
Statutory Review of a Claim Arising UnderAnother Substantive
Federal Statute that in Effect Challenges a Section 104
Response Action or a Section 106 Order?

The issue raised in the context of a claim brought under
another substantive federal statute is very similar to that raised
when a PRP seeks to discharge its CERCLA cleanup liability
before the government asserts any claim for response costs. Resolution of this issue should turn on how the statutory schemes and
policies interrelate with CERCLA. There should be, therefore, a
consistent approach to resolving the issue, even though the ultimate conclusion about whether jurisdiction is foreclosed may
properly differ in different contexts because the underlying statutory policies will vary. 328 Yet courts have been reluctant to hold
that jurisdiction is available because section 113(h) includes such
broad and categorical language foreclosing review.
The Second Circuit demonstrated such reluctance in Browning-FerrisIndustries of South Jersey v. Muszynski.329 In that case,
Browning-Ferris Industries ("BFI") and EPA were parties to a
330
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA")
consent order requiring BFI to install wells to monitor groundwater
affected by leaching from a BFI landfill.3 31 A dispute arose between
the parties over the type of pipe to use for monitoring. 332 This
dispute continued until EPA issued a section 106 order under
CERCLA3 3 3 that required BFI to submit a new monitoring plan
that would provide for the installation of stainless steel pipes. EPA
intended for this section 106 order to supersede the prior RCRA
334
consent decree, which included no details regarding monitoring.
After receiving the section 106 order, judicial review of which
section 113(h) expressly bars until EPA itself brings an action to
328. The basic approach to statutory interpretation when the terms of one statute
must be harmonized with one or more other statutes is discussed supra notes 275-279 and
accompanying text.
329. 899 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1990).
330. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).

331. 889 F.2d at 152-53. The landfill was listed on the NPL. Id.
332.
while EPA
333.
334.

Browning-Ferris Industries ("BFI") intended to use polyvinyl chloride pipes,
preferred stainless steel pipes. Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9606.
See Browning-FerrisIndus., 899 F.2d at 152-53.
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enforce the order, 335 BFI brought an action in district court, asserting claims under RCRA and CERCLA. 336 Relying on the terms
of section 113(h), the district court dismissed BFI's action.337
The Second Circuit unexpectedly concluded that the case was
"an appropriate one in which to assume jurisdiction arguendo
without deciding the issue. '338 The court raised the specific concern that "[a] comprehensive ruling on the jurisdictional issues
would necessarily have a broad impact on future EPA pollution
remediation efforts. ' 339 The court worried that such a ruling might
thwart the important purposes of CERCLA and the breadth of
section 113(h), which appears on its face to permit EPA to avoid
review of its actions whenever it thinks delayed review is necessary to accomplish its remedial objectives:
A decision [that there is jurisdiction over BFI's claim] might
have serious implications for future EPA remediation efforts
and could hamper protection of the environment in a way that
runs counter to congressional design. Other CERCLA orders
that might be one component of an EPA cleanup project that
relies upon several statutes could become subject to lengthy
and costly legal challenges. Conversely, a decision in EPA's
favor could turn a powerful weapon in the fight against pollution
into a bludgeon to be used against alleged
polluters regardless
340
of prior agreements or understandings.
335. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(3).
336. Browning-FerrisIndus., 899 F.2d at 153. The CERCLA claims challenged the
basis for the § 106 order and the existence of an imminent and substantial endangerment.
See id. BFI also asserted claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701706, 715-21 (1988), and the Constitution. See id. Such claims are discussed in detail ifra,
part IV.C and part V.
337. Browning-Ferris Indus., 899 F.2d at 153-54. The district court held that BFI
had a sufficient remedy if it complied with the § 106 order and then sued for reimbursement
of costs under § 106(b). See Brownin-FerrisIndus., 899 F.2d at 153-54.
338. Id. at 159. On the merits, the court concluded that EPA had the authority and
the support in the scientific record to require BFI to use stainless steel pipes for testing.
See id. at 160-64.
339. Id. at 154.
340. Id. at 160; see EPA Seeks to Avoid Decree's Protections, Judicial Review,
GeneratorArgues in Brief, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 766 (1990) (discussing claim that EPA
seeks to avoid terms of a consent decree entered in a RCRA case by initiating administrative
procedures under CERCLA and then relying on § 113(h) to avoid judicial review).
The interaction between RCRA and CERCLA has been discussed in other contexts.
See Note, United States v. Fisher: "Posner'sDilemma" and the Uncertain Triumph of
Outcome Over Process, 21 ENVTL. L. 427, 450 (1991) (arguing that court improperly
discourages settlements when it allows review of CERCLA action after consent decree
already settled RCRA claim related to same site and contamination); cf. United States v.

1993]

InterpretingCERCLA Review Preclusion

The Second Circuit's analysis is striking for three reasons.
First, by recognizing the difficulty in resolving the question of
jurisdiction and therefore by assuming jurisdiction on that basis,
the court did not read CERCLA's plain language as foreclosing
absolutely a court's ability to hold that immediate review is available notwithstanding section 113(h)'s broad language.
Second, although the court acknowledged that the statute may
not have to be interpreted in a categorical manner, the court's
analysis focuses almost exclusively on CERCLA's policies, ignoring the countervailing policies of other statutes. To be consistent
341
with the approach to statutory construction discussed above,
courts facing similar claims should instead construe section 113(h)
in the context of the substantive policies of statutes other than
CERCLA that may strongly favor immediate review of the plain-'
tiff's claim. The decision whether jurisdiction is present, therefore,
may vary from case to case and should depend on a balancing of
the CERCLA policies implicated in the particular case against the
applicable policies of the other statute.
The third and final point about Browning-FerrisIndustries is
that the court plainly viewed the categorical language of section
113(h) as a substantial obstacle to a conclusion that jurisdiction
was available immediately. The court, despite its ultimate ruling,
seemed reluctant to read CERCLA as giving a court jurisdiction
over a claim seeking review of a CERCLA response action or
section 106 order prior to enforcement or implementation.
This reluctance to construe section 113(h) narrowly given its
broad and categorical terms is also evident in Werlein v. United
States.342 That court focused primarily on the categorical nature
of CERCLA's language. In Werlein, several citizens residing near
a CERCLA site brought an action against the United States, which
3 43
owned the site, and several corporations that had rented the site.
Vineland Chem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 415, 420 (D.N.J. 1988) (discussing meaning and effect
of 42 U.S.C. § 6905(b), which requires that RCRA be integrated with other statutes, and
stating that provision "creates no rights in defendants to resist regulation" and "constitutes
an exhortation to the EPA to avoid unnecessary and overlapping regulation. Thus, the
decision of when to regulate and under which statutes to regulate is left to the EPA's

discretion.").
341. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
342. 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990).
343. Id. at 890.
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In addition to asserting claims under CERCLA,34 4 the plaintiffs
brought statutory claims under RCRA and the Clean Water Act
3 46
("CWA")3 45 and sought injunctive relief and damages.
The court declared that it lacked jurisdiction to review the
claims raised under the other federal (and state) statutes and offered two interpretive strategies as support. First, the court said
the "very terms" of the statute compelled this result: "the Court
has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear 'any challenges' 'under
Federal law ... or under state law.' The fact that the statute states
that it applies to state law shows that Congress intended section

9613(h) to extend beyond CERCLA. 347 In the court's view those
terms "obvious[ly]" permitted "two principled choices... : (1) [to]
rule that section 9613(h) applies only to CERCLA itself, and allow
plaintiffs' injunctive claims under RCRA, CWA and [Minnesota
state law] to challenge the ongoing cleanup; or (2) [to] rule that
section 9613(h) bars all challenges to the ongoing cleanup under
federal or state law. '348
The court's "all or nothing" approach to interpreting uniformly
a statutory provision written "in the plainest of words" appears to
receive support from the Supreme Court's construction of the
terms of NEPA349 in Andrus v. Sierra Club.350 There, the Court
explained that "[it] will ordinarily decline to fracture the clear
language of a statute," and held that NEPA did not require that
an environmental impact statement be prepared for any appropriation request. 35' But Werlein implicates different statutory policies
344. Id. See supra note 205.
345. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). The plaintiffs also alleged
violations of two Minnesota statutes, and raised common law claims. Werlein, 748 F. Supp.
at 890.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 892-93.
348. Id. at 892 n.4. In dictum, the court went on to state that, "if]rankly, were only
CERCLA and RCRA involved, the Court probably would have let plaintiffs' RCRA injunctive claims go forward." Id. The court's statement appears to reflect its view that
"RCRA has its own limitation of review provision, which only bars review of ongoing
remediation which is proceeding diligently," and that the plaintiffs' claim was that the
defendants' remedial action was not proceeding diligently. Id.
349. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c (1988 & Supp. 111990).
350. 442 U.S. 347, 356 (1979).
351. Id. The Court accordingly declined to adopt the position of the District of
Columbia Circuit, which had held that statements had to be prepared to accompany any
significant appropriation requests. See id. at 355. Cf. ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319,
328 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting EPA cannot define same statutory language--"source" in the
Clean Air Act--one way for new source policy and another way for source modification
policy).
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from Andrus; Andrus does not categorically foreclose a court's

attempt to harmonize a later statute with preexisting statutory
schemes when Congress apparently has not considered them. 52 In
fact, in an analogous context, the Supreme Court refused to read
the ordinary meaning of the term "radioactive materials" into pollution control laws precisely because it would subvert pre-existing
statutory policies. 353 The Werlein court's first interpretive strategy
fails because the court did not recognize that interstatutory con-

flicts may create ambiguities that necessitate careful lawmaking by
courts.
The Werlein decision utilized a second interpretive strategy
which was powerful in theory, although its application may not
352. In Werlein, the court held that CERCLA foreclosed review of the claims that
plaintiffs sought to raise under other statutes, notwithstanding the court's clear understanding that "the purposes underlying those statutes" would be "frustrat[ed]." Werlein, 746 F.
Supp. at 894. The court stated that:
By applying section 9613(h) to RCRA, CWA and [the Minnesota state statute]
the Court is frustrating, to a certain extent, the purposes underlying those
statutes .

. .

. Nevertheless, it is clear that Congress intended that cleanups

under section 9604 go forward unchallenged until completion of a discrete
phase. Allowing plaintiffs to challenge the [site's] cleanup under RCRA, CWA
and [the Minnesota statute] would totally eviscerate section 9613(h) and the
intent of Congress.
Id.
353. See supra note 276 (discussing Supreme Court decision in Train v. Colorado
Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1 (1976)).
A series of Supreme Court cases further supports the need to consider preexisting
policies, rather than blindly applying ordinary meaning to a statute's terms. Construing the
scope of federal court jurisdiction to review directly National Labor Relations Board
certifications under section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c), the Court has "consistently refused to allow direct review of such orders in the
Courts of Appeals." Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 479 (1964) (citation omitted).
Yet one of the two "extraordinary" exceptions to consistent refusal under the NLRA arose
because of the Court's concerns about important policies independent of the NLRA.
Specifically, in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10
(1963), the court held that direct review of a certification order was available because:
[T]he Board's assertion of power to determine the representation of foreign
seamen aboard vessels under foreign flags has aroused vigorous protests from
foreign governments and created international problems for our Government
....
T]he presence of public questions particularly high in the scale of our
national interest because of their international complexion is a uniquely compelling justification for prompt judicial resolution of the controversy over the
Board's power ....
Id. at 16-17. When a court does look beyond the text and policies of the statute to interpret
the document, the resulting interpretation may conflict with an interpretation based only
on the terms of the statute.
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have been supported by the legislative record. The court inferred
that Congress intended to bar early review under other statutes,
without regard to whether CERCLA's policies were directly
threatened by the requested judicial review, because Congress
believed that any such review would slow cleanup of the site and
improperly undermine CERCLA policies. 354 Under this construction of CERCLA, the court suggested that Congress had considered CERCLA's potential interactions with other statutes and decided to reject early jurisdiction to ensure that the CERCLA goal
of prompt cleanups remained paramount. Stated in these terms,
the court's decision parallels this Article's analysis of whether
section 113(h) forecloses early review of a health-based CERCLA
355
claim.
Whether the Werlein court's second theory is correct thus
turns on whether Congress actually made the intentional decision
inferred by the court from the categorical terms of section 113(h).
Because the legislative record offers no direct support for the
court's inference, however, a more likely reading of section 113(h)
is that Congress did not consider the complexities of statutory
interactions being raised in these cases and that Congress did not
intentionally select its preferred means for resolving statutory in356
consistencies that might arise.
Although conflicts between CERCLA's policy of delayed review and the policies identified in other federal statutes may provide a plaintiff with an argument compelling the grant of jurisdic354. See Werlein, 746 F. Supp. at 894 n.8, where the court states that:

[p]laintiffs . . . argue that the Court should hold [that there is jurisdiction]
because the relief they seek will not delay the cleanup .

. .

. Presumably, in

enacting section 9613(h) Congress concluded that any challenge to a remedial
action would cause delay. The language of the statute is mandatory, and the

Court can think of no justification for applying the statute on a case by case
basis.
355. See supra part III.B.2.a.iv. This Article concluded that, because Congress had

specifically identified the appropriate means for reviewing claims about appropriate cleanliness standards, early review of a health-based claim contesting ARARs should be barred
unless the claim is raised by a state. This conclusion is premised on the view that courts
should be most reluctant to construe a statute in a way that alters the specific means
identified by Congress for implementing the statute. See supra note 224 and accompanying

text.
356. This conclusion is also consistent with the clear statement rule, which could be
applied in this context to support the meta-policy that courts should interpret statutes in
ways that do not significantly change underlying legal rules. See supra note 118.
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tion over claims that would otherwise be barred as "premature"

under section 113(h), 357 judicial reluctance-fueled by the broad
preclusive language of CERCLA-to hear such claims prior to

EPA action suggests that the plaintiff's task likely will be a difficult
one. The most reasonable course of action for courts facing such
arguments as they arise from the various federal statutes is to
accord some, but not presumptive, weight to the broad and categorical plain language of preclusion in section 113(h), and to decide
the availability of immediate review not by conclusory, lopsided
reliance on a single statute either in favor of or against jurisdiction,
but by seeking to harmonize the policies of the two statutes and
to achieve the combined intent of the two legislative schemes. 358
C. May a Party Assert a Claim Under the Administrative
ProcedureAct and Thereby Obtain Preenforcement
Nonstatutory Review of a Section 104 Response Action or a
Section 106 Order?

The third group of cases posing possible statutory conflicts
involves the challenges to cleanups that are based on rights identified in other, typically procedural, statutes that do not themselves
provide for statutory review. Where the federal statute does not
itself provide for statutory review, the claimant will have to look
357. For example, a plaintiff may seek to assert a claim under the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 ("ESA"), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988), that a CERCLA response
action is inconsistent with ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g), and that a court cannot consider
those interests properly after the remedial action or a segment of it is completed. A court
should be able to decide in that setting whether the statutes can be harmonized and whether
the policies of ESA require that a court conduct review early so that the response action
will not threaten the existence of an endangered species. There do not yet appear to be
any cases addressing this potential conflict.
358. This interpretive process should involve a case-specific analysis of the extent
to which immediate review threatens the policies of both CERCLA and the other federal
statute. This approach would almost surely mean that the decision whether jurisdiction is
available for review of a claim raised under a particular federal statute would not be the
same for all claims and statutes. Review in different cases would interfere to varying
degrees with CERCLA policy goals and other statutory values.
The meta-policy of ensuring the adequacy of judicial review, see supra notes 121123 and accompanying text, may further support an interpretation that harmonizes the
statutes by allowing immediate review when needed to protect rights established by Congress that would be effectively lost if review were delayed. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S.
184, 190 (1958) ("This Court cannot lightly infer that Congress does not intend judicial
protection of rights it confers against agency action taken in excess of delegated powers."
(citations omitted)). This argument is particulary strong when Congress has provided a
statutory right of review under the other federal statute.
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to the APA359 for a right of action against the government. This
situation has arisen when claimants have sought to challenge CERCLA response actions or section 106 orders by relying on procedural rights identified in NEPA3 60 and the National Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA"). 361 Two courts of appeals have decided
directly whether claims available under these statutes may be
raised to gain early review of a CERCLA response action.
In Schalk v. Reilly, 362 a court-approved consent decree between the United States and Westinghouse Electric Corp. had
provided for the cleanup of two landfills where polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs) had been disposed. The decree provided that,
as part of the cleanup, PCBs removed from the site would be
incinerated.363 The complaint brought against EPA alleged that the
remedial plan adopted through the consent decree was illegal because, contrary to the requirements of NEPA, EPA had failed to
364
prepare an environmental impact statement.
To pursue their NEPA claim, the plaintiffs had to assert a
cause of action for review under the APA because NEPA itself
365
does not include provisions granting a statutory right of review.
By its terms, however, the APA accords no right of review in cases
where federal "statutes preclude judicial review. '366 Deciding
whether a statute withdraws the APA cause of action for nonstatutory review turns on an analysis of that statute-in this case,
CERCLA. 367 The Schalk v. Reilly court relied on Congress's broad
359. 5 U.S.C. § 701-706, 715-721 (1988).
360. 42 U.S.C. 99 4321-4370c (1988 & Supp. 111990).
361. 16 U.S.C. 99 470 to 470w-6 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). The same issue also arises

if a claimant seeks to rely directly on the APA when requesting early review of a CERCLA
claim. See infra note 367.
362. 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Frey v. Reilly, 111 S. Ct. 509 (1990).
363. Id. at 1093.

364. Id. at 1094.
365. See WILLIAM M. TABS & LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES

AND MATERIALS 295 (1992) ("NEPA contains no specific provision for judicial enforcement;
however, courts have interpreted its procedural requirements as establishing a 'strict standard of compliance' judicially reviewable under the [APA]." (citation omitted)); see also
supra note 239 and accompanying text (discussing courts' rationale that review is available
to enforce NEPA's procedures).
366. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1).

367. See Wheaton Indus. v. United States EPA, 781 F.2d 354, 357 (3d Cir. 1986)
("Since CERCLA is the relevant underlying statute, its preclusion ofjudicial review at this
time renders the APA also unavailable as a basis for judicial review."); see also Block v.
Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984) ("Whether and to what extent a
particular statute precludes judicial review is determined not only from its express language,
but also from the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history,
and the nature of the administrative action involved.").
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intent "'to remove challenges to remedial action plans from the

jurisdiction of the federal courts until the remedial action has been
taken,"' 368 and held that the NEPA claims could not be raised

because "APA review is not available when a federal statute spe-

'369
cifically precludes judicial review.
The Schalk v. Reilly court's analysis of the plaintiffs' ability
to assert claims under NEPA properly considers the interaction of
the three relevant statutes-CERCLA, NEPA, and APA. 370 Plain-

tiffs' inability to assert their NEPA claims thus reflects Congress's
decision that review of such claims would be available only when

other federal statutes do not foreclose review. 371 This situation
may be contrasted with one in which Congress has created a
statutory right and has also provided the express means for gaining
judicial review of government actions alleged to impair that statutory right. In the latter situation, a court must weigh both CER-

CLA and the other federal statute in deciding whether review is
foreclosed. This decision should consider Congress's own pre372
scription for adjudicating rights protected by the other statute.
368. Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d at 1097 (quoting Alabama v. United States EPA, 871
F.2d 1548, 1560 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, Alabama ex rel Siegelman v. United States
EPA, 493 U.S. 991 (1989)).
369. Id. at 1097 (citing Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984)).
Other courts have reached the same conclusion that preenforcement review of a CERCLA
response action cannot be asserted through the APA because CERCLA itself precludes
such review. E.g., Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1390-91
(5th Cir. 1989); Dickerson v. Administrator, EPA, 834 F.2d 974, 977-78 (11th Cir. 1987).
The identical conclusion had been reached even before Congress enacted § 113(h) as part
of SARA. E.g., J.V. Peters & Co., v. Administrator, EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 264 (6th Cir.
1985).
370. When a PRP asserts the NEPA claim to try to obtain early review of the EPA
response action, the APA's preclusion of review provision is not the only obstacle to
jurisdiction. One court has held that a PRP lacks standing to assert such a claim because
the PRP is not asserting interests within the zone of interests that Congress sought to
protect. See North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1991), where the plaintiff
was a PRP concerned about the costs of a site cleanup and a related study. Id. at 1241.
North Shore Gas brought the action to enjoin implementation of a part of a remedial plan,
claiming that, prior to implementation, EPA was required by NEPA to complete an environmental impact statement. Id. at 1241-42. The court concluded that, although North
Shore had Article III standing, it did not come within the "zone of interests" protected by
NEPA. Id. at 1243. See also Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. United States EPA, 777 F.2d
882, 888 n.4 (3d Cir. 1985) (affirming district court decision that plaintiffs lacked standing
to assert NEPA claim because "[tiheir professed interests were limited to potential financial
liability for the remedial action"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986).
371. In the context of CERCLA cleanups, this inability to pursue NEPA claims
should have little significance, because CERCLA itself identifies certain important procedural rights, as well as substantive concerns about public health effects, that should be
proper subjects of timely judicial review directly under CERCLA. See supra notes 234243 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 224 (discussing view that courts should be reluctant to make

HarvardEnvironmentalLaw Review

[Vol. 17:1

The Third Circuit has addressed the issue whether a statute
that fails to establish a right of review may support a claim challenging a CERCLA cleanup prior to enforcement in the context of
the NHPA. In Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson,373 the plaintiff owned

a tract of land in Upper Bucks County, Pennsylvania. 374 Located
on the property were a late-eighteenth-century stone farmhouse,
stone field walls, and fields that may have contained historical and
375
archeological remains.
Because there had been several serious chemical spills on the
property more than a decade earlier, EPA placed the site on the
NPL in March 1989.376 After EPA informed Boarhead that it was
a potentially responsible party under CERCLA for the costs of
the site's cleanup, Boarhead sued in district court for an injunction
against further EPA actions at the site pending completion of a
section 106 review under the NHPA. 377 The district court dismissed
the claim based on its conclusion that CERCLA's section 113(h)
378
barred the action.
The Third Circuit's decision affirming the dismissal of Boarhead's claim appears to approach the jurisdictional problem in two
different ways. From one perspective, the court's decision that
there is no jurisdiction for the NHPA claim is analogous to the
decision that there is no jurisdiction over a NEPA claim when that
claim involves a challenge to a CERCLA response action. The
court appears to hold that the NHPA claim may be pursued only
to the extent the plaintiff may establish a right of action under the
APA, which in Boarhead was the only authority available to a
plaintiff arguing that the United States had waived sovereign immunity. 379 Given these premises, the court's conclusion that there
new law when Congress has itself prescribed precise means by which it will pursue policy
objectives).
373. 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991).

374. Id. at 1014.
375. Id. The farm was eligible for the National Register of Historic Places. Id. at
1014 n.5.

376. Id. at 1014.
377. 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1988 & Supp. I 1990). Before bringing its claim, Boarhead
had informed EPA that the site was eligible for listing pursuant to the NHPA and had asked
whether a § 106 review had been conducted as required by the NHPA. Boarhead,923 F.2d
at 1014. After Boarhead brought its action in district court, EPA informed Boarhead by
letter that, although the § 106 review had not been completed, historic preservation issues
would be considered as part of the CERCLA process. Id.
378. See Boarhead,923 F.2d at 1016.

379. The court reached this conclusion in two steps. First, the court concluded that,
in enacting the NHPA, "Congress must have intended to establish a private right of action
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is no jurisdiction is unobjectionable because the APA provides that

a claim may not be asserted when another statute-CERCLA in
this context-bars review. 380 This Article has discussed the sound
basis for this conclusion when considering the court's holding that
there was no jurisdiction over the NEPA claim in Schalk v.
381
Reilly.
Boarhead may be viewed, however, from a second perspective. The case includes extensive analysis that construes the broad
and categorical language of section 113(h) as precluding review
under all other federal statutes. 8 2 This analysis relies on the plain
terms of section 113(h), 38 3 which led the court to state that "we
must presume Congress balanced the problem of irreparable harm
to [the archaeological or historical resources on Boarhead Farm]
and concluded that the interest in removing the hazard of toxic
waste from Superfund sites outweighed it. Boarhead's remedy lies
with Congress, not the district court." 3 84 This reasoning by the
to interested parties, such as Boarhead, in these situations." Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1017.
This conclusion has no real significance because the APA establishes a private right of
action for injunctive relief in cases of illegal government action, 5 U.S.C. § 702. Second,
the court proceeded to acknowledge that the NHPA does not itself include a waiver of
sovereign immunity for actions against the United States. Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1017 n.11.
The court was therefore constrained to state that: "The government has waived sovereign
immunity insofar as the APA gives Boarhead a right to judicial review." Id. (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 702). In short, Boarhead's claim was reviewable only to the extent that the APA made it
reviewable.
380. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1).
381. 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Frey v. Reilly, 111 S. Ct. 509 (1990).
See supra notes 362-372 and accompanying text. Boarheadshould be of limited significance
for those concerned about historical preservation values both because EPA has indicated
that it will consider such issues when preparing the RI/MS, see Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1022
n.17, and because § 113(h) of CERCLA should be construed to allow jurisdiction over
some citizens suits alleging flaws in the RI/FS process or the resulting remedial plan. See
supra notes 234-243 and accompanying text.
382. See Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1024 (holding that § 113(h) "deprives [the district
court] of the power to hear claims under the Preservation Act, or any other statute, that
would interfere with EPA's clean-up activities on a Superfund site.").
383. The court stated that:
Congress could hardly have chosen clearer language to express its intent
generally to deprive the district court of jurisdiction over claims based on other
statutes when the EPA undertakes the clean-up of toxic wastes at a Superfund
site. The section begins: "No federal court shall have jurisdiction under federal
law ....
No language could be plainer. Thus it is unnecessary for us to rely
upon the legislative history ....
even though it is consistent with the statute's
plain language.
Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1020; see also id. at 1024 ("We cannot understand what clearer
evidence could be provided than this [statutory] language." (citation omitted)).
384. Boarhead,923 F.2d at 1023. The court equivocated somewhat on the question
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Boarheadcourt is subject to the same criticism that applied in the
decision in Werlein v. United States.3 85 The court is too much the
servant of overbroad language: if Congress had indeed established
rights and a means for pursuing and vindicating those rights under
the NHPA, the court should have considered something more than
the mere categorical terms of section 113(h) before concluding that
review is barred by CERCLA and that those other statutory rights
cannot be vindicated.
Courts so far have not adopted a consistent approach to deciding whether section 113(h) of CERCLA bars early review in
cases where claimants also assert rights under other federal statutes. This Article contends that a consistent approach to this issue
is available and necessitates close attention to the interrelationship
of the relevant statutes in deciding whether CERCLA bars early
statutory review under another statute. When the claimant challenges a response action by seeking nonstatutory review under the
APA and asserts rights established by another statute, however, a
court should conclude that CERCLA bars such nonstatutory review without considering the nature of the other statutory rights
or the interaction of those rights with CERCLA.
V. DOES

SECTION

113(H) FORECLOSE PREENFORCEMENT REVIEW

OF A CLAIM THAT A SECTION

SECTION

106

104 RESPONSE ACTION OR

ORDER IS ILLEGAL BECAUSE THE CLAIMANT'S

CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS ARE BEING VIOLATED?

Part V considers the extent to which section 113(h) forecloses
review of constitutional claims that involve a challenge to a response action 38 6 or a section 106 order.3 87 Particularly in this context, one can appreciate the significance of a court's decision
of whether the court would actually tolerate a situation where NHPA values were in fact
being irreparably injured because review was delayed. See id. at 1022 n.17, where the court
stated that "[t]he EPA properly construes the Preservation Act to require it to consider the

historic preservation concerns ... before it takes action pursuant to CERCLA." Accordingly, the court stated that it did not have to "reach the troubling questions of whether
judicial review would be available if Boarhead could show that Erickson failed to comply
with the regulations the EPA has promulgated pursuant to CERCLA or whether Boarhead
would have standing to bring such a suit." Id.

385. 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990). See supra notes 342-358 and accompanying
text for a critique of the district court decision in Werlein.
386. See id. § 9604.
387. See id. § 9606(a).
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whether to rely only on CERCLA's text or to consider external
policies as well to decide the extent to which CERCLA forecloses
review of constitutional claims. This Article identifies the three
conclusions that courts have reached in interpreting the statute,
and the conclusion that reflects the best legal judgment in light of
the constitutional and statutory values at issue.
A. Reliance on the Terms of CERCLA and the Legislative
History to Support a Decision that CERCLA Forecloses
PreenforcementReview
One court of appeals has held that CERCLA bars preenforcement jurisdiction of a PRP's claim that its inability to challenge
liability for a CERCLA response action deprived the claimant of
due process and thus violated the Constitution. 88 The plaintiff
contended that the court should resolve this claim on the merits,

because section 113(h) does not apply to constitutional challenges
to CERCLA's statutory scheme. 38 9 The Sixth Circuit rejected this

contention, holding that section 113(h) itself makes no express
provision for jurisdiction over constitutional challenges 390 and that
the legislative history of the provision confirms Congress's intent
39 1
that there be no jurisdiction prior to enforcement action by EPA.
388. Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Reilly, 927 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1991). In this case,

Barmet Aluminum Corp. ("Barmet") had disposed of secondary aluminum dross at two
sites in Kentucky. In a June 1988 proposed regulation, EPA listed the two sites on the
NPL. Barmet commented to EPA that aluminum dross was not a hazardous substance
under CERCLA. Barmet thereafter received a letter from EPA indicating EPA's belief that
Barmet was a responsible party and suggesting that Barmet conduct a study of remedies
at one of the sites. EPA subsequently gave Barmet formal notice that it was a PRP for that
site. Id. at 290.
389. Id. at 292.
390. Id. at 293 ("Notably, the statutory language of section 9613(h) does not include
any explicit provision for constitutional challenges."). Accord Reardon v. United States,
731 F. Supp. 558, 567 (D. Mass. 1990) (declaring that plain language of section 113(h)
"divests all federal courts from jurisdiction subject to its express provisions. By implication,
this section specifically bars any federal court from asserting federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 which would include possible constitutional challenges."), rev'd in
part, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc).
391. Barmet, 927 F.2d at 293 (citing S. REP. No. 11, supra note 110, at 58). The
court was also predisposed to hold that jurisdiction was barred, see 927 F.2d at 292, because,
prior to the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), the court had held in J.V. Peters & Co., v.
Administrator, EPA, 767 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1985), that CERCLA barred preenforcement
review of a PRP's due process claim.
After concluding that CERCLA foreclosed jurisdiction over the constitutional claim
Barmet sought to raise, the court rejected Barmet's argument that Congress lacks power
to restrict jurisdiction in a manner that violates litigants' due process rights. Barmet, 927
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This decision is consistent with the decision in South Macomb
Disposal Authority v. United States EPA, 392 which considered

"whether the 1986 Amendments deprive this court of hearing a
constitutional challenge to the statutory scheme as a whole" prior
to enforcement by EPA. 393 The court held that such review was
foreclosed by relying first upon the plain meaning of section
113(h): 394 "Reading the language of sec. 9613(h) [foreclosing jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331] for its everyday meaning supports
the notion that this subsection prohibits constitutional as well as
statutory challenges until the time proscribed [sic] by the
395
statute.
The court also viewed its decision as consistent with the
legislative history, which the court believed demonstrated congressional approval of a district court decision prior to the enactment
of the 1986 Amendments that had held that CERCLA barred preenforcement review of constitutional claims. 396 The South Macomb
F.2d at 294. The court viewed the post-remedy hearing that CERCLA accorded Barmet as
adequate, because it allowed Barmet to contest liability and to claim that the cleanup
measures EPA employed were not consistent with the NCP. Id.
The district court had also relied on the text and legislative history of section 113(h)
and held that there was no preenforcement jurisdiction over the PRP's constitutional claim.
Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Thomas, 730 F. Supp. 771, 774 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (citations
omitted), aff'd, 927 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1991). Notwithstanding this conclusion, the district
court appeared to consider at least superficially Barmet's due process claim and rejected
that claim on the merits. See id. at 774 (declaring EPA's invitation to participate in RI/MS
"places ...parties in the difficult position of assessing their chances in a future law suit,
[but] this dilemma is not a violation of due process. On the contrary, it presents parties
with an opportunity to reduce their potential liability.").
392. 681 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
393. Id. at 1245. This case involved two NPL-listed landfills that were operated by
the plaintiff. Id. EPA wrote to the South Macomb Disposal Authority ("Authority") and
other PRPs to suggest that they proceed with an RI/FS and to inform them that, in the
absence of such action, EPA itself would perform the RI/FS using Superfund monies. Id.
at 1246. The Authority later supplied EPA with information EPA had requested and informed EPA that it was proposing to conduct the RIIFS. EPA responded that the Authority's RI/MS was inadequate and that EPA would delay any remedial action until after an
adequate RI/FS was completed. Id. The Authority did not respond to this communication
and instead brought action in district court. Id. EPA thereafter wrote to the Authority and
other PRPs stating that, because it had not received any good faith offer to perform the
RI/FS, EPA would itself undertake that project. Id.
394. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).
395. South Macomb, 681 F. Supp. at 1249-50. The court also stated in this regard
that "neither in its brief nor at oral argument did the plaintiff contend that its suit fell within
one of the five exceptions to subsection (h)" that would have provided immediate jurisdiction for the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 1249.
396. Id. at 1250-51. The court quoted from the following legislative history:
Response actions or orders under section 104 and orders under section 106
may be subject to judicial review at the time the government seeks cost
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court's effort to give its decision an aura of certitude by relying
on legislative history fails, however, because the legislative history

is no clearer than the statute's terms. 397 First, as the district court

itself recognized, 398 before CERCLA was amended in 1986 to include section 113(h), courts had generally foreclosed preenforcement review of CERCLA claims because of concerns about delayed cleanups, 399 but disagreed on the question of whether
CERCLA foreclosed preenforcement review of constitutional
claims. 400 Indeed, the South Macomb court stated its conclusion
recovery or acts to enforce the order and collect penalties for noncompliance.
This amendment clarifies and confirms that response actions and orders are
not subject to judicial review prior to that time.
As several courts have noted, the scheme and purposes of CERCLA
would be disrupted by affording review of orders and response actions prior
to commencement of a government enforcement or cost recovery action. See,
e.g., Lone Pine Steering Committee v. EPA, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1118
[sic] (D.N.J. January 21, 1985). These cases correctly interpret CERCLA with
regard to the unavailability of pre-enforcement review. This amendment is to
expressly recognize that pre-enforcement review would be a significant obstacle
to the implementation of response actions and the use of administrative orders.
Pre-enforcement review would lead to considerable delay in providing cleanups, would increase response costs, and would discourage settlements and
voluntary cleanups.
S. REP. No. 11, supra note 110 at 58.
The district court commented, "[it is noteworthy that the Senate Committee specif[Tihe court in that case held that the plaintiff could bring
ically referred to Lone Pine....
neither constitutional challenges nor statutory challenges." South Macomb, 681 F. Supp.
at 1251. This was the same legislative history that the Sixth Circuit relied upon in Barmet
Aluminum Corp. v. Reilly, 927 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1991), to support its conclusion that
jurisdiction over the constitutional claim was barred. Id. at 293. The district court in
Reardon v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 558 (D. Mass. 1990) ("Reardon 1"), rev'd in part,
947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc), also gave great weight to this portion of the Senate
Report. Because that Report affirmatively cited the district court decision in Lone Pine,
which "held that the plaintiff could bring neither constitutional nor statutory challenges
until the EPA brought an enforcement action under CERCLA," 731 F. Supp. at 567 (citation
omitted), the district court in Reardon i decided that the Senate Report "clearly implied
that section 113(h) was to preclude constitutional as well as statutory claims from judicial
review." Id. The court viewed the Report's citation to Lone Pine as "particularly telling of
Congress' intent to preclude constitutional as well as statutory claims." Reardon 1, 731 F.
Supp. at 567 n.9.
The court's reliance on a citation included in legislative history is not unprecedented.
See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1989) (concluding that court is bound to

follow results in lower court fee decisions because decisions were cited in Committee
Report). But see id. at 98-99 (Scalia, J., concurring) (sharply criticizing majority's use of
legislative history in analysis).
397. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 106, at 129 ("[There are risks of ambiguity, overinclusiveness, and underinclusiveness in relying on legislative intent, just as in relying on [a
statute's] text and purpose.").
398. South Macomb, 681 F. Supp. at 1248.
399. The leading cases reaching this conclusion are discussed supra part III.A.
400. See South Macomb, 681 F. Supp. at 1248.
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that "[t]he majority position . . . held that while statutory chal-

lenges to an EPA administrative order were precluded prior to an
enforcement suit for reimbursement, a PRP could challenge the
constitutionality of individual provisions of CERCLA. ' ' 40 1 Given
this disagreement among courts about when a plaintiff may raise
constitutional claims, the South Macomb court engaged in an overinterpretation of the Senate Report's citation when it inferred
that the Report supported a rule that barred early review of constitutional claims.
The most natural reading of the Senate Report suggests that
the case cited was one of a number of cases holding that review
of illegality claims under CERCLA should be barred until either
40 2
government enforcement or a cost recovery action is initiated.
The First Circuit's analysis in Reardon v. United States supports
this reading. 403 That court did not think the case cited by the Senate
Report specifically addressed whether CERCLA foreclosed jurisdiction over constitutional claims, and therefore it concluded that
the case had little precedential value. 404
The decisions holding that CERCLA bars preenforcement jurisdiction of constitutional claims have relied on the plain terms
of section 113(h) and its legislative history. 40 5 The decisions have
not, however, offered convincing arguments in support of constitutional claim preclusion.

401. Id.

402. Indeed, the Senate Report precedes the citation to the district court decision in
Lone Pine with a "See, e.g.," signal. S. REP. No. 11, supra note 110, at 58 (quoted at

supra note 396).
403. 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc) ("Reardon IF').
404. See id. at 1516.

405. The South Macomb court also reached the question whether Congress had
authority to foreclose jurisdiction of constitutional challenges to CERCLA response actions.
The court held that, "because CERCLA affords a PRP an opportunity to bring its constitutional challenges when the EPA brings an action against it, Congress has properly exercised its power to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts." South Macomb, 681

F. Supp. at 1252. The district court in ReardonI, which also held that CERCLA foreclosed
preenforcement judicial review, reached a contrary conclusion on the question of congressional authority. It held that "the limitations on Congress' powers to describe federal
jurisdiction dictate that section 113(h) not limit this Court's authority to review the Reardons' constitutional claim. This Court must retain jurisdiction of this case for the limited
purpose of reviewing section 107() for procedural due process infirmities." Reardon 1, 731

F. Supp. at 570 (footnote omitted). This issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
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B. Interpretationby Conclusory Holding: Cases Allowing
PreenforcementReview of ConstitutionalClaims

In a second group of cases, courts have been willing to decide
on the merits constitutional claims raised both by PRPs and by
other claimants prior to EPA enforcement actions and implementation of the response action. Notably, the courts in these cases
have failed to grapple with the underlying issue of statutory construction and have set forth no persuasive rationale for deciding
these constitutional claims on the merits.
In Schalk v. Reilly, 40 6 after deciding that section 113(h) fore-

closed review of plaintiffs' claims of illegality under CERCLA and
NEPA, 40 7 the Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' due process
claim on the merits without addressing the question of jurisdiction. 408 A number of district court decisions share the analytic
shortcomings the Schalk v. Reilly court exhibited in its unsupported decision to hear constitutional claims on the merits. These

district court cases involve constitutional claims raised both by
PRPs 40 9 and by other affected citizens. 410 In deciding the consti-

tutional claims posed by plaintiffs, these courts have not even felt
the need to rely on the Second Circuit's strategy 41' of assuming
jurisdiction so as not to have to decide a difficult question of
412
statutory construction.
406. 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Frey v. Reilly, IlI S. Ct. 509 (1990).
407. These aspects of the case are discussed supra at notes 185-191 (CERCLA
claims) & 362-369 (NEPA claims) and accompanying text.
408. Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d at 1097-98.
409. See Environmental Waste Control, Inc. v. Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry, 763 F. Supp. 1576, 1579-80 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (concluding that "[the court]

lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the Health Assessment at this time" (citations
omitted), yet considering and rejecting on the merits plaintiffs' claim that inadequate

procedures leading to publication of the health assessment deprived them of due process
rights); United States v. M. Genzale Plating, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 877, 885 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
(rejecting due process challenges on the merits both as to the NPL listing and the preclusion
of pre-enforcement review).
410. See Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v. Reilly, 716 F. Supp. 828, 83537 (D.N.J. 1989) (declining to review EPA's Record of Decision for illegalities, but rejecting
on merits claim "that EPA denied plaintiff's members due process in selecting a remedy
for the GEMS landfill").
411. The Second Circuit had adopted this strategy in Browning-Ferris Industries of
South Jersey v. Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1990). See supra notes 329-340.
412. The difficult question of statutory interpretation at issue here did not exist prior
to the enactment of § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). Before SARA was enacted, a court
could merely hold that jurisdiction over a plaintiff's constitutional claim was available
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) as a "controvers[y] arising under this chapter." See Wagner
Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[W]hile declining to review the
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Although these courts uniformly failed to articulate why jurisdiction over the constitutional claims was available in view of the

broad language of section 113(h) that "[n]o Federal court shall
have jurisdiction under Federal law . . . ,",413 the result that the
courts have reached may be explained by reference to two important principles of statutory construction. It should be noted, however, that these courts failed to provide such a rationale for their
holdings, and thus their approach subverts the role of the judiciary
414
in the lawmaking process.

First, these courts might have decided that CERCLA does
not foreclose preenforcement review of constitutional claims by
employing a clear statement rule and by foregoing "the ordinary
process" of statutory interpretation. That ordinary process is one
of "projection and imputation," whereby a court avoids any "free,
non-institutional consideration of the import or validity of the
result arrived at through the process of projection and imputation.

Indeed [the ordinary] process consists of attuning the mind to a
vision comparable to that possessed by the legislature.

'41 5

record on the merits in order to decide whether appellant has a meritorious act of God
defense, there is jurisdiction to consider claims that CERCLA is unconstitutional. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(b)."); see also Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. United States EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 887
(3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting plaintiffs' constitutional claim on merits without addressing jurisdiction issue), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986); see generally SCA Servs. of Indiana,
Inc. v. Thomas, 634 F. Supp. 1355 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (holding that court has pre-enforcement
jurisdiction over constitutional claims); Industrial Park Devel. Co. v. EPA, 604 F. Supp.
1136, 1140 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Aminoil, Inc. v. United States EPA, 599 F. Supp. 69, 72 (C.D.
Cal. 1984). SARA amended 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) so that it now states that, "[e]xcept as
provided in subsection . . . (h) of this section, the United States district courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies arising under this chapter." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(b) (emphasis added).
The case of Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. United States EPA, 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.
1987), is a hybrid case in that section 113(h) had not been enacted at the time the district
court considered the plaintiff's constitutional claim on the merits. By the time of the
appellate decision, however, the provision had been enacted. See id. at 386 n.l. The court
of appeals provided no analysis in support of its conclusion that jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's constitutional claim was available, even though the court also concluded that
CERCLA barred preenforcement review of the plaintiff's statutory challenge to a § 106
order. See id. at 386.
413. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).
414. See Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the
Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, supra note 277, at 14 ("A decision by assertion
has greatly reduced significance as part of the next problem's setting, and, given the value
of articulation in the process of reasoning, is more likely to be ill-advised."); Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 106, at 383 ("[A] candid explication of the reasoning process promises
to narrow and highlight the elements in dispute and fosters a deliberative dialogue about
statutory meaning in a concrete circumstance.").
415. Wellington & Albert, supra note 118, at 1559. The political and jurisprudential
bases for the "ordinary process" of construing statutes are discussed supra notes 106, 109
& 118.
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Rather than pursue this course, which would likely lead to a
conclusion of no jurisdiction given the broad terms of section
113(h), the courts could have required an even clearer statement
of no jurisdiction based on the canon that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional issues.416 "[I]n requiring Congress
emphatically to decide certain issues," this clear statement rule

means that the court must "reject or ignore at least a portion of
congressionalintent as that intent is derived from legislative purpose. ' 41 7 By taking this approach to section 113(h) and applying

this canon of construction, the court arrives at a different legal
conclusion than would4 1otherwise
be reached by the ordinary pro8
cess of interpretation.
Although the clear statement rule has sometimes been subject
to criticism, 419 the rule is "founded upon institutional values that
are not accounted for in the ordinary process of projection and
imputation. '420 Most importantly, the rule reinforces the primacy
of the legislature in making political judgments that have significance for the electorate 42' and ensures that legislators are account416. E.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989);
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988); see Wellington & Albert, supra note 118, at 1560 n.42 (discussing
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953), where Court
narrowly construed statutory provision to avoid a constitutional issue, notwithstanding
legislative history that supported broad reading of provision).
417. Wellington & Albert, supra note 118, at 1559 (emphasis added).
418. Thus, Dean Wellington discusses how, in order to avoid a constitutional question, the Court had to construe a statute in a way that "prohibited unions from using money
obtained from dissenting employees for purposes that realistically cannot be said to raise
serious constitutional difficulties." Harry H. Wellington, Machinists v. Street: Statutory
Interpretation and the Avoidance of ConstitutionalIssues, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 49, 67. The
Court would not have construed the statute in that manner if the statute had not otherwise
raised a constitutional issue. Dean Wellington suggests, however, that a court should not
abandon ordinary principles of statutory construction in order to avoid a constitutional
issue when the court can reasonably anticipate that it will shortly be unable to avoid
deciding the same constitutional issue in another case. Id. at 70.
419. See Posner, supra note 106, at 814-16 ("The practical effect of interpreting
statutes to avoid raising constitutional questions is therefore to enlarge the already vast
reach of constitutional prohibition beyond even the most extravagant modern interpretation
of the Constitution ....
).
420. Wellington & Albert, supra note 118, at 1559 (footnote omitted).
421. Dean Wellington provides the following rationale for the clear statement rule:
Before governmental restriction upon individual freedom is held to be either
unconstitutional or constitutional, it should be absolutely clear to a majority
of the Supreme Court that Congress has faced the issue squarely and determined clearly that in its judgment it was necessary to impose the restriction
...
. Is not this canon of statutory interpretation really a corollary of the
doctrine of judicial self-restraint in constitutional adjudication?

90
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able to the voters .422 Another way to conceptualize the clear statement rule is to analogize it to the principle that statutes when
possible should be construed so that they are consistent with basic
meta-principles .423

A second, and decidedly less significant, reason why courts
may be deciding that CERCLA allows jurisdiction over constitutional claims is a concern that the contrary holding would necessitate a conclusion that section 113(h) is unconstitutional 424 and a
decision about severability would then be required. 425 The latter
decision places the court directly in a position where the court
alone must weigh the underlying statutory policies 42 6 without any

Wellington, supra note 418, at 62 (footnotes omitted); see generally William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: ClearStatement Rules as Constitutional
Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1992).
422. See Wellington & Albert, supra note 118, at 1560, where the authors state that:
The most familiar situation in which th[e clear statement] canon is operative
is where the Court is confronted with a federal statute that would raise serious
constitutional questions if interpreted in the manner most consistent with its
underlying purpose. Where this is the case, it seems generally appropriate for
the Court to construe the statute in a way that does not pose the constitutional
issue, unless it is inescapably clear that Congress itself directly confronted the
situation before the Court and spoke unequivocally. The elected branches of
government should have a responsibility to the people to determine explicitly
and for the record that constitutionally questionable action is, in their opinion,
necessary action.
Id.
423. Professor Sunstein states that:
The aggressive construction of questionable statutes, removing them from the
terrain of constitutional doubt, can be understood as a less intrusive way of
vindicating norms that do in fact have constitutional status ....

An approach

of this sort ensures a greater degree of compliance with constitutional norms,
taking account ofjudicial underenforcement and requiring congressional deliberation on troublesome issues.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 106, at 165. The significance of meta-principles in interpreting statutes
is discussed supra at notes 118-123.
424. Indeed, one court has concluded that Congress has no authority to foreclose
early review of constitutional claims in the CERCLA context. See supra note 405.
425. For a recent Supreme Court decision on severability, see Alaska Airlines v.
Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1987).
426. See Froomkin, supra note 106, at 1092 ("A pluralist theory cannot explain the
Court's severability rulings, because severing risks ripping quid from quo.... To this day,
the Court has never offered a constitutionally satisfactory explanation of its severability
decisions."); Popkin, supra note 106, at 609-10 (noting that policy is directly introduced
into the equation when a court has held that a statute is unconstitutional and then must
decide what to do with the statute).
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basis for deciding how the legislature would decide the question
of policy.

427

Courts have generally reviewed constitutional claims that both
PRPs and affected citizens have raised prior both to completion

of a response action, or of a discrete phase of the response, and
to an enforcement or cost recovery action by EPA. Although these
courts have not provided any rationale for their decisions, possible
bases can be inferred. The next section of the Article considers a
recent decision that has sought to identify reasons why limited
preenforcement review of constitutional claims should be
permitted.
C. A Move Beyond Section 113(h)'s Text and Legislative
History: Is CERCLA Sufficiently Ambiguous to Allow a Court to
Hold that CERCLA Does Not Bar Preenforcement Review of

Some ConstitutionalClaims?
In Reardon v. United States,428 the First Circuit, sitting en
banc, considered whether section 113(h) barred federal court jurisdiction of the plaintiffs' claim "that EPA's imposition of the
[CERCLA] lien without a hearing violated the due process clause
of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.

'429

The

court resolved this issue by relying first on one of the basic strat427. See, e.g., Popkin, supra note 106, at 614 n.314 ("a court may have no way of
knowing what the historical legislature would do 'if certain provisions found to be invalid
were excised."' (citation omitted)). Although CERCLA does provide that "the remainder
of this chapter shall not be affected" by a decision that "any provision of this chapter...
is... invalid," 42 U.S.C. 9657, the Supreme Court has held that such a severability clause
is not binding, but "creates a presumption that Congress did not intend the validity of the
statute in question to depend on the validity of the constitutionally offensive provision."
Alaska Airlines, Inc., 480 U.S. at 686 (citations omitted).
428. 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc) ("Reardon Ir').
429. Id. at 1511. The CERCLA lien had been imposed pursuant to § 107(), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(0. See Reardon 11, 947 F.2d at 1511. The Reardons also raised two statutory claims
contending that the lien violated the terms of CERCLA because they were not liable for
CERCLA response costs and the lien covered too much property. See id.
The United States had not disputed the district court's decision in Reardon v. United
States, 731 F. Supp. 558 (D. Mass. 1990), rev'd in part,Reardon II, that CERCLA permitted
federal court jurisdiction of the constitutional claim. Appellees' Petition for Rehearing with
Suggestion for Rehearing En Bane at 12 n.9, Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st
Cir. 1991) (No. 90-1319) (on file with the HarvardEnvironmental Law Review) (United

States stating that, "[g]iven the narrowness of the district court's holding, we have concluded that review of the due process issue, in the circumstances of this case, does not
contravene the intent of Congress in enacting Section 113(h)."). The United States did not,
however, provide additional analysis in support of its position.
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egies available to a court that wishes to construe section 113(h)
narrowly: the court concluded that the plaintiffs' challenge did not
come within the provision because the constitutional claim did not
relate to EPA's "administration 430 of the statute and the plaintiffs
accordingly were not seeking review of a "challenge[] to removal
'431
or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title.
Having concluded that the constitutional claim did not come
within the plain terms of section 113(h), the court relied on the
clear statement rule 432 to hold that review of the plaintiffs' preenforcement claim was not barred. 433 The court stated, however, that
preenforcement review was not available for all constitutional
claims. The court held that Congress's statement of its intent to
foreclose review of the Reardons' constitutional claim was not
sufficiently clear, because:
extending jurisdiction to the Reardons' due process claim does
not necessarily run counter to the purposes underlying
430. Reardon 11, 947 F.2d at 1514 (emphasis omitted).
431. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). The court stated that the plaintiffs' due process claim
challenging the CERCLA lien provision
does not fit into the literal language of sec. 9613(h) .

. .

. Under our reading,

[the section] divests federal courts of jurisdiction over challenges to EPA's
administrationof the statute-claims that EPA did not "select[ ]" the proper
"removal or remedial action," in light of the standards and constraints established by the CERCLA statutes. The Reardons' due process claim is not a
challenge to the way EPA is administering the statute; it does not concern the
merits of any particularremoval or remedial action. Rather, it is a challenge
to the CERCLA statute itself-to a statutory scheme under which the government is authorized to file lien notices without any hearing on the validity of
the lien.
Reardon II, 947 F.2d at 1514 (emphasis added). Although the court's analysis focused on
the express terms of CERCLA, the court also discussed the legislative history of the
provision later in the decision and rejected the view that SARA's legislative history demonstrates congressional intent that pre-enforcement review of constitutional claims is
barred. See id. at 1515-16.
432. This rule and the underlying rationale for it are discussed supra notes 416-423
and accompanying text.
433. The court stated that:
[w]e do not believe that the statute expresses a clear congressional intent to
preclude the type of constitutional claim the Reardons are making-a challenge
to several statutory provisions which form part of CERCLA . . . . We find
only that a constitutional challenge to the CERCLA statute is not covered by
sec. 9613(h).
Reardon 11, 947 F.2d at 1514-15.
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§ 9613(h). For example, resolution of the due process issue
does not require any information that is not likely to be available until clean-up of a site is finished. Because it is a purely
legal issue, its resolution in a pre-enforcement proceeding does
not have the potential to force EPA to confront inconsistent
results (as would a finding, for example, that a particular spill
was caused by an act of God) . ... 434

Stated alternatively, the Reardon II court concluded that the
language and intent of CERCLA were sufficiently clear to foreclose preenforcement review of certain constitutional claims, but
not others. According to the court, CERCLA specifically forecloses preenforcement review of a constitutional claim when the
claim is based on EPA's administration of a particular cleanup and
litigating the claim would necessitate inquiry into the facts related
435

to that cleanup.
Unlike the decisions by other courts allowing federal court
jurisdiction of constitutional claims prior to government enforcement or completion of the cleanup, the Reardon II court sought
to identify a principled basis for distinguishing among constitutional claims related to CERCLA cleanups and for allowing immediate jurisdiction of some of those claims. The Reardon II

decision provides a strong argument in support of its rule, because
its argument is grounded in the language and intent of CERCLA
436
as well as in the basic principles of statutory interpretation.
434. Id. at 1515.

435. Id. at 1517. In addition to relying upon the language and intent of CERCLA,
the court also sought to support its decision to distinguish among constitutional claims by
analogizing the case at issue to McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 888 (1991).
See Reardon II, 947 F.2d at 1517. The court viewed McNary as identifying a distinction
between constitutional claims related to the administration of a statute in a particular case
(no jurisdiction) and to the statute itself (jurisdiction allowed). See Reardon 11, 947 F.2d at
1517. The Reardon court's distinction also is supported by Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 241-44
(1968). There, Justice Harlan concluded that the claim being asserted was outside the scope
of the review preclusion provision because the claim was one of procedural invalidity. See
id. at 241. As such, the claim did not "present opportunity for protracted delay" by
necessitating the review of disputed facts, but did present a claim within the special
competence of courts. Id. at 241-43.
436. Analysis of the Reardon II court's decision on the merits of the constitutional
claim-that the CERCLA lien provision violates the due process clause-is beyond the
scope of this Article. The court's due process analysis is summarized and critiqued in
Recent Case, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1420 (1992).

HarvardEnvironmentalLaw Review

[Vol. 17:1

VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the broad and categorical language of section 113(h),

courts have reached a variety of conclusions about the extent to
which CERCLA forecloses review in each of the broad types of
cases examined. This Article has proposed a legal solution for
each of the various categories of cases in which the courts consider
the availability of immediate review. In addition, it has outlined
strategies for interpreting CERCLA that are designed to enable
the courts to perform their quasi-legislative function in interpreting
437
section 113(h) more effectively.

This judicial role, however, is auxiliary to the lawmaking role
Congress needs to exercise by amending section 113(h) to permit

on its face a greater range of responses by courts. The current
statute's categorical language improperly constrains the courts'

ability to fashion the best legal solution to CERCLA cases in two
ways.
First, the terms of section 113(h) are now too categorical and
broad to tolerate easily the various constructions adopted by
courts, and suggested by this Article, in different litigation contexts. Because the best interpretations of section 113(h) are motivated by a variety of strong statutory and constitutional values
that courts are unwilling to believe were wholly trumped by the
CERCLA value of prompt cleanups, the statute should be
amended to allow the jurisdiction that courts must now exercise
in the face of CERCLA's contrary plain language. Amendment of
the statute will enhance its legitimacy, which is now being undermined by the difference between what the statute says and how
courts are (and often should be) interpreting the statute. 438
Second, in its current form, section 113(h) too many times
leads courts to reach reflexive conclusions in the face of its broad
and categorical language. Particularly with regard to CERCLA
claims that implementation of a response action threatens human
health, many courts view the statute's terms as an insurmountable
437. See Wellington & Albert, supra note 118, at 1550 ("Judicial legislation is a
necessary condition of the legal system because legislatures deal with problems prospec-

tively, cannot foresee all they deal with, and cannot resolve all they do foresee."); see also
SUNSTEIN, supra note 106, at Ill ("It is through interpretation, in the courts and the
executive branch, that regulatory improvements, interstitial to be sure, can be brought
about most easily.").
438. See supra note 106 (discussing how a plain meaning approach to statutory

construction is supported by a concern about legitimacy).
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barrier topreimplementation review. An automatic refusal to exercise jurisdiction in such cases will likely occur more frequently
as the judiciary becomes increasingly textualistic in its approach
to statutory construction. 439 In other contexts, however, the broad,
uncalibrated language of section 113(h) results in reflexive judgments that preenforcement review is available based on an apparent belief that the language cannot mean what it says. Courts may
respond in this way when a claimant relies on another statute or
the Constitution for prompt adjudication.
In all such cases, the courts err in failing to consider what
this Article has mapped as the most sensible application of section
113(h). Courts should refuse review when PRPs bring actions
against EPA to adjudicate any issues of CERCLA liability prior
to a cost recovery action. But district court review should be
available when plaintiffs claim that the process of implementing a
remedial plan will itself significantly threaten public health and the
environment, and when other statutory or constitutional policies
outweigh the interest in foreclosing CERCLA review prior to implementation or enforcement. This Article has argued that the
request for jurisdiction in particular cases will necessitate careful
decisionmaking by courts that accounts for such statutory and
constitutional values.
An amended statute thus should expressly grant the courts
discretion to weigh the values implicated in a particular case, since
Congress will likely conclude that it is impossible to legislate prospectively a rule capable of accommodating all of the competing
statutory policies at issue. 440 The amended statute should maintain,
however, a strong and absolute rule of review preclusion when
PRPs bring actions against EPA to adjudicate issues of CERCLA
liability prior to a cost recovery action or another enforcement
action.
Amending CERCLA in this manner will legitimate the courts'
efforts to interpret and apply the statute and will encourage judicial
decisionmaking to be undertaken more openly and analytically.
Moreover, amending CERCLA will specifically recognize the important role that courts necessarily play in deciding whether early
review of CERCLA response actions should be available.
439. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv.

621 (1990).
440. See supra notes 106, 118.

